Empirical support for the adaptive and maladaptive functions of autobiographical memory by Burnell, Ryan
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
 
Empirical support for the adaptive and maladaptive functions of 
autobiographical memory 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
at 
The University of Waikato 
by 
Ryan Burnell 
 
 
2021 
 
  2  
Abstract 
Autobiographical memories are hypothesised to serve at least three functions: they direct 
people’s behaviour, inform their identity, and facilitate social bonding. But most of the research 
on these three functions has focused on how memories serve them in ways that are adaptive—in 
fact, we know little about how memories might serve functions in ways that are maladaptive. We 
also know little about the factors that drive memories to serve functions in adaptive or 
maladaptive ways. Across four sets of experiments, we1 investigated both the extent to which 
memories serve maladaptive functions and the factors that drive memories to serve functions in 
adaptive or maladaptive ways. We found that people’s positive memories are primarily adaptive, 
whereas their negative memories serve a mix of adaptive and maladaptive functions. In addition, 
we found that the more a memory is associated with a sense of reliving, the more adaptive it 
tends to be. Finally, we found evidence that it is not necessary for people to have personally 
experienced an event, nor for them to believe an event really happened, in order for the memory 
of that event to serve functions. Considered together, these data highlight the need for 
researchers to take more nuanced view of the functions of autobiographical memory and 
demonstrate the importance of measures that separate adaptive and maladaptive functions. 
 
1 Here, my use of the word “we” reflects that, although the research in this thesis is my own, I 
conducted it in a lab where I supervised a team comprised of undergraduate and Honours 
students. I also received advice and direction from my supervisors. For those reasons, I often use 
the words “our” and “we” in this thesis. Elsewhere in this thesis, I use the word “we” in a 
different sense; for example, to refer to what is or is not known in the wider scientific 
community. 
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Outline of the thesis 
The first chapter of this thesis provides an overview of the literature on the functions 
served by autobiographical memories, and outlines the rationale for the manuscripts presented in 
this thesis. Chapters 2 through 5 present the results of our research in the form of four 
manuscripts published in or submitted to peer-reviewed academic journals. Chapter 2 presents 
our first manuscript, published in Memory. Chapter 3 presents our second manuscript, published 
in the Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Chapter 4 presents our third 
manuscript, submitted February 6, 2021, and under review at Memory & Cognition. Chapter 5 
presents our fourth and final manuscript, submitted February 10, 2021, and under review at the 
Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Finally, Chapter 6 integrates the findings 
from these four manuscripts and discusses their contributions to the literature. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Memory plays a vital role in people’s lives. Without the ability to remember information, 
people would be wandering around with no idea who they are, what they are supposed to be 
doing, or where they left their keys (Sherry & Schacter, 1987). But there is more to memory than 
just a collection of facts about the world. People also remember specific events that happened to 
them, often accompanied by a vivid sense of reliving (Tulving, 1972). These vivid, specific 
memories are known in the literature as autobiographical memories. 
Autobiographical memory 
Autobiographical memories have long been of interest to philosophers and psychologists. 
In fact, the study of these memories can be traced all the way back to Aristotle’s De Memoria 
(Ross, 2014). Aristotle noted that people can bring to mind the “sensations” of previous 
experiences—a clear reference to what we would now call autobiographical memories. Many 
other philosophers, such as Locke and Hume, also discussed people’s memories for personal 
experiences, and made a distinction between these autobiographical memories and general 
knowledge (see Herrmann, 1982 for a review). 
More recently, discussions of autobiographical memory can be found in the works of 
early psychologists in the late 19th century. Galton, for instance, described in detail the various 
characteristics of his own recollections, including the sensory images that accompanied them 
(Galton, 1883). For example, in commenting on the mental image of his breakfast table, he noted 
that it was “fairly clear, but not quite so bright as the reality.” William James, too, discussed 
autobiographical memory at length in The Principles Of Psychology, suggesting at one point that 
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“Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be dated in my past. In 
other words, I must think that I directly experienced its occurrence” (James, 1890, p. 650). Here, 
James is outlining one of the key features of autobiographical memories: that people believe the 
events really happened to them. 
Not long after, Colgrove examined a subset of autobiographical memories that would 
come to be known as “flashbulb” memories (Colegrove, 1899). He asked subjects to describe 
their memory of Lincoln’s assassination, and found that people’s accounts tended to be highly 
vivid and detailed. Like Galton and James, Colgrove pointed out that these memories were often 
accompanied by both visual images and belief. 
Even Freud was interested in autobiographical memory, proposing that painful memories 
are repressed or pushed into the unconscious where they continue to exert an influence on 
people’s mood and behavior (Freud, 1915). Although the evidence does not support Freud’s 
theories of repression, the central role of these ideas in his psychoanalytic theories highlights the 
importance of autobiographical memory to the thinkers of the time (Loftus, 1991). 
But with the rise of behaviorism in the early 20th century, the study of people’s mental 
experiences—including autobiographical memories—largely fell by the wayside (Brennan, 
2014). It was not until the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 60s brought the study of mental 
experience back to the forefront of psychological science that research addressing 
autobiographical memories began to reappear. For instance, in one seminal paper, Tulving 
(1972) distinguished between factual semantic memories and episodic memories of specific 
events that are accompanied by a sense of reliving. In that paper, Tulving argued that we need to 
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understand (and therefore study) both episodic and semantic memories if we want to fully 
understand how memory works.  
Two years later, Crovitz and Schiffman (1974) published one of the earliest empirical 
studies of autobiographical memories. In this study, which drew on Galton’s work, people were 
asked to describe autobiographical memories that came to mind in response to various cue 
words. There was a “recency effect” such that memories of recent events tended to come to mind 
more frequently than memories of distant events. This landmark study inspired a body of work 
that has employed similar methods (Franklin & Holding, 1977; Rubin, 1982). For instance, one 
study used the word-cue method to show that this recency effect can be found across people of 
various different age groups. A subsequent word-cue study suggested that recency alone cannot 
fully explain the distribution of people’s memories—the results demonstrated that people tend to 
remember more memories from their late teens and twenties than a recency effect would predict. 
This phenomenon has come to be known as the reminiscence bump, and is still being 
investigated today (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Tekcan et al., 2017; Wolf & Zimprich, 2020). In 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, calls to investigate memory as it occurs in “everyday life” helped 
the study of autobiographical memory gain increasing momentum (Bruce, 1985; Neisser, 1978). 
And from the considerable work that has been done in the decades that followed, we now know 
much about the characteristics of people’s autobiographical memories. 
Characteristics of autobiographical memories 
As Aristotle noted more than 2000 years ago, one of the key characteristics of autobiographical 
memories is that they are often accompanied by a sense of reliving—the sights, sounds, 
emotions, and other sensations from the event come to mind, and the event is “replayed” in the 
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mind’s eye almost as though one is “mentally time traveling” back to it (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997; Tulving, 1972, 1983). This mental time travel sometimes takes a first-person perspective, 
as though people are re-watching what happened through their own eyes. Other times, people 
relive the event from a third-person perspective, as though they were an observer watching from 
a nearby vantage point (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Talarico & Rubin, 
2003). Regardless of the perspective, engaging in this mental time travel requires people to bring 
to mind the various elements that make up the memory, reconstruct both the spatial layout of the 
scene and the temporal order in which events played out, and place themselves in it (Rubin et al., 
2019). This process of reconstruction is possible because the various elements of an event are 
associated together during encoding, with the hippocampus playing a key role (Nadel & 
Moscovitch, 1997; Rubin & Umanath, 2015). 
Another key characteristic of autobiographical memories is that people believe the events 
really happened to them (Brewer, 1986; Pillemer, 1998). In fact, people tend to be confident in 
the accuracy of their autobiographical memories, and are unwilling to take effortful steps to 
verify their veracity (Nash et al., 2017; Wade et al., 2014). This confidence is not always 
justified, though. The reconstructive nature of autobiographical memories means they are 
malleable—inaccurate information can sometimes be incorporated into them (Loftus & Palmer, 
1974). To understand why, we need to consider how people distinguish between reality and 
fiction. 
According to the Source Monitoring Framework, information in memory does not tend to 
be “tagged” with where that information came from (Johnson et al., 1993). For this reason, when 
people bring to mind mental images of an event, they make judgments in the moment about 
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where these images came from—a process known as source monitoring. For instance, people 
sometimes need to decide whether an event really happened or was rather something they 
dreamed about or imagined (Johnson et al., 1988). Other times, people need to decide which 
external source a piece of information came from (“did I read that the earth is flat in the New 
York Times or in The Onion?”) or when they encountered that information (“did I read about that 
last night, or a year ago?”). 
In many cases, people make these source judgments in a relatively rapid, effortless way 
(Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). To do so, they tend to rely on the phenomenological characteristics 
of the memory itself. For instance, there is evidence that people use a heuristic that if a 
“memory” is vivid, it is likely to be real (Johnson et al., 1993). Indeed, real memories tend to be 
more vivid and detailed than “memories” of imagined or dreamed events (Johnson et al., 1993). 
But this rapid, heuristic approach to source monitoring can sometimes lead to errors. If, for 
example, the “memory” of an imagined event is highly vivid and detailed—perhaps because it 
was imagined repeatedly—people can mistake it for something that really happened (Garry et al., 
1996). But in situations in which people are highly motivated to accurately recall the past, such 
as when witnesses to a crime testify about what they saw, people can attempt to take a more 
systematic approach to source monitoring to avoid these heuristic errors. This systematic 
approach relies less on the phenomenological characteristics of the memory and more on 
reasoning, logic, and supporting memories (Johnson et al., 1988). For example, someone might 
decide his vivid “memory” of seeing Santa fly through the snow one Christmas is not real 
because he knows Santa does not exist or because a supporting memory of his family having an 
outdoor barbecue that Christmas suggests it could not have been snowing. Of course, if an 
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imagined event is highly plausible, there is still no guarantee this systematic approach will lead 
people to correctly judge the “memory” as being an imagined event (Hyman & Loftus, 1998). 
Because people sometimes make these source monitoring errors, inaccurate details can be 
incorporated into their memories (Bartlett, 1932; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Even memories of 
momentous events such as the 9/11 attacks can be wildly inaccurate, despite people being very 
confident in the accuracy of these memories (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). 
And in extreme cases, people can come to believe in entire events that never happened (Wade et 
al., 2002). For example, experimenters have led subjects to develop false memories for a wide 
range of events, from spilling punch on the bride’s mother at a wedding to being attacked by a 
dog as a child (Hyman et al., 1995; Porter et al., 1999). In the real world, too, there are many 
examples of these false memories, including false memories of events that would have been 
traumatic (Loftus, 1993). For instance, during sessions with a church counselor, a woman named 
Beth Rutherford came to believe her father had raped and impregnated her on at least two 
occasions, and that he had forced her to abort the fetuses with coat hangers (Loftus, 1997). But 
subsequent medical examinations showed that these memories were false—Rutherford was still a 
virgin and had never been pregnant. During the counseling sessions, the counselor had suggested 
to Rutherford that it was likely she had been abused as a child and that any images and dreams 
she might experience relating to sexual abuse must be real memories—suggestive techniques that 
ultimately led Rutherford to make tragic source monitoring errors. Together, this evidence 
highlights the fragile nature of autobiographical memories and shows that people’s belief in their 
memories is not always justified. 
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We also know that autobiographical memories are ever present in people’s thoughts and 
conversations. For instance, diary studies that ask people to note each time an autobiographical 
memory comes to mind suggest that people think about these memories dozens of times each day 
(Rasmussen et al., 2015; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2011). In many of these instances, the recall is 
voluntary—that is, people intentionally search for a memory and bring it to mind, perhaps 
because they think it might help them achieve their current goals (Conway, 2005). For example, 
a man looking for his keys might bring to mind the memory of arriving home the night before in 
the hope he might remember where he left them. But autobiographical memories also frequently 
come to mind in an involuntary way, brought to mind without intention by cues in the 
environment (Berntsen, 1998). For instance, smells act as powerful memory cues that can evoke 
memories from early life (Willander & Larsson, 2006). 
Of course, people do more than just think about their autobiographical memories—they 
also talk about them with others (Miller, 1994). In fact, in one study, as many as 75% of 
conversations included discussions of at least one autobiographical memory (Beike et al., 2016). 
Moreover, on any given day, people talk to others about more than half of the memorable events 
they experienced that day (Pasupathi et al., 2009). Surely, if people think and talk about their 
autobiographical memories so often, these memories must play an important role in people’s 
lives. 
Indeed, the evidence fits with this idea. Impairments in people’s ability to recall specific 
autobiographical memories are associated with a host of problems. For example, patients with 
brain damage that has impaired their ability to recall specific memories tend to have considerable 
difficulty planning for the future and functioning on a day-to-day basis (Schacter et al., 2007; 
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Talland, 1965; Tulving, 1985). Furthermore, there is evidence that even mild impairments in 
people’s ability to recall specific episodes can contribute to the development of depression 
(Williams et al., 1996). Taken together, the evidence suggests that autobiographical memories 
play an important role in people’s lives. 
Functions of autobiographical memories 
Why, though, are autobiographical memories so important? In other words, what 
functions do they serve? This important question was posed by Baddeley (1988) in his classic 
paper, “But what the hell is it for?”. In that paper, Baddeley suggested that a full understanding 
human memory must consider the functions that memory evolved to serve. After all, humans—
and their memory systems—are a product of evolution (Darwin, 1859; Neisser, 1978). Through 
the process of natural selection, “adaptive” traits that improve an individual’s chances of 
surviving to reproduce tend to become more common over time. Why? Because individuals who 
possess the adaptive trait will reproduce more than individuals who do not. Therefore, as long as 
the trait is passed down genetically from parent to child, the proportion of individuals in the 
population possessing the adaptive trait will increase over time. It is logical to conclude, then, 
that for our memory systems to have evolved as they have, they probably provided some 
adaptive benefits (Dawkins, 1976; Klein et al., 2010). For these reasons, Baddeley proposed that 
scientists should take a “functional approach” to the study of memory—that is, they should 
investigate the functions that people’s memories serve, rather than focusing solely on how 
accurate memories are under different circumstances. Such an approach would help generate 
new questions that scientists might not otherwise think to ask, and ultimately further our 
understanding of how memory affects people’s behavior in everyday life. (Bruce, 1989; Neisser, 
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1978). In the decades that have followed Baddeley’s directive, a growing body of work has 
applied these ideas to the study of autobiographical memories, investigating the functional 
significance of being able to vividly remember specific episodes from the past. 
Overview of the Three Function Model. 
Although it is impossible to say with any certainty what evolutionary functions 
autobiographical memories serve, the most widely accepted model posits that autobiographical 
memories serve three main kinds of functions: they direct people’s behaviour (the directive 
function), help people form and maintain a sense of self (the self function), and promote social 
bonding and communication (the social function; Pillemer, 1992; Bluck, 2003). Of course, this 
model is not universally accepted. There is evidence that autobiographical memories might serve 
other important functions, too, such as helping people regulate their emotions (Pasupathi, 2001). 
In addition, the relative importance of the three functions is disputed; some evidence suggests the 
directive function is the primary function of memory (Schacter et al., 2017), while other 
evidence suggests social functions are the most important (Mahr & Csibra, 2018; Neisser, 1978). 
Alternative models of functions have also been proposed. For example, one model 
suggests that instead of measuring the extent to which a memory serves each of the three 
categories of functions, we should instead measure where the functions of that memory sit along 
two independent dimensions (Webster, 2003). The first dimension of this model pits self-related 
usage against social usage—a memory at the “self” end of this dimension would be important for 
people’s sense of self, whereas a memory at the “social” end would be important for social 
connections. The second dimension pits “growth-focused” memories against “loss focused 
memories—memories at the “growth focused” end would be used to achieve one’s goals and 
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improve one’s circumstances, while memories at the “loss focused” end would be used to cope 
with losses and failures. For the purposes of this thesis, I will adopt the three-function model 
because it has the broadest empirical support and a strong theoretical foundation (Bluck & Alea, 
2011; Waters, 2014). In this thesis, I aim to advance our understanding of directive, self, and 
social functions in two main ways: first, by investigating the extent to which these functions can 
have maladaptive outcomes; and second, by examining the factors that drive autobiographical 
memories to serve functions in adaptive or maladaptive ways. 
Directive Functions 
To suggest that autobiographical memories serve a directive function is to suggest they 
guide people’s thinking and behaviour. It is hardly surprising that the ability to remember 
information is crucial for people’s capacity to make decisions and respond to their environment 
(Damasio, 1995). But there are at least three reasons why the ability to remember specific 
autobiographical memories might have advantages over and above simply remembering general 
facts about the world. 
First, specific autobiographical memories allow people to draw on information that is 
unique to a particular occurrence of an event (Pillemer, 1998). Take, for example, people who 
are trying to remember where they parked their car on a given morning. Of course, these people 
could simply rely on their general knowledge about where they typically park. But if, on this 
particular day, their usual carpark was full and they were forced to park in a different location to 
normal, that general knowledge would be of little use. In such a scenario, being able to recall the 
specific memory of parking the car that morning could save these people a great deal of time and 
effort. For this reason, it has been suggested that autobiographical memories are particularly 
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useful for remembering events that deviate from scripts or schemas that people hold (Schank, 
1990). 
Second, the sensory, temporal, and spatial details that accompany autobiographical 
memories are, in and of themselves, useful pieces of information that people can draw on to 
guide their actions (Pillemer, 1992; Schacter & Madore, 2016; Williams et al., 2007). For 
instance, for someone who witnessed a crime to provide a full account of how the crime played 
out or a description of the perpetrator’s appearance, it is important for that witness to be able to 
mentally time travel back to the event and picture the scene (Allwood, 2010; Schwartz, 2005). 
Moreover, these episodic details can serve as memory cues that help people bring to mind 
relevant memories when they are needed. Even in isolation, visual images and smells are 
powerful memory cues that can evoke even decades-old memories (Paivio, 1990; Willander & 
Larsson, 2006). Furthermore, in autobiographical memories, the various episodic elements that 
are encoded are bound together in memory. As a result, when a similar situation arises in the 
future, people can quickly bring to mind memories matching that specific combination of cues, 
often without requiring a deliberate memory search (Berntsen, 1998). This fast access to relevant 
memories makes it possible to draw on past experiences to determine the best response to the 
current situation. (Conway et al., 1992; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Schank, 1990; 
Tulving, 1985). 
Finally, episodic details provide people a way of distinguishing between memories for 
real experiences and mental images of events that did not really happen (Rubin et al., 2019; 
Tulving, 1985; Johnson et al., 1993). Because people sometimes bring to mind thoughts and 
images of events that did not occur—such as imagined future events or the contents of a dream—
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they need to “reality monitor” by making a judgment about whether those events really 
happened. Errors in reality monitoring can have severe consequences, as demonstrated by the 
tragic case of Beth Rutherford coming to believe she was raped by her father (Loftus, 1997). As I 
have discussed, one way people make these reality monitoring judgments is to consider the 
phenomenology of the memory. Memories of real events tend to be more detailed and vivid than 
“memories” of imagined or dreamed events, so people use these characteristics to distinguish 
between what is real and what is not (Johnson et al., 1988, 1993). But even “memories” of events 
that never happened can be vivid, which can lead to reality monitoring errors. Nonetheless, 
without the episodic information that accompanies autobiographical memories, it would 
probably be even more difficult for people to distinguish between reality and fiction (Brewer, 
1988; Tulving, 1985). 
For all these reasons, we might expect autobiographical memories to contribute to 
people’s ability to make decisions and solve problems, especially when those memories are 
accompanied by episodic recollection. Consistent with this idea, people often report drawing on 
specific memories when faced with problems or decisions (Bluck et al., 2005; Pillemer, 1998; 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). College students, for example, often report bringing to mind a 
specific learning experience to help them answer exam questions (Conway et al., 1997). 
Similarly, when solving hypothetical social problems, people who reported they brought to mind 
specific memories tended to have more success at solving the problems than people who did not 
(Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996). Even in sporting contexts, athletes report using specific 
memories of past failures to provide motivation (Pillemer, 1998). There is also some limited 
experimental evidence to suggest autobiographical memories guide people’s behavior—one 
experiment found that recalling a positive memory about a college leads people to be more likely 
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to recommend that college and to donate to the college instead of an alternative charity 
(Kuwabara & Pillemer, 2010). Together, these studies provide evidence that autobiographical 
memories can serve directive functions in a variety of ways. 
But autobiographical memories do more than just help people deal with immediate 
challenges—they also help people plan for the future. It is hardly surprising that future planning 
an important ability (Klein et al., 2010; Troub, 1982). Long-term endeavors, such as pursuing a 
degree or building a house, depend on people’s ability to consider what the outcomes of those 
endeavors might be in the future. Even day-to-day activities, such as packing a lunch before 
leaving for work, demonstrate the value of planning for the future. To engage in future planning, 
people often mentally travel forward in time to imagine possible futures (Tulving, 1985). Doing 
so allows people to consider how different scenarios might play out, and ultimately helps them 
decide on the best course of action (Sanson et al., 2018; Schacter, 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
1997, 2007). 
There is considerable evidence that this process of imagining possible futures relies, at 
least in part, on autobiographical memory. The general idea is that people draw on and 
recombine elements from their past experiences in order to imagine the future (Schacter et al., 
2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). For example, to decide on whether a holiday would be 
worth the cost, people might imagine what that holiday would be like. They might first imagine 
themselves on a sunny beach by bringing to mind the image of a beach from a past holiday, then 
place their friends or family in the scene by drawing on memories of how those people look and 
act. Of course, this recombination process does not necessarily happen in such an intentional, 
stepwise way. Nonetheless, the evidence is consistent with the idea that people draw on elements 
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from their memories when constructing future scenarios. For instance, studies of brain damaged 
patients demonstrate that people who have impairments in their ability to bring to mind episodic 
memories also tend to have difficulty imagining and planning for the future (Klein et al., 2002). 
In addition, neuroimaging studies have found that remembering past and imagining the future 
produce similar patterns of brain activation, which fits with the idea that the two abilities involve 
similar processes (Addis et al., 2007). Finally, future thoughts tend to have similar 
phenomenological characteristics to autobiographical memories—both can be vivid, emotional, 
and accompanied by a sense of being transported in time. Taken together, these data fit with the 
idea that autobiographical memories provide building blocks that allow people to simulate and 
plan for the future. 
Self Functions 
The second proposed function of autobiographical memory is to develop and maintain 
people’s sense of self. This sense of self—made up of people’s priorities, desires, values, and 
beliefs about themselves—can have a profound influence over people’s decision making and 
behaviour (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Take, for example, the future planning we have 
already discussed. For people to engage in useful simulations of the future, they first need to 
decide what to simulate. Ultimately, they will also need to decide what actions to take in order to 
realize (or avoid) those simulated futures. Both of these decisions will, of course, depend on 
people’s desires and goals—in other words, their sense of self (Conway, 2005). After all, 
someone who aspires to be a world champion swimmer will surely simulate different futures to 
someone who is aiming to complete a PhD. Likewise, the two will probably make different 
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decisions about how to spend their time. In this way, people’s sense of self can affect their 
thinking and behavior. 
People’s sense of self has long been theorized to depend on their autobiographical 
memories. In the late 1800s, for example, William James suggested that people’s “personal 
memories” are a crucial part of what makes them who they are—an idea that has been echoed 
ever since (Baddeley, 1988; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; James, 1890). But how might 
autobiographical memories contribute to people’s sense of self? The answer to this question is 
complex, because recent views of the self suggest that it is not one unitary construct, but a series 
of interrelated constructs (Klein, 2010; Neisser, 1988; Prebble et al., 2013). In particular, 
autobiographical memories are theorised to be important for two key aspects of the self: people’s 
self-concept and their sense of self-continuity. 
First, let us consider the self-concept, which consists of people’s beliefs about their own 
traits and personality characteristics. For example, one person might believe she is hard-working 
and organized, while another might believe she is lazy and disorganised. Intuitively, it makes 
sense that these beliefs about the self would be informed by autobiographical memories. For 
example, the memory of working long hours to finish a project on time might lead someone to 
believe that she is hard-working. Indeed, people report that one of the reasons they bring to mind 
autobiographical memories is to maintain or alter their beliefs about themselves (Bluck et al., 
2005; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). Moreover, people’s goals and worries about the future are 
often associated with important, vivid memories known as “self-defining memories” (Singer et 
al., 2013). Further evidence for the importance of autobiographical memories in the self-concept 
comes from developmental studies, which suggest that children’s ability to reminisce plays an 
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important role in the development of their self-concept (Fivush & Reese, 1992). Similarly, older 
adults with Alzheimer’s disease—a condition that impairs people’s ability to recall 
autobiographical memories—tend to be less able than healthy older adults to come up with 
descriptions of their own personality (Addis & Tippett, 2004). It is important to note, however, 
that people’s self-concept might not rely entirely on autobiographical memories. In fact, brain-
damaged patients with profound impairments in their ability to recall autobiographical memories 
are sometimes able to both retain and update their self-concept (Klein, 2010). But considered as 
a whole, the evidence suggests that autobiographical memory contributes to people’s self-
concept. 
Next, let us consider self-continuity. Self-continuity is the sense of being fundamentally 
the same person over time, such that people tend feel a connection to their past self and also to 
their imagined future selves (Sani, 2008; Troll & Skaff, 1997). That people have self-continuity 
does not mean they view themselves as unchanging over time—on the contrary, people tend to 
think they are constantly improving (Wilson & Ross, 2001). Still, this sense of connection to past 
and future selves is an important part of what leads people to feel a sense of responsibility for 
their past actions (Prebble et al., 2013; Sani, 2008). Connection to past and future selves might 
also contribute to people’s motivation to act in ways that provide long-term benefits. After all, if 
people did not feel a connection to their future self, why would they ever forgo immediate 
gratification in pursuit of long-term goals? This important sense of self-continuity is thought to 
be associated with autobiographical memory in at least two ways. First, autobiographical 
memory allows people to mentally time travel back to their past experiences. It has been 
suggested that the sense of being transported back to an event and watching it play out leads 
people to feel like their present self is connected to that event (Tulving, 1985; Wheeler et al., 
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1997). Second, autobiographical memories provide the building blocks that people use to create 
a narrative of their life story, which in turn serves as an explicit link between the present self and 
past experiences (Addis & Tippett, 2008; McAdams, 2001). Consistent with these ideas, people 
report that they bring to mind autobiographical memories when they are thinking about how they 
have changed over time (Bluck et al., 2005). 
Taken as a whole, the literature suggests that autobiographical memories contribute to 
people’s sense of self. But this relationship also goes in the other direction—that is, people’s 
sense of self affects what people remember about their past (Ross & Wilson, 2003). For instance, 
people’s current goals can cue specific memories that are relevant to or congruent with those 
goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Moreover, people’s sense of self can affect the way in 
which people remember and interpret specific memories. We have long known that memories, 
even vivid episodic ones, are not simply objective records of the past (Bartlett, 1932). Instead, 
memories are shaped by people’s beliefs, schemas, and biases (Barclay & Wellman, 1986; 
Bartlett, 1932; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). As just one example, people’s memories tend to become 
distorted over time in ways that are thought to help people maintain a positive sense of self 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008; Greenwald, 1980; Ross & Wilson, 2003). This 
evidence further demonstrates the tight connection between people’s sense of self and their 
autobiographical memories. 
Social Functions 
Up to this point, I have discussed how autobiographical memories can guide people’s own 
decisions and behaviour. But people’s chances of survival and success don’t just depend on their 
own decisions. After all, humans are social creatures, and cooperation with others affords huge 
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survival benefits Aronson (1999). For example, working together in social groups likely 
provided early humans with safety in numbers, allowed them to work together to take down large 
prey, and meant that knowledge could be transferred from one generation to the next. 
Cooperation has also allowed for successful division of labor and specialization, which have 
been vital to the success of modern society (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Even today, people go to 
great lengths to seek out attachment with others, and being ostracized from others can cause 
intense distress and anxiety (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007). 
To form and maintain these important social bonds, people need others to like and trust 
them. Autobiographical memories contribute to this goal by strengthening social bonds between 
people. For example, studies that examine conversations between dyads have found that when 
one person shares an autobiographical memory with another, both people tend to feel closer to 
one another other. (Beike et al., 2016; Laurenceau et al., 1998; Pasupathi, 2003). Moreover, 
when people are asked about the situations in which they have shared autobiographical memories 
with others, they frequently report doing so to form and or strengthen relationships with others 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011; Hyman & Faries, 1992; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). One reason 
autobiographical memories might contribute to the formation of relationships is that these 
memories convey information about who we are as a person. Therefore, by strategically sharing 
particular memories with others, people can highlight shared interests and values, or simply 
present a positive image of themselves (Hyman & Faries, 1992; Marsh & Tversky, 2004). In the 
case of already formed relationships, talking about memories of shared experiences can elicit 
feelings of closeness or intimacy towards the conversation partner (Alea & Bluck, 2003). 
Unsurprisingly, people talk about their positive memories more than negative memories 
(McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008). Yet people do also talk about negative memories, which might be 
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beneficial in some situations—for instance, there is evidence that sharing negative memories can 
elicit empathy from others (Bluck et al., 2013; Rimé et al., 1992). There is even evidence that 
just thinking about a memory involving another person can lead the rememberer to feel closer to 
that person (Alea & Bluck, 2007). In all these ways, autobiographical memories might help 
strengthen relationships. 
Another important aspect of social relationships is effective communication (McCann & 
Higgins, 1992). Here, too, autobiographical memories can be beneficial by helping people 
convey information to others in an engaging, persuasive way. There is evidence that sharing 
autobiographical memories tends to capture listeners’ attention and interest more than sharing 
general facts, perhaps because the rich episodic details in these memories make it easier for 
listeners to picture and connect with the story being told (Pillemer, 1998; Schank, 1990). These 
episodic details can also make the information being shared seem more credible than it otherwise 
would, potentially convincing others to trust and act on it (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Bruce, 1989; 
Mahr & Csibra, 2018). Perhaps for all these reasons, people often share autobiographical 
memories in an attempt to justify or explain their behavior (Mahr & Csibra, 2018; Pasupathi et 
al., 2002). Together, the evidence fits with the idea that autobiographical memories can facilitate 
communication, which would benefit both those sharing the memories and those listening to 
them (Pillemer, 1992). 
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Overview of the thesis 
Manuscripts 1 and 2 
Taken together, the literature suggests that autobiographical memories direct people’s 
behaviour, give people a sense of self, and help people form and maintain social bonds (e.g. 
Bluck et al., 2005; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). But there is one major problem with this 
work: it has largely assumed these functions produce adaptive outcomes. Indeed, for 
autobiographical memory to have evolved in the way it has, it makes sense that these memories 
would be adaptive in the long run. But it is not necessarily the case that when some function 
evolves, it produces adaptive outcomes across the board (Darwin, 1859). For example, certain 
polymorphisms make some groups from Africa resistant to malaria—an adaptive function, to be 
sure (Haldane, 1990). Yet these same polymorphisms dispose this group to sickle cell anemia—a 
potentially fatal condition. Likewise, consider the dodo bird. With no natural predators, it was 
adaptive for the dodo to become flightless to build up fat reserves that could help it survive the 
food-scarce dry season (Fuller, 2002). But when Dutch sailors arrived, that same trait meant the 
dodo was unable to escape the sailors, ultimately leading to the extinction of the species. Clearly, 
then, traits that evolved to serve an adaptive function can ultimately be maladaptive in some 
situations. 
This fact has long been recognized in the autobiographical memory literature. For 
example, Bruce (1985, p. 85) suggested traits that evolved to serve an adaptive function “may 
even presently be maladaptive, perhaps reflecting a constraint in the organism’s design.” More 
recently, models of the social function have acknowledged that the extent to which sharing a 
memory is adaptive depends on a variety of factors, including the relationship between the sharer 
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and the receiver, and the characteristics of the memory being shared (Alea & Bluck, 2003). For 
example, if a Republican were to share with a Democrat the memory of a time they attended a 
Trump rally, the sharing of that memory might harm the relationship, rather than help it. 
Likewise, it is easy to think of situations in which memories might serve self or directive 
functions in ways that are maladaptive. Consider someone who experienced a catastrophic 
failure as he pursued his career goals. If he decides, based on this memory, to give up on his 
career or ruminate excessively about the failure, this memory would be serving directive 
functions in ways that could be considered maladaptive (Harris et al., 2014; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000). Furthermore, if this person developed a negative sense of self as a result of incorporating 
this memory into his sense of self, we might consider the memory as serving a maladaptive self 
function. Indeed, there is evidence that incorporating traumatic events into one’s sense of self is 
associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). It seems reasonable, 
then, to expect that autobiographical memories might sometimes serve functions in ways that are 
maladaptive. 
If we want to understand the role people’s autobiographical memories play in their lives, 
it is important that we understand these maladaptive functions. In fact, a landmark paper 
published more than a decade ago argued that “a later development in any program of research 
on function would be the identification of adaptive and maladaptive ways in which memory is 
employed in everyday life” (Bluck et al., 2005, p. 92). More recently, the field was urged to take 
a broader view of autobiographical memory functions, including the idea that functions can be 
thought of as “reasons for remembering” that could be adaptive or maladaptive (del Palacio-
Gonzalez et al., 2018; Harris et al., 2014). Surprisingly, though, little empirical work has 
investigated the extent to which memories serve functions in maladaptive ways. 
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Instead, the literature tends to rely on measures that focus primarily on the ways people’s 
memories are adaptive, or that conflate adaptive and maladaptive outcomes. Take, for example, 
the Thinking About Life Events questionnaire (TALE)—the most commonly used measure of 
functions in the literature (Bluck & Alea, 2011). The TALE asks people how often they think 
back over or talk about their life for various reasons, including “when I want to develop a closer 
relationship with someone.” and “when I need to make a life choice and I am uncertain which 
path to take.” Endorsement of these items is taken as evidence that people’s memories are 
adaptive. Yet these items do not necessarily suggest adaptive outcomes. After all, people might 
want to develop closer relationships with others, but could end up sharing a memory in a way 
that hurts their relationships. Likewise, when people bring to mind a memory to help them 
choose which path to take, there is no guarantee the memory will lead them to make the best 
decision. As another example, consider a study that measured the self function of specific 
memories by asking people to rate the degree to which “this memory tells me something about 
my identity” (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). This item cannot, of course, tell us whether 
people’s memories are shaping their identity in ways that are adaptive or maladaptive. This 
problem is not confined to these two measures, but cuts across the literature as a whole (see, for 
example, Kulkofsky & Koh, 2009; McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008; Pillemer et al., 2015). To what 
extent, then, do memories serve maladaptive functions? That is the question that the first two 
manuscripts of this thesis addresses. 
In our first manuscript, published in Memory, we adapted function items from the 
literature to capture both adaptive and maladaptive functions. Then, we measured the extent to 
which people’s positive and negative memories serve these adaptive and maladaptive functions. 
In addition, to address the possibility that adaptive functions are the reason why people value 
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their autobiographical memories, we examined the relationship between these functions and how 
much people wanted to hold onto the memories. 
In our second manuscript, published in the Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, we focused specifically on the social function. Research on this function has told us 
much about when and why people share their memories (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Hyman & Faries, 
1992). But models of the social function make clear that the extent to which sharing a memory is 
adaptive depends on how those listening to the memory respond (Alea & Bluck, 2003). It is 
therefore important that we understand the factors that affect how people appraise and respond to 
the memories shared with them by others. In this manuscript, we investigated how people’s own 
appraisals of how an event has affected them might influence other people’s appraisals of those 
experiences, and in turn, the extent to which that memory might serve social functions in ways 
that are adaptive or maladaptive. 
Manuscript 3 
Taken together, the results from the first two manuscripts support the hypothesis that 
memories can serve both adaptive and maladaptive functions. But under what conditions are 
memories most likely to be adaptive or maladaptive? To answer this question, we need to 
understand the factors that drive memories to serve adaptive and maladaptive functions. 
Theoretical accounts suggest that the episodic characteristics that accompany autobiographical 
memories help these memories serve adaptive functions by providing useful information and 
acting as memory cues (Tulving, 1985). There is also some empirical evidence to support these 
ideas (Sheldon et al., 2011). But less is known about how other characteristics of 
autobiographical memories relate to the functions those memories serve. For instance, one 
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defining feature of autobiographical memories is that people believe the events really happened 
to them (Pillemer, 1998). To what extent is this belief in a memory important for that memory to 
serve functions? The third manuscript of this thesis addresses this question. 
The relationship between belief and the functions of memories is important to investigate 
to help us understand the factors that drive memories to serve functions. An understanding of this 
relationship will also help us understand what might happen when people stop believing in an 
autobiographical memory. Sometimes, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract 
their belief in the memory—as Beth Rutherford did after the medical examinations proved her 
memories of being raped by her father could not be real. In Rutherford’s case, the retraction 
came about because there was evidence that contradicted the memory. In other cases, people 
might retract their belief in a memory because it conflicts with logic or reason, or because a 
family member told them the event never happened (Scoboria et al., 2015). When people retract 
their belief in a false memory, though, the memory itself does not simply disappear. On the 
contrary, people often retain a vivid “memory” for the event, even though they know the 
memory is false (Mazzoni et al., 2010). These “retracted memories” are common—one in five 
people report they have at least one such memory (Mazzoni et al., 2010). But the extent to which 
these retracted memories serve functions—helpful and harmful—remains unclear. To the extent 
that belief is important for memories to serve functions, we should expect that retracted 
memories tend to serve functions less than memories people still believe. But if memory 
functions are primarily driven by other factors, such as a vivid sense of reliving, retracted 
memories should continue to serve functions, much like memories that people do believe. In our 
third manuscript, under review at Memory & Cognition, we address these competing hypotheses 
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by asking people to rate the functions of their retracted memories, and comparing these functions 
to the functions of memories they still believe. 
Manuscript 4 
Another defining feature of autobiographical memories is that they are of specific, 
personally experienced, events. But how important is it that an event was personally experienced 
for the memory of that event to serve directive, self, and social functions? After all, people can 
also hold specific memories of events that they did not experience themselves. For example, 
people sometimes have “vicarious memories” for events they learned about from other people 
(Larsen & Plunkett, 1987). Basketball player Bill Russell, for instance, reported that his 
grandfather had once recounted to him the memory of standing up to members of the Klu Klux 
Klan. According to Russell, this vicarious memory stayed with him his whole life (Pillemer et 
al., 2015). People also tend to have specific memories of important events from their country’s 
history—known as collective memories (Hirst et al., 2018; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). For 
instance, when asked for the events that shaped their country’s identity, almost 70% of 
Americans mention the American Civil War. To what extent might these vicarious and collective 
memories serve functions even though people did not personally experience the events? 
In the case of vicarious memories, there are some data to answer this question: people 
tend to report that their vicarious memories serve directive, self, and social functions—although 
slightly less often than their own autobiographical memories (Pillemer et al., 2015). Bill Russell, 
for instance, suggested that his grandfather’s memory taught him an important lesson about not 
being intimidated by others. But the extent to which collective memories serve functions remains 
unclear. There have been suggestions in the literature that collective memories might serve 
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functions for the collective as a whole that are similar to the functions of autobiographical 
memories—for example, by forging the identity of the group or guiding its decisions (Hirst & 
Manier, 2008). But there is little empirical evidence to support these suggestions. Therefore, in 
our fourth manuscript, under review at Journal for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 
we asked people to report the functions served by their collective memories, and compared these 
functions to the functions of autobiographical memories. The findings further our understanding 
of the extent to which memories of events that were not personally experienced can serve 
functions. 
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Chapter 2: Negative memories serve functions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways 
Manuscript published in Memory: 
Burnell, R., Rasmussen, A. S., & Garry, M. (2020). Negative memories serve functions in both 
adaptive and maladaptive ways, Memory, 28, 494-505, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2020.1737133  
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Abstract 
Autobiographical memories are said to serve at least three functions: they direct people’s 
behaviour, inform their identity, and facilitate social bonding and communication. But much of 
the research on these three functions has not distinguished between memories that serve 
functions in adaptive ways from those that serve functions in maladaptive ways. Across two 
experiments, we asked subjects to provide either positive or negative memories. Then, to 
operationalize adaptive and maladaptive functions, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which 
those memories serve directive, self, and social functions in ways that “help” and in ways that 
“hurt.” To investigate whether people believe the adaptive benefits of their memories outweigh 
any maladaptive effects, we also asked subjects how willing they would be to erase the memories 
if given the opportunity. We found that negative memories served functions in both helpful and 
hurtful ways, whereas positive memories were primarily helpful. Furthermore, the more helpful a 
memory was, the more reluctant subjects were to erase it. Conversely, the more hurtful a 
memory was, the more willing subjects were to erase it. These results suggest it is important to 
distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive functions when investigating the functions of 
autobiographical memory. 
Keywords: autobiographical memory; function; maladaptive; negative memory; 
posttraumatic growth 
!  
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Athlete-turned-actor Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson often tells the story of his “Seven bucks 
moment.” All his life, Johnson dreamed of playing professional football. After an injury kept 
him out of the US National Football League, Johnson joined the practice squad of the Canadian 
Football League’s Stampeders (Johnson, 2016). But not long afterwards, the Stampeders cut him 
from the team. In that moment, Johnson saw a lifetime of dreams vanish: “I left home when I 
was 18 and promised my family I’d make something of myself. Now 5yrs later at 23, I’m 
moving right back in with my parents, a failed football player with just 7 bucks in my pocket. 
Dream over” (Johnson, 2018). Johnson fell into depression, sitting at home on his couch with no 
idea what to do with his life. It was The Rock’s “rock bottom.” Given how painful this 
experience was, we might expect The Rock would jump at the chance to rid himself of this 
negative memory. 
As it turns out, though, he would not. On the contrary, he is so fond of the memory that 
he even named his production company “7 Bucks Productions.” But why? One possibility is that 
memories—even negative ones—serve adaptive functions. Evidence from the autobiographical 
memory literature shows that people’s memories serve at least three broad functions—they direct 
people’s thinking and behaviour, help people maintain a sense of self and identity, and are shared 
with others in social contexts to help form and strengthen relationships (Bluck & Alea, 2002; 
Cohen, 1998; Hyman & Faries, 1992; Pillemer, 1992).  
It has also been proposed that autobiographical memories can serve other functions, such 
as regulating emotions (e.g. Kulkofsky, Wang & Hou, 2010; Pasupathi, 2003) and providing a 
sense of social identity (e.g. Berntsen, 2009; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009; Wright & Gaskell, 
1992). In the reminiscence literature, more specific functions such as teaching others and 
maintaining intimacy have also been subject for systematic research—these functions have been 
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viewed as sub-categories of the three broad functions (e.g. Bluck & Alea, 2002; Cappeliez, 
O’Rourke, & Chaudbury, 2005; Webster, 2003).  
It is not just people’s positive memories that can serve these various functions. In fact, 
people tend to rate their negative memories as more directive than their positive memories, and 
researchers have suggested that even the most traumatic events can serve adaptive functions 
(Pillemer, 2003; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). Furthermore, it has been shown that negative 
memories sometimes have redemptive qualities (McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & 
Bowman, 2001) and can serve as turning points in the life story (Pillemer, 2001; 2003; see also 
Habermas & Bluck, 2000 for similar views). The Rock, for example, used his “seven bucks” 
memory to motivate him to do more with his life (Johnson, 2016). 
But negative memories can also be maladaptive in a variety of ways. After all, we know 
that thinking back to negative experiences can produce strong negative emotions (D’Argembeau, 
Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003). In extreme cases, negative memories are even related to 
psychopathology—for example, rumination is associated with depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000), and there is evidence that the characteristics of people’s memories for a trauma contribute 
to the development of PTSD (Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011). Furthermore, research on 
reminiscence functions has identified specific uses of memory that are sometimes maladaptive, 
such as bitterness revival and boredom reduction (Harris, Rasmussen, & Berntsen, 2014; 
Webster, 2003). 
But memories could also be maladaptive in ways that map onto the directive, self, and 
social functions of memory. Although it might generally be adaptive for memories to serve these 
three functions (e.g. Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005), it is possible that some instances in 
which memories serve these functions could be maladaptive. Take, for example, an alternate 
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reality where The Rock’s “rock bottom” memory led him to give up on his dreams and stay on 
his couch. In that case, The Rock's memory is serving a directive function by guiding his 
behaviour, but is doing so in a way that is maladaptive. Likewise, if the memory led him to think 
that he is incapable of succeeding, we might then consider the memory as serving a self function 
in a way that is maladaptive. Finally, if the Rock had complained to others about his experiences 
in a way that made people annoyed or frustrated with him, we might think of the memory as 
serving a social function in a way that is maladaptive (see Pillemer, 2003 for similar examples). 
For the sake of brevity, we will henceforth refer to memories that serve functions in ways that 
are adaptive as serving adaptive functions and memories that serve functions in ways that are 
maladaptive as serving maladaptive functions.  
Surprisingly, we know little about the extent to which people’s memories serve directive, 
self, and social functions in ways that are maladaptive. One reason for this gap is that the 
literature investigating the directive, self, and social functions of autobiographical memory tends 
to rely on measures that focus primarily on the ways people’s memories are adaptive, or that do 
not separate adaptive and maladaptive outcomes. Take, for example, a study that measured the 
self function by asking people to rate the degree to which “this memory tells me something about 
my identity” (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). This item cannot, of course, tell us whether 
people’s memories are shaping their identity in ways that are adaptive or maladaptive. Likewise, 
more extensive survey measures that use more than one item to address the three broad functions 
largely do not differentiate between adaptive and maladaptive usage (e.g. Bluck & Alea, 2011; 
Webster, 2003). This insensitivity to the maladaptive contributions of people’s memories is a 
problem that cuts across the literature as a whole (see, for example, Kulkofsky et al., 2010; 
McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008; Pillemer, Steiner, Kuwabara, Thomsen, & Svob, 2015).  
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It makes sense that in trying to understand why we have autobiographical memories, 
research has focused on adaptive usage. After all, trying to understand the adaptive advantage a 
behaviour or process confers on us is an important part of psychological science (see, for 
example, Bruce, 1985; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008). But without a full understanding of the 
ways in which autobiographical memories are maladaptive, it is hard to know the extent to which 
autobiographical memories are, on the whole, adaptive. Indeed, a landmark paper published 
more than a decade ago addressed function in terms of everyday usage, but encouraged scientists 
to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive ways of using memory in future research: “A 
later development in any program of research on function would be the identification of adaptive 
and maladaptive ways in which memory is employed in everyday life” (Bluck et al., 2005, p. 
92). The present experiments aim to address this gap by examining the adaptive and maladaptive 
ways people’s memories serve directive, self, and social functions in everyday life. 
More recently, the field was urged to take a broader view of the functions of 
autobiographical memory, including the idea that functions can be thought of as “reasons for 
remembering” that could be adaptive or maladaptive (Del Palacio-Gonzalez, Watson, & 
Berntsen, 2018; Harris et al., 2014). But we still know little about the relative adaptive and 
maladaptive contributions of people’s memories. To what extent do people’s memories serve 
directive, self, and social functions in adaptive and maladaptive ways? To answer this question, 
we conducted two pre-registered experiments in which we asked people to provide either 
positive or negative memories. In each experiment, we asked subjects to report the extent to 
which the memories “help” them and “hurt” them in ways that map on to the directive, self, and 
social functions of autobiographical memory.  
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Of course, even if a memory is maladaptive, it could still be that the adaptive benefits of 
that memory outweigh its maladaptive effects. We might expect, then, that people want to hold 
on to adaptive negative memories—as The Rock does with his “seven bucks” memory—but 
want to get rid of maladaptive negative memories. We tested this possibility by asking subjects 
how willing they would be to “erase” the memories they provided (in Experiments 1 and 2) and 
how willing they would be to “save” the memories forever (in Experiment 2).  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Experiments 1 and 2 were both pre-registered—analyses that were not pre-registered are noted as 
exploratory. The pre-registrations, supplemental materials, and data for the two experiments are 
available at osf.io/y6vg2/   
Subjects 
We recruited workers from the United States and Canada on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform (https://www.mturk.com/) through TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). 
Subjects participated in exchange for $0.20 Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until we 
had 400 useable data points, after exclusions. Because of the way Mechanical Turk interacts with 
Qualtrics, 418 subjects completed the survey, 4 of whom did not provide autobiographical 
memories, and a further 4 who did not pass the attention check1. The final dataset included 410 
subjects (Mage = 41.25, SD = 13.42) of whom 150 identified as men, 257 as women, and 3 as 
gender diverse. All but five of our subjects reported that English was their primary language. 
Those five subjects reported their primary language as Italian, Urdu, Chinese (two subjects), and 
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Spanish. 
Design 
We manipulated the type of memory subjects brought to mind (most positive, most negative) 
between subjects. 
Procedure 
This experiment was approved by the University of Waikato’s School of Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the University’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee. We conducted this experiment in accordance with the World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki.  
The procedure took place in a single session, comprising five parts. First, we told subjects 
we were interested in people’s memories for specific events that took place within 24 hours at a 
specific time and place that they personally experienced. Then, we asked some subjects to 
describe their most negative memory and other subjects to describe their most positive memory 
(see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix A for the full instructions). We asked subjects for 
negative memories because we reasoned that negative memories are those most likely to be 
maladaptive (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rubin et al., 2011). We asked for positive memories to 
provide comparison memories that should be similar in emotional intensity, but have different 
valence.  
Second, subjects rated the extent to which their nominated memory serves functions in 
ways that help them, and in ways that hurt them. To gather these data, we modified function 
items that have been used in the literature (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009; 2013). These items 
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comprise one item for each of the directive, self, and social functions. We also included a fourth 
item measuring the social identity function, which addresses social bonding and a sense of 
belonging with others but without the memory having to be shared (see Berntsen, 2009; Wright 
& Gaskell, 1992). We modified these items because the original items do not separate whether a 
memory is serving functions in ways that are adaptive or in ways that are maladaptive, which 
was our main research interest. For example, we split the item “this memory tells me something 
about my identity” into two items (“this memory tells me something about my identity in ways 
that help me” and “this memory tells me something about my identity in ways that hurt me”). We 
repeated this modification for each item, so that the original four-item scale became an eight-
item scale, with four items measuring the adaptive functions, and four items measuring the 
maladaptive functions (see Table 1 for the full list of these function items and their anchors). 
Finally, we created a sum variable for helpful functions by taking the mean of the four items 
measuring helpful functions and a sum variable for hurtful functions by taking the mean of the 
four items measuring hurtful functions. 
Third, subjects completed a series of other ratings about their nominated memory. More 
specifically, as a manipulation check, we asked subjects to rate the valence of their memory on 
two items (see Table 1; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Next, subjects completed an 
attention check and then rated how significant the memories were for their life story and how old 
they were when the event took place.  
Fourth, we told subjects to imagine they had the opportunity to completely erase their 
nominated memory, meaning that the memory would be gone—they would not be able to bring 
to mind any aspect or aspects of what happened. We asked subjects to rate how likely they would 
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be to erase the memory, and then to make a dichotomous yes/no decision about whether they 
would erase it (see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix A for the full instructions).  
Finally, subjects answered basic demographic questions about their age, gender, and 
primary language. 
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Table 1. Full list of items for Experiments 1 and 2. 
Function 
This memory guides my thinking and behavior in ways that help me 
This memory guides my thinking and behavior in ways that hurt me 
This memory tells me something about my identity in ways that help me 
This memory tells me something about my identity in ways that hurt me 
I share this memory with other people in ways that help me 
I share this memory with other people in ways that hurt me 
This memory gives me a sense of belonging with other people 
This memory gives me a sense of disconnection from other people 
Valence 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are extremely positive 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are extremely negative 
Willingness to erase/save 
If you could actually erase[save] this memory, how likely would you be to 
do that? (1 = not at all likely, 7 = extremely likely) 
If you could actually erase[save] this memory, would you? (Yes/No) 
Age of event 
How old were you when this event took place? Please give your age at the 
time estimated in years; type in the number, e.g., 7  
Centrality 
This memory is significant for my life because it imparts an important 
message for me or represents an anchor, critical juncture, or a turning 
point (1 = not at all, 7 = completely) 
Note. Function and Valence items all rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a very 
high degree). Items adapted from Rasmussen and Berntsen (2009), and 
Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003). 
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Results & Discussion 
Our primary research question was: to what extent do people’s memories serve functions in ways 
that are adaptive and maladaptive? Before turning to this question, we first examined subjects’ 
descriptions and checked that our manipulations were successful. 
Descriptives & manipulation checks 
Subjects' most negative memories took place at a mean age of 27.66 (SD = 13.97; Range = 3-65). 
In the mean, these memories took place 13.40 years ago (SD = 13.51). The descriptions were 
also fairly short (Mwords = 49.50, SD = 41.83, Range = 2-365)2. Subjects rated their memories as 
highly negative (Mnegativity = 6.21, SD = 1.31; Mpositivity = 1.42, SD = 0.94), and significant to their 
life story (M = 5.35, SD = 1.64). Examples of negative memories subjects described included “I 
had a miscarriage” and “When my grandad died. It was really sad to me as the first major death 
in my life. It was very unexpected and sad.”  
Subjects' most positive memories took place at a mean age of 27.78 (SD = 13.40; Range 
= 3-72). In the mean, these memories took place 13.68 years ago (SD = 14.34). The descriptions 
were fairly short (Mwords = 44.65, SD = 25.56; Range = 4-147). Subjects rated their memories as 
highly positive (Mpositivity = 6.55, SD = 0.85; Mnegativity = 1.30, SD = 0.90), and significant to their 
life story (M = 5.79, SD = 1.46). Examples of positive memories included “Giving birth to my 
son” and “when I married my husband. He is the best partner I could have asked for and I still 
can't believe he married me.” 
Function ratings 
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Before turning to our primary research question, we first examined the reliability of our adaptive 
and maladaptive sum variables. As expected, we found correlations among the helpful items and 
among the hurtful items, and both sum variables had good reliability (αhelpful = 0.83, αhurtful = 
0.86; see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix A for a detailed analysis of the correlations 
between the function items and the reliability of the sum variables).  
We now turn to our primary research question: to what extent do people’s memories 
serve functions in ways that are adaptive and maladaptive? Using the function sum variables, we 
first compared the helpful and hurtful function ratings of subjects who described their most 
negative memories. As the left-hand side of Figure 1 shows, subjects’ negative memories were 
both moderately helpful (M = 3.26, SD = 1.38) and moderately hurtful (M = 3.71, SD = 1.47). 
The relative mixture varied somewhat across the individual functions (see the Supplemental 
Materials in Appendix A), but overall subjects’ memories were slightly more hurtful than they 
were helpful (Mdiff = 0.45, 95% CI [0.17, 0.72]). These findings suggest that people’s most 
negative memories are neither wholly adaptive nor wholly maladaptive—instead, they tend to 
serve a mix of adaptive and maladaptive functions. 
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But do people’s positive memories also serve this mix of functions? They do not. As the 
right-hand side of Figure 1 shows, subjects' most positive memories tended to be much more 
helpful (M = 5.24, SD = 1.31) than hurtful (M = 1.56, SD = 1.02; Mdiff = 3.68 [3.45, 3.92]). In 
fact, these memories were at floor on hurtful functions. This pattern holds true across the 
individual functions (see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix A). Furthermore, we found 
that subjects’ positive memories were more helpful than their negative memories (Mdiff = 1.98 
[1.72, 2.24]) and less hurtful (Mdiff = 2.15 [1.90, 2.39]). These results suggest that unlike people’s 
negative memories, their positive memories tend to be predominantly adaptive. 
Willingness to erase the memories 
Figure 1. Mean helpful and hurtful function ratings for subjects' positive and negative 
memories. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the cell means. 
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Thus far we have established that people’s negative memories serve functions in a mixture of 
adaptive and maladaptive ways, and that this mixture is not present in positive memories. But do 
people want to hold on to their negative memories—as The Rock does with his “seven bucks” 
memory—or would they rather forget them? If people believe the adaptive utility of their 
memories outweighs the maladaptive effects, we might expect people to want to hold on to them. 
But on the other hand, if people believe the maladaptive effects of their memories outweigh the 
adaptive utility, they might want to erase the memories. To answer this question, we analysed 
subjects’ responses to two items. The first item asked subjects to rate how likely they would be 
to erase their nominated memory if they got the chance. The second item asked them to make a 
dichotomous yes or no choice about whether they would erase it.  
First, we examined responses to these two questions from subjects who provided their 
most positive memory. Given that these memories are highly positive, and appear to be at floor 
on maladaptive functions, we expected that subjects would be unlikely to want to erase them. 
Indeed, subjects were overwhelmingly unwilling to erase their nominated memory—subjects’ 
ratings of how likely they would be to erase their most positive memory were at floor (M = 1.26, 
SD = 0.91), and only 4 subjects out of 198 said they would erase it when asked to make a 
dichotomous choice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these data show that people value holding on to 
their positive memories. 
By contrast, when we examined responses to these two questions from subjects who 
provided their most negative memory, we found more varied responses. In the mean, it appeared 
that subjects were moderately willing to erase their most negative memory (M = 3.56, SD = 
2.42). But a closer inspection of the distributions revealed a starkly bimodal distribution—
subjects tended to be either highly likely or not at all likely to erase their most negative memory 
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(see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix A for the full distributions). These results show 
that some people are highly willing to get rid of their most negative memory, whereas others are 
very reluctant do so. This split is reflected in subjects’ responses to the dichotomous choice 
about whether to erase the memory—61% said they would not erase the memory, while 39% 
said they would. Despite the fact that these memories were subjects’ most negative memories, 
the majority would not want to erase them. Considered as a whole, these data suggest that many 
people value holding on to even their most negative memories. 
Why, though, did subjects choose not to erase their most negative memory? One 
possibility is they believed the adaptive utility of these negative memories outweighs whatever 
maladaptive effects the memories carry with them. If this explanation were correct, we would 
expect that subjects’ willingness to erase a negative memory would be related to the extent to 
which that memory serves functions in ways that are adaptive and maladaptive. Exploratory 
results provide evidence for this explanation. More specifically, the more helpful a negative 
memory was, the less willing subjects were to erase it (r = -0.43 [-0.51, -0.35]). Conversely, the 
more hurtful a negative memory was, the more willing subjects were to erase it (r = 0.51 [0.43, 
0.57]) These results suggest that people want to get rid of negative memories that are 
maladaptive, but are reluctant to get rid of those that are adaptive. In turn, these results fit with 
the idea that many people believe the adaptive functions of their negative memories outweigh the 
maladaptive functions those memories serve. 
Alternate explanations 
Of course, our design means we cannot determine if adaptive and maladaptive functions are 
driving people’s decisions about whether to erase their memories. One plausible alternative is 
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that people simply want to erase memories that are highly negative, and that those memories also 
happen to be high on maladaptive functions and low on adaptive functions. To address this 
possibility, we conducted an exploratory logistic regression with helpful function, hurtful 
function, and negative valence predicting subjects’ decisions about whether to erase their most 
negative memory3. This analysis showed that hurtful function was the strongest and only 
significant predictor of people’s decisions. More specifically, the more hurtful a memory was, 
the more likely subjects were to want to erase it (OR = 1.36 [1.10, 1.69]). By contrast, the more 
helpful a memory was, the less likely subjects were to want to erase it, although this effect was 
not significant and the effect size is plausibly trivial (OR = 0.81 [0.64, 1.02]). There was no 
strong evidence that valence predicted subjects’ willingness to erase the memory (OR = 1.18 
[0.91, 1.56]). These results provide evidence against the idea that valence is driving the 
relationships between functions and people’s willingness to erase their most negative memory. 
Of course, there is a relationship between valence and functions—negative memories tend to be 
more maladaptive than positive memories. But these results suggest that people’s willingness to 
erase their memories is more likely driven by the functions the memories serve than by the 
valence itself.   
Another possible explanation for subjects’ reluctance to erase their negative memories is 
that they were wary of the general consequences of erasing a memory. For example, we know 
that many people believe that changing people’s memories in therapy might have unintended 
negative consequences, and it is possible that some subjects decided not to erase their memory 
for this reason (Nash, Berkowitz, & Roche, 2016). But this explanation cannot fully account for 
our results. Based on this explanation alone, we would expect to see similar reluctance across all 
memories, regardless of function or valence. But we did not see that. Instead, we saw that 
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subjects’ willingness to erase a memory was related to the functions that memory serves, and 
also that subjects were more willing overall to erase negative memories than positive ones. 
Therefore, our results do not support this counter-explanation. 
Summary 
Taken together, this experiment provides evidence that negative memories serve functions in a 
mix of adaptive and maladaptive ways, and that positive memories are predominantly adaptive. 
Furthermore, the results show that many people value even their most negative memories, 
perhaps because they believe the adaptive benefits of these memories outweighs their 
maladaptive effects. 
In this experiment, though, each subject provided only one memory—either their most 
positive or most negative memory. If people really are weighing up the adaptive and maladaptive 
functions of a memory when deciding how much they value keeping that memory around, we 
should expect that, within any one person’s memories, the memories they most want to get rid of 
should be the ones that are most maladaptive. By contrast, the ones they most want to hold on to 
should be the ones that are most adaptive. Furthermore, this pattern should hold true regardless 
of the valence of the memory. We addressed this possibility in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we asked subjects to provide either their five most negative memories or their 
five most positive memories. Then, we asked them to pick from these five memories the one they 
would be most likely to erase, and the one they would be least likely to erase. To further 
understand the extent to which people value their positive and negative memories, we asked a 
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separate group of subjects to pick from their five nominated memories the one they most want to 
save forever, and the one they least want to save. We hypothesised that people want to hold on to 
adaptive memories and get rid of maladaptive memories. If so, subjects’ “most likely to erase” 
memories should be more maladaptive than their “least likely to erase” memories, and also less 
adaptive. Conversely, subjects’ “most likely to save” memories should be less maladaptive and 
more adaptive than their “least likely to save” memories. Furthermore, these patterns should hold 
true for the subjects who provided their most positive memories and also those who provided 
their most negative memories. 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers from the United States and Canada on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform through TurkPrime (Litman, et al., 2017).4 Subjects participated in exchange for $0.70 
Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until 400 subjects had completed the survey. Because 
of the way Mechanical Turk interacts with Qualtrics, 425 subjects completed the survey. Based 
on our pre-registered criteria, we excluded 12 subjects who did not provide autobiographical 
memories. We also excluded a further 9 subjects who selected the same memory as their “most 
likely” and “least likely” memory. The final dataset contained 404 subjects (Mage = 39.25, SD = 
14.10), 142 of whom identified as men, 259 as women, and 3 as neither man nor woman. 
Design 
We employed a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design with Memory Valence (positive, negative), and 
Instructions (erase, save) as between-subjects factors and Memory Choice (most likely, least 
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likely) as a within-subjects factor. 
Procedure 
This experiment was approved by the University of Waikato’s School of Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the University’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee. We conducted this experiment in accordance with the World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki.  
The procedure for this experiment is displayed in Figure 2. First, subjects completed 
basic demographics. As in Experiment 1, we told subjects we were interested in people’s 
memories for specific events that took place within 24 hours at a specific time and place that 
they personally experienced. Then, we asked some subjects to provide their five most negative 
memories, and other subjects to provide their five most positive memories. Then, using the same 
instructions as Experiment 1, we told half of the subjects to suppose they could erase one 
memory. We then asked these subjects to select, from the five memories they had just described, 
the memory they would be most likely to erase and the one they would be least likely to erase. 
We told the other half of the subjects to imagine they could “save” a memory—meaning they 
would always be able to bring to mind the experience, as well as the images and feelings 
associated with it, even if they lost their memory for all other experiences (see the Supplemental 
Materials in Appendix A for the full instructions). We asked these subjects to select from their 
five memories the memory they would be most likely to save and the one they would be least 
likely to save. We counterbalanced the order of these selections so that some subjects selected 
their “most likely” memory first and others selected their “least likely” memory first.  
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After making both their selections, subjects rated (in counterbalanced order) their “most 
likely to erase[save]” and “least likely to erase[save]” memories on a series of items. First, as a 
manipulation check, subjects rated the item “If you could actually erase[save] this memory, how 
likely would you be to do that?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a very high degree).  Next, 
subjects rated the helpful and hurtful functions of the memory using the same items as in 
Experiment 1 (see Table 1 for the full list of these function items). Then, subjects rated the 
valence of their memory on the same two items used in Experiment 1, and reported their age at 
the time of the event. Finally, we asked subjects to make a yes or no decision about whether they 
would erase[save] the memory. Subjects completed all the ratings about one memory before 
rating the other memory. 
 
Results & Discussion 
Before turning to our main analyses, we first examined subjects’ descriptions and checked that 
our manipulations were successful. 
Figure 2. Diagram of the method for Experiment 2. 
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Descriptives & manipulation checks 
Subjects' negative memories took place at a mean age of 24.81 years (SD = 13.19, range: 2-70). 
In the mean, these memories took place 14.49 years ago (SD = 13.27). The descriptions were 
again fairly short (Mwords = 14.57, SD = 15.78, range: 1-100). As expected, subjects rated their 
negative memories as highly negative (Mnegativity = 5.27, SD = 1.90, Mpositivity = 2.08, SD = 1.65). 
Examples of negative memories subjects described included being cheated on and the death of a 
parent. 
Subjects' positive memories took place at a mean age of 26.32 years (SD = 13.75, range 
2-89). In the mean, these memories took place 12.88 years ago (SD = 13.10). The descriptions 
were fairly short (Mwords= 16.13, SD = 17.01, Range = 1-103). As expected, subjects rated their 
positive memories as highly positive (Mpositivity = 5.83, SD = 1.59; Mnegativity = 1.79, SD = 1.53). 
Examples of positive memories included graduating college and the birth of a child.  
Next, we checked that subjects rated that they would be more likely to erase their “most 
likely to erase” memories than their “least likely to erase” memories. They did (Mmostlikely = 3.93, 
Mleastlikely = 2.15, Mdiff = 1.78, [1.46, 2.10]).  Likewise, subjects who were asked about saving 
their memories rated that they were more likely to save their “most likely to save” memories than 
their “least likely to save” memories (Mmostlikely = 5.23, Mleastlikely = 3.20, Mdiff = 2.02, [1.72, 
2.33]; See Supplemental Materials in Appendix A for a breakdown by valence). These results 
suggest our manipulations were successful. 
Adaptive and Maladaptive function ratings 
We now turn to our main research question: to what extent do people’s memories serve functions 
in ways that are adaptive and maladaptive?  
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Negative memories. First considering subjects’ negative memories, we found a pattern that is 
consistent with Experiment 1: people’s negative memories tended to serve functions in a mixture 
of adaptive and maladaptive ways. As Figure 3 shows, however, the precise mixture of functions 
varied across memories. More specifically, the left side of the top panel of Figure 3 shows that 
subjects’ “most likely to erase” negative memories tended to be more hurtful than helpful (Mdiff = 
0.93 [0.46, 1.40]) whereas their “least likely to erase” negative memories tended to be more 
helpful than hurtful (Mdiff = 1.09 [0.64, 1.54]). Comparing these two sets of memories, we found 
that subjects’ “most likely to erase” negative memories were less helpful than their “least likely 
to erase” negative memories (Mdiff = 1.13, [0.82, 1.44]) and also more hurtful (Mdiff = 0.89, [0.54, 
1.23]). 
The results from subjects who were asked about saving their memories mirror these 
results almost exactly, as the left side of the bottom panel of Figure 3 shows. Subjects’ “most 
likely to save” memories tended to be more helpful than hurtful (Mdiff = 0.95 [0.53, 1.37]), 
whereas subjects’ “least likely to save memories” tended to be more hurtful than helpful (Mdiff = 
0.89 [0.50, 1.27]). Comparing the two sets of memories, we found that subjects’ “most likely to 
save” negative memories were more helpful than their “least likely to save” negative memories 
(Mdiff = 1.18, [0.86, 1.49]), and less hurtful (Mdiff = 0.66, [0.37, 0.95]). 
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Figure 3. The top panel displays the mean function ratings of subjects who selected the memory they 
would be most likely to erase and the one they would be least likely to erase. The bottom panel 
displays the mean function ratings of subjects who selected the memory they would be most likely to 
save and the one they would be least likely to save. The left-hand side of each panel displays 
subjects who provided their five most negative memories, while the right-hand side displays subjects 
who provided their five most positive memories. Light grey bars represent mean helpful function 
ratings, dark grey bars represent mean hurtful function ratings. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals of the cell means. 
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Together, these results provide further support for the idea that negative memories serve 
functions in ways that have both adaptive and maladaptive effects. These results extend those 
Experiment 1 by suggesting that although negative memories are often more adaptive than 
maladaptive, it is also common for them to be more maladaptive than adaptive (see the 
Supplemental Materials in Appendix A for a breakdown by each individual function). 
Furthermore, the results show that in addition to being unwilling to erase adaptive negative 
memories, people also desire to preserve those memories as they are. 
But how willing overall were people to want to erase or save their memories? In 
Experiment 1, only a minority of people reported they would erase their most negative memory. 
But in this experiment, there were some memories that subjects commonly did not want to hold 
on to—most subjects (75%) said they would erase their “most likely to erase” negative memory, 
and few subjects (12%) said they would save their “least likely to save” negative memory. 
Crucially, these memories tended to be ones that were more hurtful than helpful. By contrast, 
subjects tended to want to hold on to the memories that were more helpful than hurtful—only a 
minority of subjects (32%) said they would erase their “least likely to erase” negative memory, 
and the majority of subjects (60%) said they would save their “most likely to save” negative 
memory. 
Positive memories. In contrast to subjects’ negative memories, but consistent with Experiment 1, 
subjects’ positive memories tended to be predominantly adaptive. More specifically, the right 
side of the top panel of Figure 3 shows that subjects’ most likely to erase positive memories were 
much more helpful than hurtful (Mdiff = 2.02 [1.59, 2.45]), as were their least likely to erase 
positive memories (Mdiff = 3.71 [3.28, 4.13]). Comparing the two sets of memories, we found 
that subjects’ “most likely to erase” positive memories were less helpful than their “least likely 
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to erase” positive memories (Mdiff = 1.24, [0.91, 1.57]) and more hurtful (Mdiff = 0.44, [0.18, 
0.70]). 
Likewise, as the right side of the bottom panel of Figure 3 shows, subjects’ most likely to 
save positive memories were much more helpful than hurtful (Mdiff = 3.80 [3.36, 4.24]), as were 
their least likely to save negative memories (Mdiff = 2.37 [1.87, 2.87]). Once again, subjects’ 
“most likely to save” positive memories were more helpful than their “least likely to save” 
positive memories (Mdiff = 1.10, [0.74, 1.45]), and less hurtful (Mdiff = 0.34, [0.09, 0.59]). 
These results provide further support for the idea that positive memories tend to be 
primarily adaptive. Furthermore, across both positive and negative memories, people want to 
hold on to memories that serve adaptive functions and get rid of memories that serve 
maladaptive functions. Unsurprisingly, few subjects wanted to erase their positive memories—
only 17% said they would erase their “most likely to erase” positive memory, and 6% said they 
would erase their “least likely to save” positive memory. By contrast, most subjects wanted to 
save their positive memories—97% said they would save their “most likely to save” positive 
memory, and 78% said they would save their “least likely to save” positive memory. From these 
two experiments it is clear that most people value holding onto their positive memories, perhaps 
because these memories are almost exclusively adaptive.  
Predicting willingness to save or erase 
As in Experiment 1, we ran exploratory logistic regressions to test the possibility that negative 
valence, rather than adaptive or maladaptive function, was really driving people’s choices to save 
or erase their negative memories. Because we asked each subject to rate two memories, we 
conducted multi-level models with helpful function, hurtful function, and valence predicting 
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people’s decisions about whether to save[erase] their two memories. 
Recall that some subjects were asked about saving their memories, and others were asked 
about erasing them. Therefore, we conducted separate regressions for subjects in those two 
conditions. The model predicting subjects’ decisions about whether to erase their memories 
produced results that were largely consistent with Experiment 1. More specifically, helpful 
function and hurtful function both strongly predicted subjects’ decision to erase their memories. 
The more hurtful a memory was, the more likely subjects were to say “yes” to erasing the 
memory (OR = 3.03 [1.61, 5.70]), and the more helpful a memory was, the less likely they were 
to say “yes” to erasing it (OR = 0.32 [0.16, 0.64]). Valence was a trivial and non-significant 
predictor of subjects’ decisions to erase their memories (OR = 1.07 [0.77, 1.48]). These results 
suggest that people’s willingness to erase their memories is more likely driven by the functions 
the memories serve than by the valence of the memory itself—consistent with Experiment 1.   
The model predicting subjects’ decisions about whether to save their memories produced 
a somewhat different pattern. More specifically, helpful function was the strongest and only 
significant predictor of people’s decision to save their memory. The more helpful a memory was, 
the more likely subjects were to say “yes” to saving it (OR = 2.31 [1.65, 3.23]). Unlike the model 
predicting subjects’ decisions to erase their memories, there was no strong evidence that hurtful 
function predicted people’s decisions to save their memories (OR = 0.88 [0.68, 1.13]). Perhaps 
the “erase” framing drew subjects’ attention more to maladaptive functions, whereas the “save” 
framing drew subjects’ attention more to the adaptive functions of the memory. Regarding 
valence, the more negative a memory was, the less likely subjects were to say “yes” to saving it, 
but this effect was not significant, and size of this effect was plausibly trivial (OR = 0.84 [0.69, 
1.02]). 
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Overall, these findings suggest that people want to erase maladaptive memories and save 
adaptive memories. Furthermore, valence did not account for these relationships. 
Summary 
Taken together, the results from Experiment 2 provide further evidence that people’s memories 
serve functions in a mixture of adaptive and maladaptive ways. Moreover, the results suggest 
that people want to get rid of memories that are maladaptive and hold on to memories that are 
adaptive.  
General Discussion 
Across two experiments and 814 subjects, we found that people rated their negative memories as 
moderately adaptive, but also moderately maladaptive. By contrast, people rated their positive 
memories as predominantly adaptive. Furthermore, we found evidence that the maladaptive 
effects of a memory are distinct from its valence. We also found that people wanted to hold on to 
memories that serve functions in adaptive ways and get rid of memories that serve functions in 
maladaptive ways. Considered together, these findings get us a step closer to the goal of 
identifying the adaptive and maladaptive effects of people’s autobiographical memories. 
The experiments documented here have implications for the literature on the functions of 
autobiographical memories. Our findings extend research showing that some uses of memory—
such as bitterness revival and rumination—can be maladaptive. More specifically, these findings 
demonstrate that the three theorised functions of autobiographical memory can sometimes 
produce maladaptive outcomes. Why, though, do we have a memory system that often carries 
with it these maladaptive effects? One possibility is that these effects are a by-product of the 
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same processes that allow autobiographical memories to serve adaptive functions. After all, it is 
often the case that maladaptive outcomes can result from generally adaptive processes (e.g., 
Bruce 1985). For example, although fear conditioning regularly helps people avoid potential 
threats, in extreme cases it can lead to phobias that cripple people’s ability to function (Seligman, 
1971). This idea fits with the ecological literature, which suggests that no process or trait is 
inherently adaptive (Bruce, 1985). Instead, the adaptiveness of a trait depends on the context in 
which the trait is expressed. Similar ideas have been proposed for false memories—that they are 
the maladaptive by-product of having a memory system that is flexible enough to update and 
correct mistakes (Newman & Lindsay, 2009).  
Given that we found evidence of these maladaptive effects only in people’s most negative 
memories, it seems likely that the majority of autobiographical memories tend to be more 
adaptive than maladaptive. But to fully understand the relative adaptive and maladaptive 
contributions of autobiographical memories, future research should continue to investigate other 
ways in which autobiographical memories can be maladaptive. For example, although we found 
little evidence that positive memories are maladaptive, positive memories that produce a sense of 
nostalgia, or which lead people to become overconfident might also have maladaptive effects.  
In investigating people’s desire to preserve their memories, these experiments also 
contribute to our understanding of people’s attitudes towards their memories. Our results are 
consistent with other work suggesting people often value their negative memories—people 
regularly keep photos and mementos that bring to mind negative experiences, and report they 
would not take a drug that would dampen a negative memory, even if doing so might reduce the 
likelihood of developing PTSD (Newman, Berkowitz, Nelson, Garry, & Loftus, 2011; Petrelli & 
Whittaker 2008). Nonetheless, some of our subjects reported they would want to rid themselves 
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of negative memories—especially memories that were highly maladaptive. Given the recent 
efforts to identify drugs that might alter the content of negative memories, it is important to 
consider both the adaptive and maladaptive effects these memories can have (Brunet et al., 2008; 
Pitman et al., 2002). Unless these drugs can reduce the maladaptive effects of negative memories 
while leaving the adaptive functions intact, it might not always be wise to use them (Bluck, 
2017). 
Our results also highlight the overlap between the literature on autobiographical memory 
and the literature on clinical cognition. More specifically, the posttraumatic growth literature 
suggests people who experience a traumatic event often believe they have grown as a result of 
the experience (Schuettler & Boals, 2011; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). For example, people 
often report a traumatic experience changed their life path, taught them how strong they are, or 
increased their closeness with others. Such reports are remarkably similar to the adaptive 
functions subjects in our experiments commonly reported, and that have been discussed across 
the autobiographical memory literature (Bauer, McAdams, & Pals, 2008; Bluck et al., 2005; 
Pillemer, 1992; McAdams et al., 2001). Furthermore, people often report post-traumatic growth 
even if a traumatic experience also produced maladaptive consequences such as post-traumatic 
stress symptoms. These reports fit with our finding that any given memory can serve functions in 
both adaptive and maladaptive ways. 
We do not know, however, the extent to which order effects contributed to the 
relationships between the functions and people’s willingness to erase their memories. In 
Experiment 1, subjects completed the function and valence ratings before rating their willingness 
to erase that memory. It is possible that rating the functions first encouraged subjects to consider 
those functions when rating their willingness to erase that memory. In turn, subjects might have 
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adjusted their willingness based on their function ratings in a way they normally would not have. 
In Experiment 2, we attempted to address this possibility by reversing the order and first asking 
people to decide how willing they would be to erase the memory before rating valence and 
function. That the findings of the two experiments produced similar results provides some 
evidence against this possibility. Furthermore, if order effects were driving these relationships, it 
is unclear why we would not also see similar relationships between valence and people’s 
willingness to erase their memories. Therefore, it seems unlikely that order effects can explain 
the results of these two experiments. 
There are, however, at least three limitations to our findings. First, we measured the 
adaptive and maladaptive forms of each function with only a single, broad item. In this, a first 
attempt to separate adaptive and maladaptive functions, we operationalized adaptive as “helpful” 
and maladaptive as “hurtful.” But it is possible that when subjects rated the hurtful ways they use 
their memories, they were referring to ways in which the memories were emotionally painful, but 
ultimately adaptive. If so, we might expect that negative memories rated as highly hurtful might 
also be the ones rated as highly helpful. But we found instead that subjects’ ratings of hurtful 
functions were negatively correlated with their ratings of helpful functions. Nonetheless, it is 
important that future research develops more robust measures of the ways in which memories are 
maladaptive. 
A second limitation is that we asked people for events that took place within 24 hours, 
and at a specific time and place. There is evidence, however, that recurring events and events 
that take place over an extended time can serve functions differently to specific events (Waters, 
Bauer, & Fivush, 2014). To establish a broad understanding of how autobiographical memories 
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serve functions in ways that are adaptive and maladaptive, future work should investigate the 
relative mix of functions served by these different types of memories. 
A third limitation is that our measures of function rely on subjects’ self-reports. In this 
way, our work here suffers from the same limitation that plagues the field as a whole: we do not 
know the degree to which the functions people reported accurately reflect the functions their 
memories actually serve. We are, of course, not the first to raise this limitation (Hyman & Faries, 
1992). If we are to move forward as a field, it is worth thinking about ways to incorporate 
behavioural measures into studies of autobiographical memory functions. 
Taken together, these two experiments provide evidence that memories can serve 
directive, self, and social functions in ways that are maladaptive. In doing so, our findings stress 
the importance of taking a broader view of functions that distinguishes between their adaptive 
and maladaptive forms—especially when investigating negative memories. If we, as a field, 
conflate adaptive and maladaptive use of memory, or focus primarily on ways in which people’s 
memories are adaptive, we risk inflating the reported frequency of adaptive functions. More 
broadly, such an approach would hinder our efforts to fully understand the ways in which 
people’s memories affect their behaviour, identity, and relationships. 
Author Notes 
1. This exclusion rate is lower than that of many other published studies run on Mechanical Turk, including 
those from our own laboratory. This low rate could be due to the stringent criteria we used for this study, 
which required at least a 99% approval rating. 
2. We did not exclude subjects on the basis of the length of their description because some subjects provided 
short descriptions (e.g. “getting married”) that appeared to be genuine autobiographical memories. 
3. The reason we employed a logistic regression with subjects’ dichotomous choice as the dependent measure is 
that the bimodal distribution of subjects’ ratings of their likelihood to erase the memory made those data 
inappropriate for linear regression. In addition, because there was very little variance in the maladaptive 
functions of subjects’ positive memories (which were at floor) we restricted these analyses to negative 
memories only. 
4. The data for Experiment 2 were collected before the data for Experiment 1. 
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Abstract 
People often talk about the consequences of their negative experiences with others in 
ways that serve important social functions. But to fully understand this social function, it is vital 
to understand how listeners appraise the event being shared with them. We hypothesized people 
might draw on the consequences of others’ events to appraise what those experiences were like 
at the time. In three pre-registered experiments, we asked subjects to read someone else’s first-
person account of a negative event. For some subjects, this account ended in a statement 
suggesting the event led either to growth or harm. We found that subjects who read that the event 
led to growth tended to think the event was less negative at the time than subjects who read 
nothing about consequences. Taken together, our findings suggest that people draw on the 
consequences of other people’s negative events to make unwarranted appraisals about those 
events. 
Keywords: Autobiographical memory, Social function, Decision-making, Causal 
reasoning, Traumatic memory 
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General audience summary 
In the months and years following a negative event, people will often talk with others 
about the event and its consequences. These “others” must decide how to respond—for example, 
what support or advice to provide to the person sharing the memory. When these others learn of 
the consequences of the event, does it affect their judgments of what the event was like at the 
time? We address that question in three experiments. In each experiment, we asked people to 
read someone else’s first-person account of a negative event. We manipulated the consequences 
reported in that account—some people read that the event had harmful consequences, some read 
that the event led to psychological growth, and some read an account with no report of 
consequences. Compared to people who had not read a report of consequences, those who had 
read the event led to growth tended to think the event was less negative at the time. They also 
thought the event would have caused less intense symptoms of distress. Conversely, those who 
had read that the event led to harm tended to think the event would have caused more symptoms 
of distress than did people who had not read the report of consequences. Taken together, our 
findings suggest that people draw on the consequences of others’ negative events to make 
unwarranted judgments about those events. 
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People draw on the consequences of others’ negative experiences to make unwarranted 
appraisals about those experiences 
A participant in one of our studies relayed to us the most negative event he has 
experienced. “I was driving to school early in the morning,” he wrote. “I began nodding off on 
the highway. I was two or three blocks from school and I fell asleep on a long straight road. 
When I woke up, I had crashed through a barbed wire fence and into a telephone pole. My shirt 
was bloodied. I was crying. The smell of the engine fluids just permeated. I was taken to the 
hospital. No serious injuries, but I was rather lucky to be alive.” 
In the months and years following a negative event such as this one, people will often talk 
about it with others (Pennebaker, Zech, & Rimé, 2001; Pillemer, 1992). Sharing memories in this 
way can elicit empathy from others, and help forge and maintain relationships—important social 
functions. From the research on these social functions of memory, we understand much about 
when and why people share their memories (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 1992). Clearly, 
though, social functions involve not just the person sharing the memory, but also the people on 
the other end. After all, these “receivers” of the memory need to decide what to take away from 
the memory, and how to respond. For example, people listening to a family member recount a 
negative event need to decide what support, advice, and feedback to provide. And in a court 
setting, jurors watching or reading witness testimony need to evaluate that testimony in order to 
reach a verdict. These decisions often depend on people’s interpretation of what happened at the 
time of the event. For example, in one study, subjects thought that a man who missed his plane 
by 5 minutes would have been more upset than if he had missed it by 30 minutes (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). And in another study, subjects who read that a man was shot at a store 
  74  
he rarely visited tended to think the man deserves less compensation than subjects who read he 
was shot at his regular store (Miller & McFarland, 1986). It is important, therefore, that we 
understand the factors that affect people’s appraisals of others’ experiences. 
One factor that might affect these appraisals is the sharer’s own report of the 
consequences of the event. Sometimes, people might report the event caused them harm—for 
example, the participant above might report having repeated, intrusive thoughts about the crash, 
or that it has led him to feel disconnected from other people (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; Burnell, Rasmussen, & Garry, 2020). But other times, people might report the event 
caused them to grow—for example, this participant might report that the crash led him to realize 
he is stronger than he thought, or that it made him feel a greater sense of appreciation for life 
(Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). When others learn of these consequences, does it affect their 
appraisals of what the event was like at the time? That is the question we address in the 
experiments reported here. 
In fact, the consequences of negative events tell us little about what those events were like 
at the time. For instance, the harm people report after a negative event depends on a variety of 
factors, such as their general emotional reactivity, how they remember the event, and how they 
regulate their emotions when thinking about the event (Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011). As a 
result, people who experience similar events can have very different responses (Bonanno & 
Mancini, 2012). Likewise, reports of posttraumatic growth tell us little about how negative an 
event was. In fact, people report growing from all manner of negative events—from the trivial, 
such as breaking the screen on their phone, to Criterion A traumas (Boals & Schuler, 2019; 
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Taken together, the data suggest people have little empirical 
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foundation for drawing on the consequences of another person’s event when making appraisals 
of the event itself. 
Yet the judgment and decision-making literatures provide reasons to expect people might 
draw on the consequences in exactly this way. Broadly, we know that people often rely on their 
knowledge of the world when making judgments, and that this tendency can produce errors 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Along similar lines, we know that people draw on their 
beliefs or “implicit theories” about the world when appraising their own past (Ross, 1989). For 
example, people tend to believe that moral and political views stay relatively consistent over 
time. As a result, when people change their political affiliation, they often misremember their 
past affiliation as aligning with their current affiliation (Reiter, 1980). Perhaps, then, people 
might draw on their beliefs about the world when appraising other people’s experiences. 
Consistent with this idea, one recent study found that clinical psychologists tend to associate 
negative events with harmful consequences, and that this association can lead to memory errors 
(Weine & Kim, 2018). In that study, clinicians who read that a client had extreme symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress tended to misremember the event as more negative than it really was. 
Conversely, clinicians who read that the client had only mild symptoms tended to misremember 
the event as less negative than it was. 
But it remains unclear whether laypeople would fall victim to these same mistakes. After 
all, clinicians frequently encounter people who are suffering harmful consequences, a situation 
that would lead to the overrepresentation of negative consequences in clinicians’ beliefs about 
negative events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). By contrast, laypeople might encounter a wider 
set of responses to negative events, which should lead to more representative beliefs about the 
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consequences of these events. Even so, negative events that had harmful consequences should 
elicit strong emotions and encourage rehearsal, and therefore would still be more memorable 
than negative events without such consequences (Talarico, Bohn, & Wessel, 2019; Talarico, 
LaBar, & Rubin, 2004; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007). We might expect, 
therefore, that even laypeople would tend to believe that negative events reliably lead to negative 
consequences. 
If laypeople do hold such a belief, we might expect that when they learn someone has 
grown from a negative event, this information would conflict with that belief. To resolve this 
conflict, people might reason that the event couldn’t have been all that negative at the time, and 
adjust their appraisal of the event accordingly. Similarly, when people learn that someone has 
been harmed by a negative event, they might think that information is evidence the event was 
particularly negative, and adjust their appraisal of the event to fit that “evidence.” 
To what extent, then, do laypeople rely on reported consequences of other people’s 
experiences to make appraisals about what those events were like at the time? Across three pre-
registered experiments, we asked subjects to read someone else’s first-person accounts of a 
negative event. We then manipulated whether that account included a statement reporting 
posttraumatic growth, harm, or neither, and measured subjects’ appraisals of the event. Across 
all three experiments, our findings converge on the idea that people draw on the consequences of 
negative events to make appraisals about how negative those events were at the time. 
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Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we asked subjects to read a genuine memory report of someone else’s 
negative experience. We manipulated the consequences of the report by appending a description 
of posttraumatic growth, of harm, or neither. Our primary interest was in the extent to which 
subjects would use these reports of consequences to make appraisals of what the event was like 
at the time. The experiment was approved by the University of Waikato’s School of Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee under the delegated authority of the University’s Human Research 
Ethics Committee. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the ethical provisions of 
the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. The experiment was administered online 
using Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/). 
Method 
This experiment was pre-registered, as were Experiments 2 and 3. The pre-registrations, 
materials, and data for all three experiments are available on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/82trp). 
Subjects  
We recruited subjects from the United States and Canada via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform (https://www.mturk.com/) through TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). 
Subjects participated in exchange for $0.30 Amazon credit. Not knowing how large the effects of 
our manipulation might be, we aimed to collect data until we had complete responses from 600 
subjects. Because of the way Mechanical Turk interacts with Qualtrics, 626 subjects completed 
the survey. According to our pre-registered criteria, we then excluded 4 subjects who failed the 
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attention check. Of the remaining 622 subjects, 41 (7%) failed to correctly identify which ending 
sentence (if any) they had read (harm = 9%, control = 3%, growth = 8%). These data suggest 
those 41 subjects did not attend to the memory report, so we excluded them from the analyses. 
The overall patterns do not change when these subjects are included. For completeness, we 
report the results with these subjects included in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B. 
Therefore, our final sample consisted of 581 subjects (191 who read the growth consequence, 
201 who read the harm consequence, and 189 who read nothing about consequences). 
Design  
We manipulated Consequences (harm, control, growth) between subjects. 
Procedure 
First, subjects read a description of one of four negative memories. The memory reports 
were drawn from a prior study in which we had asked people for the negative memory that 
bothers them the most now. One report described a car crash, one described the suicide of a 
father, one described witnessing a friend drowning, and one described being in a tornado 
(Taylor, Jordan, Zajac, Takarangi, & Garry, 2020). We told subjects the memory report was from 
a participant in one of our other studies, and that we would refer to this participant as 
“Participant 7” (P7) for the purposes of maintaining anonymity. The memory reports ranged 
between 60 and 168 words (M = 100.75; see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B for the 
full memory reports and a breakdown of the results separated by memory report). 
Regardless of which memory report subjects read, we manipulated the consequences of 
the event by adding a sentence to the end of the report. Some subjects read an added sentence 
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suggesting the event led to growth: “As a result of this experience I realised I’m stronger than I 
thought I was.” Other subjects read an added sentence suggesting the event led to harm: “As a 
result of this experience I realised I’m not as strong as I thought I was.” A third control group 
read the memory with no added ending sentence. Note that these added endings describe 
Participant 7’s subjective beliefs about the consequences of the event, which may or may not 
reflect its true consequences. In an earlier pilot study, we had found subjects rated all three 
versions of the memories as highly plausible and easy to understand. The results of this pilot 
study can be found in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B. 
Recall we hypothesized that people might draw on the reported consequences to make 
appraisals about what that event was like at the time—for example, after hearing another 
person’s report of growth, people might reason that the event couldn’t have been all that 
negative. We addressed this possibility in two ways. First, we asked subjects about the 
characteristics of the event that P7 experienced—subjects rated the valence and intensity of the 
event itself. Second, we asked subjects about P7’s emotional response at the time of the event—
subjects rated the valence and intensity of the feelings P7 would have experienced at the time 
(see Table 1 for the full wording of these items). Subjects completed these two sets of ratings in 
counterbalanced order. We included an attention check at the end of these two sets of items: 
“Compared to now this is not a real question please select option five.” 
We also included a series of items measuring the extent to which subjects used the 
consequences of the event to appraise P7’s personality. But because those results are not central 
to our primary research question, we report them in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B. 
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Next, subjects completed a three-alternative forced-choice manipulation check asking 
them which sentence had appeared in the memory description they read earlier. There were 
always three options: the sentence suggesting growth, the sentence suggesting harm, and a third 
option which was “None of the above.” Finally, subjects completed basic demographics and 
reported what they thought the purpose of the study was. 
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Table 1 
Items from Experiments 1 and 2 
Experiment 1  
Think about the event itself that Participant 7 described.  
The event that Participant 7 experienced was… (1 = Extremely negative, 7 = Extremely positive)  
The event that Participant 7 experienced was… (1 = Not at all intense, 7 = Extremely intense)  
  
Think about Participant 7’s feelings at the time of the event.  
Participant 7’s feelings at the time were… (1 = Extremely negative, 7 = Extremely positive)  
Participant 7’s feelings at the time were… (1 = Not at all intense, 7 = Extremely intense)  
 
Experiment 2  
This memory is significant for Participant 7’s life because it imparts an important message for them or 
represents an anchor, critical juncture, or a turning point (1 = Not at all, 7 = Completely)  
  
Think about the event itself that Participant 7 described.  
The event that Participant 7 experienced was negative (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely)  
The event that Participant 7 experienced was positive (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely)  
The event that Participant 7 experienced was intense (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely)  
  
Think about Participant 7’s feelings at the time of the event.  
Participant 7’s feelings at the time were negative. (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely)  
Participant 7’s feelings at the time were positive (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely)  
Participant 7’s feelings at the time were intense (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely)  
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Results & Discussion 
Our primary question was: To what extent do laypeople rely on the consequences of other 
people’s negative events to make appraisals of what the events were like at the time? Recall we 
addressed this question in two ways: by asking about the valence of the event itself, and by 
asking about P7’s emotional response at the time the event occurred. 
Let us first turn to subjects’ ratings of the valence of the event, which are displayed in the 
left panel of Figure 1. As the figure shows, across all three conditions subjects tended to rate the 
event as negative. But more importantly, the reported consequences mattered: subjects who read 
the growth consequence rated the event itself as less negative than subjects who read the harm 
consequence, or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.45, 95% CI [0.20, 
0.70], Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.55 [0.30, 0.80]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was plausibly no different from 
zero, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.10 [-0.15, 0.35]. The reports of consequences did not affect subjects’ 
ratings of how intense the event was (see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B for a full 
breakdown). 
We found a similar pattern when we examined subjects’ ratings of P7’s emotional 
response at the time the event occurred. These data are displayed in the right panel of Figure 1. 
Across all three conditions, subjects rated P7’s feelings at the time of the event as negative. But 
again, the reported consequences mattered: subjects who read the growth consequence rated P7’s 
feelings at the time of the event as being less negative than subjects who read the harm 
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consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.95, 95% CI [0.63, 
1.27], Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.73 [0.41, 1.05]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was plausibly no different from 
zero, Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.22 [-0.11, 0.55]. We did find, however, that subjects who read the harm 
consequence rated P7’s feelings as more intense than subjects who read nothing about 
consequences, Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.39 [0.05, 0.74]. See the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B 
for a full breakdown of subjects’ intensity ratings. 
Together, both measures provide evidence for the idea that when people read about 
someone else’s negative event, they draw on reports of growth to make appraisals about what the 
event was like at the time. But what are we to make of the finding that reports of harm had no 
effect on people’s judgments about how negative the event was? It is possible that even without 
Figure 1. Violin plots of subjects’ valence ratings from Experiment 1, split by condition. The left panel 
displays subjects’ ratings of the valence of the event, the right panel displays subjects’ ratings of the 
valence of P7’s feelings at the time. Dots represent individual data points, diamonds represent the cell 
means, and error bars represent the 95% CI around the cell mean. 
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any information about consequences people tend to assume that these negative events would 
have had harmful consequences. If that is the case, it makes sense that the report of harm would 
have done little to change subjects’ understanding of the events. But it is also possible that these 
results were driven by a ceiling effect—even when P7 reported nothing about consequences, 
subjects rated the event as highly negative, which left little room for the harmful consequences to 
push people’s ratings higher. We attempted to address these possible explanations in Experiment 
2. 
Summary 
Taken together, these results show that when someone reports growing from a negative event, 
others tend to judge the event as being less negative at the time it happened. But one could argue 
that this finding is not surprising because these appraisals are warranted and logical. To see why, 
consider what a subject might make of the statement that “as a result of this experience I realized 
I’m stronger than I thought I was.” It is plausible the subject might reason that the basis for this 
realization was that P7 was less distressed than he or she expected to be during the event itself. 
And if P7 was not that distressed during the event, it makes sense to infer that the event was not 
that negative at the time. This logic would be reasonable, and could cause the pattern of results 
we see here. In Experiment 2, we address this counter-explanation by making it clear that the 
growth or harm P7 reports was not a realization that happened at the time of the event, but 
instead arose only after considerable reflection. In addition, to better understand how the 
consequences reported by P7 affect subjects’ appraisals of the event, we asked subjects to rate 
how significant the event would have been to P7’s life story. 
Experiment 2 
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Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform in exchange for $0.30 
Amazon credit. In Experiment 1 we were able to estimate effect sizes with good precision, so we 
again aimed to collect data until we had complete responses from 600 subjects. From a null 
hypothesis significance testing perspective, in Experiment 1 the differences between subjects 
who read about growth and subjects in the other two conditions were large (d’s > 0.49). 
Therefore, maintaining this sample size in Experiment 2 gave us greater than 99% power to 
detect an effect of the same size. Because of the way Mechanical Turk interacts with Qualtrics, 
630 subjects completed the survey. It was always our intention to collect data from 600 subjects, 
but we mistakenly wrote in our pre-registration that our intended sample size was 300 subjects. 
According to our pre-registered criteria, we again excluded 6 subjects who failed the attention 
check. Once more, we also excluded a further 70 (11%) who failed to correctly identify which 
ending sentence (if any) they had read (harm = 17%, control = 6%, growth = 11%), leaving us 
with a final sample of 554 subjects (169 who read the growth consequence, 195 who read the 
harm consequence, and 190 who read nothing about consequences). 
Design 
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated Consequences (harm, control, growth) between 
subjects. 
Procedure 
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The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1, with a few exceptions. 
We dropped the Big Five measure, and dropped the tornado memory because it was considerably 
longer than the other three reports and was the only report that referenced how old “P7” was at 
the time of the event. Therefore, subjects read one of three negative memories: a car crash, the 
suicide of a father, or a friend drowning. Once again, we manipulated the consequences of the 
event by adding a sentence to the end of the memory. This time, however, the growth 
consequence was “I have reflected on this experience a lot and have come to realize that because 
I went through it, I have since changed for the better.” The harm consequence was “I have 
reflected on this experience a lot and have come to realize that because I went through it, I have 
since changed for the worse.” A third control group read the memory with no added 
consequence. 
Next, subjects completed a series of ratings about the event P7 described. These ratings 
were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the items measuring the valence of the event and 
the valence of P7’s feelings were each split into two items—one assessing positive valence and 
one assessing negative valence (see Table 1). We made this change in an effort to increase the 
variance in subjects’ responses and reduce the possible ceiling effect seen in Experiment 1. 
Subjects also rated the intensity of the event and of P7’s feelings, as in Experiment 1. We report 
the results of these intensity items in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B. 
Subjects then rated how significant the event would have been to P7’s life story on one 
item: “This memory is significant for Participant 7’s life because it imparts an important message 
for them or represents an anchor, critical juncture, or a turning point” (1 = Not at all, 7 = 
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Completely; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Finally, subjects answered basic demographic 
questions and reported what they thought the purpose of the study was. 
Results & Discussion 
Before returning to our primary question, we first examined subjects’ ratings of how 
significant the event would have been to P7’s life story. We found that, compared to control 
subjects, subjects who read either the growth consequence or the harm consequence rated the 
event as more significant, Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.45, 95% CI [0.22, 0.69], Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.54 
[0.30, 0.79]. Descriptive statistics for this measure can be found in Table 2. Given that subjects 
in those two groups had read an additional sentence explicitly stating that P7 has reflected on the 
experience a lot and that the event changed P7, this finding is not entirely surprising. 
Nonetheless, these data provide further evidence that subjects attended to the endings and 
considered them when making ratings about the event. 
Table 2 
Significance ratings from Experiments 2 and 3 
Consequence 
Experiment 2 
M (SD) 
Experiment 3 
M (SD) 
Harm 6.52 (0.86) 6.03 (1.15) 
Control 5.98 (1.18) 5.69 (1.38) 
Growth 6.43 (0.86) 6.34 (0.89) 
We next returned to our main question: To what extent do people rely on the 
consequences of other people’s experiences to make appraisals of what those events were like at 
the time? Once again, we addressed this question in two ways: by asking about the 
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characteristics of the event itself, and by asking about P7’s emotional response at the time the 
event occurred. 
First, we examined subjects’ ratings of the event itself. We created a combined measure 
of subjects’ ratings of the valence of the event by reverse coding the item asking subjects how 
positive the event was and then calculating the mean of this reverse-coded item and the item 
asking subjects how negative the event was. The two event valence items were highly correlated, 
r(552) = -0.80, and the combined measure had excellent internal consistency (! = 0.89). The 
overall patterns do not change when these items are considered separately. The same is true of 
the two feelings valence items, r(552) = -0.76, ! = 0.86. The data from this combined measure 
are displayed in the left panel of Figure 2. As the figure shows, we found a very similar pattern 
Figure 2.   Violin plots of subjects’ valence ratings from Experiment 2, split by condition. The 
left panel displays subjects’ ratings of the valence of the event, the right panel displays subjects’ 
ratings of the valence of P7’s feelings at the time. Dots represent individual data points, 
diamonds represent the cell means, and error bars represent the 95% CI around the cell mean. 
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to Experiment 1. More specifically, subjects across all three conditions rated the event as 
negative, and we again found some evidence that the ending mattered: subjects who read the 
growth consequence rated the event itself as less negative than subjects who read the harm 
consequence or who read nothing about the consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.62, 95% CI [0.42, 
0.82], Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.61 [0.42, 0.81]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(harm-control) = 
0.01 [-0.20, 0.21]. As the figure shows, we were not successful in reducing the ceiling effect in 
subjects’ ratings.  
We again found a similar pattern when we turned to subjects’ ratings of P7’s emotional 
response to the event. Here, too, we created a combined measure of subjects’ ratings by reverse 
coding the item asking subjects how positive P7’s feelings were at the time and then calculating 
the mean of this reverse-coded item and the item asking subjects how negative P7’s feelings 
were at the time. The data from this combined measure are displayed in the right panel of Figure 
2. Subjects rated P7’s feelings at the time of the event as negative across all three conditions. But 
as in Experiment 1, subjects who read the growth consequence rated P7’s feelings at the time as 
being less negative than subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about 
consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.54, 95% CI [0.31, 0.76], Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.49 [0.27, 0.71]. 
The difference between subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing 
about consequences was again trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.05 [-0.18, 0.28].  
Overall, these results suggest that people drew on the consequences of the event to make 
appraisals about what the event was like at the time. Perhaps most crucial for our purposes is that 
in this experiment it was clear the consequences P7 reported came about after the event, rather 
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than during the event itself. For this reason, the information about these consequences should not 
logically support appraisals of the event itself. Therefore, our findings provide evidence that 
people draw on the consequences even when doing so is unwarranted. 
Considered together, Experiments 1 and 2 tell us that if, for example, someone reports 
growing from a car crash, people tend to judge the crash as less negative at the time it occurred. 
These results raise the possibility that people think extremely negative events are unlikely to lead 
to growth. Of course, that does not mean a report of growth will lead people to think a negative 
event was a joyous experience. After all, subjects in these experiments still tended to rate the 
events as at least somewhat negative. This pattern is hardly surprising—subjects had just read an 
account of the event itself. This account would provide evidence the event was, in fact, negative. 
Nonetheless, reading a report of growth led subjects to adjust their appraisals of the event 
towards it being less negative. 
If people do believe that negative events are unlikely to lead to growth, they might also 
think that growth is a sign that the event would not have been particularly distressing in the 
months following the event. But this appraisal, too, would be unwarranted. After all, the 
literature suggests reports of growth and post-traumatic stress symptoms often go hand-in-hand 
(Liu, Wang, Li, Gong, & Liu, 2017). To what extent, then, do people use reports of growth to 
make appraisals about the distress others would have experienced following negative events? We 
set out to answer this question in Experiment 3 by asking subjects to rate the symptoms of 
distress P7 would have experienced in the months following the event. 
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Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform, who participated in 
exchange for $0.30 Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until we had 450 complete 
responses, after exclusions. In Experiments 1 and 2, the differences between control subjects and 
subjects who read about growth were all large (d > 0.49). Using the smallest of these effect sizes 
(d = 0.496), maintaining a sample size of 600 would have given us greater than 99% power to 
detect an effect of that size. Reducing the sample size to 450 still left us with greater than 98% 
power. On that basis, we settled on 450 overall. Because of the way Mechanical Turk interacts 
with Qualtrics, 469 subjects completed the survey. According to our pre-registered criteria, we 
excluded 42 subjects who failed the attention check, and 2 subjects who provided a nonsensical 
description of the event they had read. Because substantially more subjects failed these attention 
checks than we anticipated based on the first two experiments, our sample was somewhat smaller 
than we planned (427). Once again, we then excluded a further 49 (11%) who failed to correctly 
identify which ending sentence (if any) they had read (harm = 14%, control = 6%, growth = 
15%), leaving us with a final sample of 378 subjects (120 who read the growth consequence, 141 
who read the harm consequence, and 117 who read nothing about consequences). 
Design 
As in the first two experiments, we manipulated Consequences (harm, control, growth) 
between subjects. 
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Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2, except we did not ask 
subjects about what the event was like at the time. Instead, we asked subjects to report the 
symptoms of distress they thought P7 would have experienced in the months following the event. 
To do so, we modified the Impact of Events Scale – Revised (IES-R; Weiss and Marmar, 1997), 
such that subjects rated—on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely)—how intensely they 
thought P7 would have been affected by each of 22 symptoms in the months following the event. 
Examples of these symptoms include “Any reminder brought back feelings about it” and “I was 
jumpy and easily startled.” We also included an attention check in this block of items: “I 
struggled to this is not a real question, please select moderately.” The full instructions and list of 
items can be found in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix B. As in Experiment 2, subjects 
also rated how significant the event would have been to P7’s life story. Finally, as an additional 
attention check, we also asked subjects to describe the event they had read. 
Results & Discussion 
In line with Experiment 2, we found subjects who read the growth consequence rated the 
event as more significant to P7’s life story than subjects who read nothing about consequences, 
Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.65, 95% CI [0.31, 0.98]. Subjects who read the harm consequence rated the 
event as slightly more significant to P7’s life story than subjects who read nothing about 
consequences, but the size of this effect was plausibly close to zero, Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.33 [-0.02, 
0.68]. 
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We next turned to our primary question: To what extent would people draw on other 
people’s reports of growth to make appraisals about the distress those people experienced in 
response to a negative event? To answer this question, we followed the usual practice for scoring 
the IES-R and summed together, for each subject, their ratings about the 22 symptoms. We then 
took this new sum—which could range between 0 and 88—and classified it according to whether 
the subject read the growth consequence, the harm consequence, or nothing about consequences. 
This measure had excellent internal consistency (! = 0.94). We display these results in Figure 3. 
As the figure shows, subjects who read the growth consequence thought P7 would have 
experienced less intense symptoms of distress in the months following the event than subjects 
who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 
11.10, 95% CI [6.61, 15.59], Mdiff(control-growth) = 5.41 [0.88, 9.93]. These results suggest that 
subjects were using P7’s report of growth to make appraisals about his or her symptoms of 
distress in the months following the event—consistent with the findings from the first two 
experiments. Furthermore, we found that subjects who read the harm consequence thought that 
P7 would have experienced more intense symptoms of distress in the months following the event 
than subjects who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-control) = 5.69 [0.99, 10.39]. These 
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results suggest that subjects drew on reports of harmful consequences to make appraisals of P7’s 
experience. Furthermore, these results provide some evidence that the lack of any effect of the 
harmful consequence on subjects’ ratings in the first two experiments was driven by a ceiling 
effect. These patterns hold true across each of the subscale scores (see the Supplemental 
Materials in Appendix B). 
So far, we have examined how subjects’ ratings of symptoms depended on the 
consequences they read. But the absolute level of these symptom ratings is also informative. If 
we again turn to Figure 3, the horizontal line (at a score of 33) represents the level of symptoms 
on the self-scored version of the IES-R that would indicate the probable presence of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (Creamer, Bell, & Failla, 2003). As Figure 3 shows, subjects in all 
three conditions tended to rate P7’s symptoms as being well above this cutoff level, (Mharm = 63, 
Figure 3.   Violin plot of symptom ratings split by condition. Dots 
represent individual data points, diamonds represent the cell means, 
and error bars represent the 95% CI around the cell means. 
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Mcontrol = 58, Mgrowth = 52). In fact, 92% of all subjects rated P7’s symptoms above this cutoff. 
These high symptom ratings also hold true across all three memory reports—91% who read the 
car crash report rated symptoms above cutoff, 93% who read the father’s suicide report, and 92% 
who read the friend drowning report. These results fit with the possibility subjects believe 
negative events like these reliably lead to severe symptoms of distress—despite the fact the 
literature suggests that such extreme distress is rare (Bromet, Karam, Koenen, & Stein, 2018). 
General Discussion 
Across three experiments and 1513 subjects, we investigated the extent to which people 
draw on the consequences of other people’s negative events to make appraisals about what those 
events were like at the time. We found that people who read someone grew from a traumatic 
event tended to rate that event as less negative than people who read the same event with no 
report of consequences. Moreover, they expected that person to experience fewer symptoms of 
distress in the subsequent months. In addition, people who read that someone was harmed by a 
traumatic event tended to expect that person to experience more severe symptoms of distress 
than people who read the same event with no report of consequences. These results converge on 
the idea that people use information about the consequences of other people’s experiences to 
reason backwards, making unwarranted appraisals about what the events were like at the time. 
A critic might argue, however, that the way subjects adjusted their appraisals about the 
event was actually quite reasonable, given the information subjects had about the consequences. 
After all, even among distressing events, there is a general tendency for events at the extreme to 
result in more harmful consequences than their less extreme counterparts (Rind, Tromovitch, & 
Bauserman, 1998). But relying on these kinds of general tendencies when making judgments can 
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often produce errors (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). For instance, harm is not a reliable 
sign that an event was particularly negative at the time. In fact, the harm caused by an event is 
more a function of how people remember that event than what the event was like at the time, 
which in turn depends on a number of characteristics—such as how intensely that person tends to 
experience emotions or how often that person ruminates about negative events (Rubin, Dennis, 
& Beckham, 2011). But even if there is some merit in drawing on a report of harm to decide that 
an event was highly negative, there is no merit in drawing on a report of growth to decide an 
event was less negative. If anything, the evidence suggests that the more negative an event was, 
the more people think they have grown as a result of that event—a pattern that goes against the 
appraisals subjects made in our experiments (Liu, Wang, Li, Gong, & Liu, 2017). 
Why, then, would subjects rely on people’s reports of consequences when making these 
appraisals? One explanation is that subjects drew on their general beliefs that traumatic events 
reliably lead to harmful consequences. This explanation fits with the finding from Experiment 3 
that subjects across all three conditions expected P7 to experience high levels of symptoms of 
distress. If subjects did draw on such a belief, Participant 7’s statement of growth would have 
conflicted with this belief. How would subjects resolve such a conflict? One possibility is that 
subjects would update their beliefs about traumatic events to fit this new evidence that traumatic 
events can lead to growth. But this possibility would not explain why subjects adjusted their 
appraisals of what the event was like at the time. That pattern of results instead fits with another 
possibility: that subjects held on to their beliefs about the consequences of traumatic events and 
changed their appraisals of what the event was like at the time—in other words, they changed 
their interpretation of the evidence to fit their beliefs. To the extent that people believe traumatic 
events reliably lead to harmful consequences, this belief would not square with the research. In 
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fact, the majority of people who experience negative events like the ones depicted in our 
materials actually tend to respond with resilience, and rarely go on to report lasting symptoms of 
distress (Bonanno, 2004; Bromet, Karam, Koenen, & Stein, 2018; Galatzer-Levy, Huang, & 
Bonanno, 2018). How people come to hold these inaccurate beliefs, and how they might be 
corrected are important questions for future research to address. 
The idea that people might believe traumatic events reliably lead to harmful consequences 
is reminiscent of the affective forecasting literature, in which people are asked to predict how 
they would respond to a positive or negative event if it were to happen to them in the future 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Typically, people overestimate their reaction to the event—so, in the 
case of negative events, people overestimate how much distress the event will cause them. Yet 
we might still expect people to be more optimistic about their own chances of growing from a 
traumatic event than they are about others’ chances of growing from a similar event. After all, 
people tend to be more optimistic about their own future than they are about others’ futures 
Weinstein (1980). Moreover, people view themselves as improving over time more so than other 
people (Wilson & Ross, 2001). One avenue for future research, then, would be to compare 
people’s predictions about how they might respond to a traumatic event to their predictions of 
how others might respond to that event. 
To what extent, though, are these effects likely to be practically meaningful? One could 
argue that the effects reported here are relatively small—after all, even when subjects read an 
event led to growth, they still tended to rate the events as negative. But there are reasons to think 
these effects might be more pronounced in real-world situations. In these experiments, we 
designed our materials to provide a strong test of our hypothesis—the memory reports described 
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Criterion A events that were unambiguously terrible, and we added only a short, one-sentence 
description of the consequences. When the circumstances of an event are more ambiguous, or 
when the report of consequences is more extensive, people might be even more likely to adjust 
their appraisals of the event on the basis of the consequences. After all, we know that under 
conditions of uncertainty, people tend to rely more on causal inferences, and decision-making 
tends to be particularly swayed by heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982). Nonetheless, the extent to which the effects reported here have real-world 
consequences for the actions of family members, friends, and jurors is an empirical question, and 
our hope is that these experiments prompt future research on this topic. 
In these experiments, we aimed to tap into subjects' appraisals of what negative events 
were like at the time they happened. But it remains unclear how reports of consequences affect 
listeners' appraisals of how the memories affect the rememberer in the long term. For example, a 
report of growth might lead listeners to conclude the memory continues to serve helpful 
functions for the rememberer, while a report of harm might lead them to conclude it continues to 
serve harmful functions. In future, it might be useful to give subjects the opportunity to appraise 
both the event at the time and its later effects on the rememberer's thinking and behavior. Doing 
so might better illuminate the relationships between people’s appraisals of what an event was 
like at the time and their appraisals of the subsequent effects that memory has on thinking and 
behavior. 
There are, of course, several limitations to these experiments. First, we used only a small 
set of memory reports across all three experiments. Although these reports described a range of 
different events, and we found similar patterns across these events, we do not know the extent to 
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which these effects generalize to other events. Second, the memory reports featured short, broad 
statements of consequences; other ways of describing growth or harm might produce different 
effects. For instance, a more specific report of growth that steps subjects through the process of 
how that growth came about might make it easier to understand how one could grow from a 
negative event. In that case, the report of growth might be less likely to change subjects’ 
appraisals of what the event was like at the time. Third, as one of our dependent measures in 
Experiments 1 and 2, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which “the event Participant 7 
experienced” was positive or negative. Our aim here was to tap into subjects’ appraisals of what 
the event was like at the time it happened. But it is possible some subjects interpreted “the event” 
as encompassing both the event itself and its subsequent consequences. To the extent that some 
subjects interpreted the question this way, it would be perfectly reasonable for those subjects to 
adjust their ratings on the basis of Participant 7’s report of consequences. Finally, we did not tell 
subjects how much time had passed between the event and when the memory report was written. 
This information might have important effects on the extent to which people would draw on the 
consequences, because people are especially likely to draw causal links between events and 
subsequent consequences when those consequences occur soon after the event (Lagnado & 
Sloman, 2006). 
These results have implications for our understanding of the functions of autobiographical 
memory (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 1992). More specifically, the results demonstrate that 
when people share their own appraisal of how an event has affected them, listeners use that 
information to make appraisals of both the event itself and the people sharing the memory. If, in 
turn, listeners tend be less empathetic or less likely to realize that someone is still dealing with 
distress, this situation could be an example of how memories can serve a maladaptive social 
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function (Burnell, Rasmussen, & Garry, 2020). Furthermore, there is evidence that people extract 
lessons from other people’s memories, and use those memories to guide their own behaviour—a 
clear example of a directive function (Pillemer, Steiner, Kuwabara, Thomsen, & Svob, 2015). To 
fully understand these functions, it is important that future research continue to investigate the 
factors that affect how people appraise and use the memories that others share with them. 
These results also add to a literature showing that the consequences reported by victims in 
court can affect how willing jurors are to find the defendant guilty in criminal cases, and how 
much liability jurors attribute to the defendant in civil cases (Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek, & Holt, 
1977; Greene, Johns, & Bowman, 1999). Although some have theorized that these effects might 
reflect jurors’ desire to seek vengeance for the victim’s suffering (Davis, Kerr, Stasser, Meek, & 
Holt, 1977), our findings suggest the consequences reported by the victim might alter jurors’ 
interpretations of the facts of the case. This possibility fits with work showing that jurors often 
develop a story of the case, and adjust their interpretation of new facts to fit within this story 
(Carlson & Russo, 2001; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
Taken together, the three experiments reported here show that people use the 
consequences of others’ experiences to make unwarranted appraisals of what those experiences 
were like at the time. These findings raise the possibility that people hold beliefs about negative 
events that do not square with reality, and highlight the importance of understanding how people 
interpret and use the memories others share with them. 
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Abstract 
People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—
much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. 
Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. 
These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological 
characteristics as their believed memories (e.g. Mazzoni et al., 2010). But can they also continue 
to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their 
retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions, and compared these functions to those 
served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. We found that people’s retracted memories still 
served both helpful and harmful functions, and to a similar extent as their genuine memories. 
Furthermore, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and 
the extent to which those memories served functions. These results suggest memories can serve 
functions even in the absence of belief, and highlight the potential for false memories to affect 
people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them. 
Keywords: False memory, Memory Functions, Autobiographical memory 
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Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways 
A participant in one of our studies recounted a vivid memory of an accident that occurred 
while he was renovating his home. During the renovations, he told us, a piece of metal flew into 
his eye. The doctors explained that although his eyesight would be unaffected, they could not 
remove the metal. But a few years later, when this man was getting an MRI scan, he learned 
there was no piece of metal in his eye. He came to realize his memory was completely false; 
there had been no accident, and no trip to the doctor. These false memories—like real 
memories—can be very compelling, and affect people’s thinking and behavior in both helpful 
and harmful ways (Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005; Laney, Morris, Bernstein, 
Wakefield, & Loftus, 2008; Pillemer, 1992). For example, our participant’s memory might have 
led him to be more cautious in his home repairs or to worry about the metal lurking in his eye. 
But even after he realized the accident never really happened, this man still retained a vivid 
“memory” of the event. Could this memory, once retracted, still affect his behavior? 
This question is important to answer, because this man’s experience is far from an 
isolated case. In fact, the literature suggests approximately 20% of adults can think of at least one 
“memory” of an event they now realize never really happened (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 
2010). These “memories” have been referred to in the literature as “nonbelieved memories,” and 
are typically defined as “a vivid memory for an event that you used to believe was true, however 
for some reason you stopped believing that the memory was in fact true. However, the 
nonbelieved memory continues to feel similar to an actual memory for a true event” (Mazzoni, 
Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). These sorts of memories 
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comprise a class of memories of interest for a variety of theoretical and practical reasons (Otgaar, 
Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2015). 
But are these memories best described as “nonbelieved memories?” It is true that, as a 
package, people are no longer willing to call the memories real. Yet people often report belief in 
at least some aspects of these memories—a finding that does not square with the term 
“nonbelieved” (Scoboria, Nash, & Mazzoni, 2017). Of course, this continued belief is hardly 
surprising in light of the work showing false memories typically feature plausible arrangements 
of people, places, and objects (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Hyman & Kleinkneckt, 1999; 
Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). Also, the term “nonbelieved memories” does not convey a 
crucial feature of these memories—that people once believed in the parts of the memory they 
eventually realized were not real. To address these two concerns, we turned to the false memory 
literature, in which the term “retracted” has long been used to describe memories people used to 
believe, but no longer do (Lief & Fetkewicz, 1995; Ost, 2017). “Retracted memories” can 
accommodate memories in which people hold some belief, but which don’t, ultimately, meet the 
threshold to be endorsed as real. Moreover, the term “retracted” echoes usage in legal settings, in 
which retracting means to formally withdraw a legal document that had been put forward. For all 
these reasons, we suggest the term “retracted memories” would better capture the class of 
memories people have come to realize are false. It is therefore the term we adopt here. 
To understand the potential for these retracted memories to affect people’s thinking and 
behavior, we first need to consider the effects of “genuine” autobiographical memories. The 
literature suggests that autobiographical memories have at least three broad helpful functions 
(Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Pillemer, 1992). First, they direct people’s thinking and 
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behavior—for example, by providing lessons that people can use to solve problems and plan for 
the future (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Pillemer, 2003). Second, they help people maintain a 
coherent and positive sense of self—for instance, the memory of an academic success might give 
people confidence that they are intelligent and capable (Conway, 2005; Ross & Wilson, 2003). 
Third, people share their memories with others in ways that help forge and maintain vital social 
relationships—for example, people might discuss an emotional experience to elicit empathy from 
friends or family (Alea & Bluck, 2003). Recent evidence suggests memories can also serve 
harmful versions of these functions—for example, leading people to make the wrong decision or 
to have a negative sense of self (Burnell, Rasmussen, & Garry, 2020). Could retracted memories 
still serve these functions, helpful and harmful, even after people have retracted them? That is 
the question we address here. 
On the one hand, there are reasons to think retracted memories might not continue to 
serve functions. From an evolutionary perspective, it would not be particularly adaptive for 
people to rely on memories they know are wrong (Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Boucher, 2017). After all, it has been suggested that a key evolutionary 
advantage of memory is that it enables organisms to remember their past experiences and adjust 
their subsequent behavior accordingly (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002). For example, 
humans’ ability to remember where to find food and water provides obvious survival advantages 
(Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010). But if these memories were wrong, relying on them might not be 
adaptive—there would be little utility in seeking out a watering hole that never existed. In fact, 
relying on these memories might even be maladaptive, leading to unnecessary expenditure of 
time and energy. Therefore, when people realize one of their autobiographical memories is false, 
we might expect them to stop relying on it. Indeed, there is some evidence for this idea. In one 
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study, some subjects were led to falsely remember reading a “lure” word from a Deese-
Roediger-McDermott list (Deese, 1959; Otgaar, Moldoveanu, Wang, & Howe, 2017; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Later, when asked to solve a problem related to the lure word, subjects’ 
performance depended on whether they believed in this false memory. Subjects who believed 
they saw the lure word tended to be faster at solving the problems than subjects who never 
developed this false memory. But more importantly, subjects who initially believed they saw the 
lure word, but were then told their memory was wrong, did not show this advantage. These 
findings fit with the idea that when people stop believing in a memory, that memory is less likely 
to guide their thinking and behavior. 
On the other hand, there are reasons to think retracted memories might continue to serve 
functions. For one thing, when people imagine events that might happen in the future, they 
clearly do not believe those events have happened. Yet these future thoughts can have profound 
effects on thinking and behavior (Daniel, Stanton, & Epstein, 2013; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; see also Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Sanson, Newman, & Garry, 2018). 
Perhaps, then, the vivid phenomenological characteristics of these thoughts help drive them to 
serve functions. Consistent with this idea, vivid phenomenological characteristics have been 
linked with the functions of memories. Autobiographical memories often contain valuable 
perceptual, spatial, and temporal information people can draw on, and which helps cue memories 
when they are needed (Pillemer, 1992; Schacter & Madore, 2016; Tulving, 1985; Williams, 
2007). Therefore, if retracted memories retain these episodic characteristics, they might continue 
to serve functions. Indeed, when people retract their belief in a memory, many of the 
characteristics of that “memory”—including the sense of reliving that accompanies it—remain 
relatively unaffected (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Scoboria et al., 2014). Why? One 
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possible explanation is that belief is not an inherent or stable property of a memory. Instead, it is 
an attribution people make in the moment, based on factors such as the phenomenological 
characteristics of that memory, whether it makes logical sense, and whether it fits with other 
supporting memories (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Sanson, Cardwell, Rasmussen, & Garry, 2020; Taylor, Jordan, Zajac, Takarangi, & Garry, 
2020). Therefore, if belief is simply an attribution, retracting a memory should have minimal 
impact on the characteristics of that memory. And if these phenomenological characteristics are 
what drives memories to serve functions, we might expect retracted memories to continue 
serving functions. 
To what extent, then, do retracted memories serve functions? If belief in memories is 
important for those memories to serve functions, we should expect retracted memories to serve 
functions to a lesser extent than “believed” memories. But if functions depend at least in part on 
phenomenological characteristics, retracted memories should continue to serve at least some 
functions. Across four pre-registered experiments, we addressed this question by asking people 
to report the helpful and harmful functions of their retracted memories. We then compared these 
functions to those served by their believed memories. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we measured the helpful and harmful functions of people’s retracted 
memories, and compared these functions to those served by memories that people still believe. 
This Experiment was pre-registered; the pre-registrations, supplemental materials, and data for 
all experiments reported in this paper are available on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/q3sjm/?view_only=6ae3a6f255df46b98c53bcd50b6afb7a). These experiments 
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were approved by the University of Waikato’s School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
under the delegated authority of the University’s Human Research Ethics Committee. 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk; 
https://www.mturk.com/) through TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017)2. Subjects 
participated in exchange for Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until 400 subjects had 
completed the survey. Because of the way MTurk interacts with Qualtrics, 414 subjects 
completed the survey. According to our pre-registered criteria, we then excluded 16 subjects who 
did not provide an autobiographical memory—for example, one subject simply wrote “good.” In 
addition to these pre-registered exclusions, we excluded a further 14 who clearly misunderstood 
the instruction to provide a retracted memory—for example, several subjects wrote about 
negative experiences they wish had never happened. Finally, we excluded 7 subjects who 
provided a believed memory outside the requested 4-10 age range3, leaving us with our final 
sample of 377 subjects. 
 
2 We found similar results in an in-person pilot study we conducted with undergraduates—see 
the Supplemental Materials for a summary of this pilot.  
3 The pattern does not change when these subjects are included. 
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Design 
We employed a quasi-experimental design with Memory (retracted, believed) as a 
between-subjects factor. 
Procedure 
First, we provided subjects with a description of a retracted memory, adapted from the 
literature (Mazzoni et al., 2010): 
“Sometimes people have a memory for an event, but they stop believing the event really happened 
to them. Nevertheless, their ‘memory’ for the event continues to feel like a real memory.” 
Then, we asked subjects whether they have one of these memories. Subjects who said 
“yes” were asked to describe the memory. Subjects who said “no” served as our comparison 
group—these subjects provided a “believed” memory that occurred between age 4-10. We used 
this age range in an attempt to match the age of these believed memories to the age of the 
retracted memories, which mostly fell within this age range in one of the landmark studies of 
retracted memories (Mazzoni et al., 2010). 
Next, we asked subjects to rate their nominated memory on four pairs of items that 
measure the extent to which a memory is helpful and harmful, such as “This memory guides my 
thinking and behavior in ways that help me” and “This memory guides my thinking and behavior 
in ways that hurt me” (Burnell et al., 2020; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). These items and their 
anchors appear in Table 1. Then, subjects rated their belief in the memory on a single item, and 
reported how old they were when the event “occurred” (see Table 1). Finally, subjects who 
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described a retracted memory were asked when and why they stopped believing in the memory. 
Because the reasons why subjects stopped believing in their memories are not central to our 
research question, we report those results in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix C. 
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Table 1 
Function, belief, and valence items from Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
Helpful functions 
This memory guides my thinking and behavior in ways that help me (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high 
degree) 
This memory tells me about my identity in ways that help me (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high 
degree) 
I share this memory with other people in ways that help me (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high degree) 
 
This memory gives me a sense of belonging with other people (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high 
degree; Experiments 1 & 2 only) 
Harmful functions 
This memory guides my thinking and behavior in ways that hurt me (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high 
degree) 
This memory tells me about my identity in ways that hurt me (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high 
degree) 
I share this memory with other people in ways that hurt me (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high degree) 
 
This memory gives me a sense of disconnection from other people (1 = Not at all, 7 = To a very high 
degree; Experiments 1 & 2 only) 
Belief 
I believe this event really occurred in the way I remember it, and that I have not imagined or 
fabricated anything that did not occur (1 = 100% imaginary, 7 = 100% real) 
Valence (Experiments 2 and 3 only) 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are positive (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely) 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are negative (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely) 
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Results 
Before turning to our primary research question, we first classified subjects according to 
whether they reported having a retracted memory. We found that 106 people (28%) reported 
having a retracted memory, and 271 people (72%) reported they do not have any. Examples of 
subjects’ retracted memories include “I remember being chased by geese at my 8th birthday 
party in a park, but I feel like I may have gotten that memory from a television show” and “I 
remember really driving my parent’s car when I was a little kid with my younger sister holding 
the pedals.” In the mean, subjects’ descriptions were 36.19 words long (SD = 25.53, Mdn = 28, 
range = 4-127). Examples of subjects’ believed memories include “When I was 7 a friend 
accidentally hit me with a metal bat and I had to go to the hospital to receive stitches” and “I 
remember my 5th birthday party. We had a pinata and a ton of people came. I remember it was 
probably the biggest party I had as a child.” In the mean, subjects’ descriptions were 38.22 words 
long (SD = 24.03, Mdn = 34, range = 3-147). 
As expected, subjects believed their retracted memories less than the believed memories 
(see Table 2). This finding, which suggests residual belief in some retracted memories, fits with 
prior work (Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria, et al., 2017). Subjects believed in their retracted 
memories for a mean of 9.09 years (SD = 9.35) before retracting them, which in turn occurred 
12.38 years (SD = 10.65) prior to the study. The retracted memories also “occurred” at a later age 
than subjects’ believed memories (Mretracted = 13.63, SD = 10.47, Mdn = 10.50, range = 0-59; 
Mbelieved = 6.49, SD = 1.76, Mdn = 6, range = 4-10). 
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Table 2         
Subjects’ belief ratings for each experiment 
Experiment Believed Retracted Mdiff 95% CI 
 M Mdn SD M Mdn SD   
Experiment 1 6.24 7.00 1.24 4.51 5.00 1.94 1.73 [1.33, 2.14] 
Experiment 2 6.41 7.00 1.07 3.81 4.00 2.06 2.60 [2.17, 3.02] 
Experiment 3 5.96 7.00 1.42 3.67 4.00 1.99 2.29 [2.02, 2.55] 
Experiment 4 5.84 6.00 1.16 3.98 4.00 1.50 1.86 [1.67, 2.05] 
We now turn to our primary question: To what extent do people’s retracted memories 
serve helpful and harmful functions? To answer this question, we created a measure of helpful 
function by taking the mean of the items measuring the helpful directive, self, and social 
functions for each memory. Likewise, we created a measure of harmful function by taking the 
mean of the items measuring the harmful directive, self, and social functions. Both measures had 
good internal reliability (!helpful = 0.85, !harmful = 0.88). We display the results of these two 
measures in Figure 1—the left side displays subjects’ ratings of their retracted memories, and the 
right side displays subjects’ ratings of their believed memories. As the distribution on the left 
side of the figure shows, many subjects rated their retracted memories as at least moderately 
helpful and harmful. Furthermore, if we compare these ratings to subjects’ ratings of their 
believed memories, we see the two types of memories were rated as similarly helpful, Mretracted = 
3.06; Mbelieved = 3.18; Mdiff = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.51]. Likewise, subjects’ believed and 
retracted memories were rated as similarly harmful, Mretracted = 2.49; Mbelieved = 2.18; Mdiff = 0.32, 
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95% CI [-0.02, 0.66]. These results suggest that many people think their retracted memories 
continue to serve helpful and harmful functions. 
 
One interpretation of these findings is that people do not need to believe a memory is 
“real” for that memory to serve functions. But there is another possible explanation. As we 
reported earlier, subjects reported some residual belief in their retracted memories (see the 
Supplemental Materials in Appendix C for the distribution). For this reason, it is possible that the 
Figure 1.   Subjects’ ratings from Experiment 1 of the extent to which their nominated 
memory serves helpful and harmful functions. Bars represent the mean values; dots represent 
individual data points. Error bars represent the 95% CIs around the cell means. 
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retracted memories served functions only because subjects still held some belief in them. If this 
account were true, we might expect the memories subjects believed most would be the ones that 
were the most helpful or harmful. Indeed, exploratory analyses provided some evidence for this 
account. For instance, among subjects’ retracted memories, the more people reported believing 
in their memory, the more helpful they rated that memory as being, r(104) = 0.34, 95% CI [0.16, 
0.50]. Likewise, the more people reported believing in their memory, the more harmful they 
rated that memory as being, although this relationship was plausibly no different from zero, 
r(104) = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.35]. These findings raise the possibility that the extent to which 
people believe in a memory is related to the functions that memory serves. But given our 
relatively small sample of retracted memories and the wide confidence intervals around these 
correlations, it is difficult to draw conclusions (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). 
One limitation of these data is that subjects’ retracted memories tended to be for events 
that “occurred” at a later age than the believed events. To the extent that recent events might be 
more vivid and more relevant to people’s current situation, these differences in how long ago the 
believed and retracted events occurred might be masking differences between believed and 
retracted memories that would otherwise be apparent. There were two main reasons that 
subjects’ retracted and believed memories were not well-matched on age. First, subjects tended 
to provide a believed memory from the lower end of the 4-10 age range we gave them—perhaps 
because our instructions encouraged a search starting at age 4. Second, there was a wider spread 
in the ages at which subjects’ retracted memories “occurred” than we anticipated based on prior 
research (Mazzoni et al., 2010; see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix C for a full 
breakdown of the age distribution). Therefore, we next sought to replicate Experiment 1 using a 
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comparison group of believed memories that more closely matched the retracted memories. 
Experiment 2 was not pre-registered, but followed the same analytic approach as Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers on MTurk through TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017). Subjects 
participated in exchange for Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until 400 subjects had 
completed the survey. Because of the way MTurk interacts with Qualtrics, 414 subjects 
completed the survey. As in Experiment 1, we excluded 17 subjects who did not provide an 
autobiographical memory and a further 14 who misunderstood the instruction to provide a 
retracted memory, leaving us with our final sample of 383 subjects. 
Design 
We again employed a quasi-experimental design with Memory (retracted, believed) as a 
between-subjects factor. 
Procedure 
The method for Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1, with three exceptions. 
First, given the wide range of belief ratings we saw in Experiment 1, we attempted to clarify the 
definition of a retracted memory. We provided subjects with the following description: 
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Sometimes people have a memory for an event, but they come to realize the event never happened at all—
their “memory” was completely false. Nevertheless, their “memory” for the event continues to feel like a real 
memory, even though they know the event didn’t really happen. 
Second, we sought to elicit an age distribution of believed memories that was closer to that of the 
retracted memories. To do so, we asked subjects who did not have any retracted memories to 
describe a “believed” memory that occurred before the age of 15. Third, recent work suggests 
negative memories, in particular, are often harmful (Burnell et al., 2020). Therefore, we asked 
subjects to rate the valence of their memory on two items: one measuring the extent to which the 
memory elicits positive feelings, and one measuring the extent to which the memory elicits 
negative feelings (see Table 1). 
Results 
As in Experiment 1, we classified subjects according to whether they reported having a 
retracted memory. In this experiment, 101 people (26%) reported having one, and 282 people 
(74%) reported not having any. An example of a retracted memory was: “I remember going to a 
theme park with my family when I was younger and I remember stuff we did but they tell me 
that we never went anywhere.” Subjects’ descriptions of their retracted memories were 39.55 
words long in the mean (SD = 22.12, Mdn = 34, range = 5-109). An example of a believed 
memory was: “I remember seeing my grandma the last time before she died hoping it would not 
be the last.” Subjects’ descriptions of their believed memories were 41.27 words long in the 
mean (SD = 24.73, Mdn = 36.50, range = 4-174). 
Once again, subjects’ retracted memories were believed less than subjects’ believed 
memories (see Table 2). Our revised instructions elicited memories that were believed less than 
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in Experiment 1. In the mean, the retracted memories were believed for 7.04 years (SD = 7.72), 
and were retracted 12.67 years ago (SD = 11.80). Our revised instructions also brought the age 
distributions closer together than in Experiment 1, but the retracted memories still occurred later 
than the believed memories, Mretracted = 14.99, SD = 12.60, Mdn = 8, range = 1-55; Mbelieved = 
10.08, SD = 3.36, Mdn = 11, range = 1-15. 
Next, we returned to our primary research question: to what extent do retracted memories 
serve functions in helpful and harmful ways? As Figure 2 shows, we replicated the findings of 
Experiment 1. More specifically, many subjects reported their retracted memories serve helpful 
and harmful functions to at least a moderate degree. Furthermore, we again found no evidence 
that people think their retracted memories are less harmful than believed memories, Mretracted = 
2.32; Mbelieved = 2.23 Mdiff = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.40]. We did, however, find that the retracted 
memories tended to be rated as slightly less helpful than believed memories, Mretracted = 2.97; 
Mbelieved = 3.35; Mdiff = 0.38, 95% CI [0.06, 0.71]. Together, these results provide further 
evidence that people think their retracted memories continue to serve helpful and harmful 
functions. 
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As in Experiment 1, we next examined the relationship between subjects’ belief in their 
retracted memories and the degree to which those memories serve functions. In this experiment, 
we found no evidence of a relationship between belief and helpful functions—the correlation 
between these two variables was plausibly no different from zero, r(99) = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.03, 
0.35]. Likewise, the relationship between belief and harmful function was plausibly zero, r(99) = 
0.07, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.26]. Taken together, we found no compelling evidence to suggest that 
belief is important for memories to serve functions. 
Figure 2.   Subjects’ ratings from Experiment 2 of the extent to which their nominated 
memory serves helpful and harmful functions. Bars represent the mean values; dots represent 
individual data points, and error bars represent the 95% CIs around the cell means. 
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But subjects’ retracted and believed memories were still not well matched for how long 
ago the events “occurred.” Therefore, in Experiment 3, we yoked subjects’ believed memories to 
their retracted memories to ensure the two types of memories were matched on age. 
Experiment 3 
To allow us to easily yoke subjects’ believed memories to their retracted memories, we 
switched to a within-subjects design—when subjects reported having a retracted memory, we 
asked them to describe both that memory and a believed memory that “occurred” around the 
same time. In addition, to examine the relationships between the phenomenological 
characteristics of people’s retracted memories and the functions those memories serve, we added 
a series of items measuring phenomenological characteristics from the Autobiographical 
Memory Questionnaire (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003, 2004). Finally, we markedly 
increased our sample size so we could draw stronger conclusions from the correlations between 
belief and functions. This experiment was pre-registered. 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers on MTurk through TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017). Subjects 
participated in exchange for Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until 800 subjects had 
completed the survey to ensure we had a big enough sample of retracted memories to establish 
stable correlations between belief and functions (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Because of the 
way MTurk interacts with Qualtrics, 827 subjects completed the survey. According to our pre-
registered criteria, we excluded 40 subjects who failed both attention checks, 13 who did not 
  129  
provide an autobiographical memory, and 67 who misunderstood the instruction to provide a 
retracted memory, leaving us with our final sample of 707 subjects. 
Design 
We manipulated Memory (retracted, believed) within subjects. 
Procedure 
First, we asked subjects if they have any retracted memories, using the same instructions 
as in Experiment 2. Subjects who said “yes” were asked to describe the memory, and then to 
report how old they were at the time the “event” happened. We then asked those same subjects to 
describe a memory they really do believe that happened at the same age. If they could not think 
of one, we asked them to choose an event that occurred as close to that age as possible. Subjects 
who did not have any retracted memories rated two believed memories, but because the data 
from these subjects is not central to our research question, we report those data in the 
Supplemental Materials in Appendix C. 
Next, subjects rated each memory, in counterbalanced order, on a series of scales—
completing the full set of scales for one memory before rating the other. First, subjects rated the 
functions of the memory and their belief in it using the items from Experiments 1 and 2. We 
removed the function items asking about belonging/disconnection from others because the social 
belonging function is less agreed upon in the literature (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). Then, 
subjects completed 17 items measuring the phenomenological characteristics of the memory, 
such how vivid the memory is, and the extent to which it is accompanied by a sense of reliving 
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(see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix C for the full list of items and the results for each 
item; Rubin et al. 2003). Finally, subjects reported when and why they retracted the memory. 
Results 
Once again, we classified subjects according to whether they reported having a retracted 
memory. A larger percentage of subjects reported having a retracted memory than in the first two 
experiments: 321 people (45%) reported they have one, and 386 people (55%) reported they do 
not have any. Recall that in this experiment, our key comparison was within subjects—we asked 
subjects who had a retracted memory to report both that memory and a believed memory from a 
similar time. For this reason, we report here only the data from subjects who reported having a 
retracted memory. 
In the mean, subjects’ descriptions of their retracted memories were 33.30 words long 
(SD = 21.51, Mdn = 29, range = 4-130). Subjects’ descriptions of these believed memories were 
25.18 words long in the mean (SD = 17.54, Mdn = 21, range = 2-109). 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, subjects believed their retracted memories less than their 
believed memories (see Table 2). In the mean, the retracted memories were believed for 5.94 
years (SD = 7.31), and were retracted 15.88 years ago (SD = 12.27). Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, 
subjects’ believed memories and retracted memories “occurred” at a similar age (Mretracted = 
14.67, SD = 12.75, Mdn = 10, range = 0-68; Mbelieved = 14.61, SD = 12.32, Mdn = 10, range = 1-
68). 
Now, we return to our primary question. As the distributions in Figure 3 show, we found 
converging evidence for the idea that many retracted memories serve helpful and harmful 
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functions. In contrast to Experiment 1, but consistent with Experiment 2, subjects rated their 
retracted memories as less helpful than their believed memories, Mretracted = 3.00; Mbelieved = 3.74; 
Mdiff = 0.74, 95% CI [0.55, 0.93]. Subjects’ believed and retracted memories were rated as 
similarly harmful, Mretracted = 2.27; Mbelieved = 2.26; Mdiff = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.16]. 
 
These differences in helpful functions once again raise the possibility that belief in a 
memory is important for that memory to serve helpful functions. Consistent with this idea, we 
found that the more people believed in a retracted memory, the more helpful it tended to be, 
Figure 3.   Subjects’ ratings from Experiment 3 of the extent to which their believed and 
retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions. Bars represent the mean values; dots 
represent individual data points, and error bars represent the 95% CIs around the cell means. 
  132  
r(319) = 0.37, 95% CI [0.27, 0.46]. We also found that that the more people believed in a 
retracted memory, the more harmful it tended to be, although this relationship was less strong, 
r(319) = 0.14, 95% CI [0.03, 0.25]. These results suggest belief might be related to the functions 
memories serve. 
But there is an important counter-explanation for these results. Because of our design, we 
were not able to manipulate belief independently of other memory characteristics. In fact, we 
found that subjects’ retracted memories were also different from believed memories in 
phenomenology—a finding consistent with previous work (Mazzoni et al., 2010). For example, 
retracted memories were rated as less vivid than believed memories, Mretracted = 4.92; Mbelieved = 
5.46; Mdiff = 0.54, 95% CI [0.36, 0.72] and were accompanied by a less intense sense of reliving, 
Mretracted = 4.47; Mbelieved = 5.04; Mdiff = 0.56, 95% CI [0.38, 0.75]. To get a better picture of the 
relationship between belief and the functions of memory, it is important to consider the 
contribution of the phenomenology of memory. 
Therefore, we conducted exploratory regressions to further investigate how the functions 
of retracted memories are related to belief and two key components of phenomenology: reliving 
and vividness (Rubin, Deffler, & Umanath, 2019). We conducted two linear regressions using 
the data from subjects’ retracted memories: one with belief, vividness, and reliving predicting 
helpful function, and one with belief, vividness, and reliving predicting harmful function. As 
Table 3 shows, both belief and reliving were independently related to the helpful functions 
served by subjects’ retracted memories such that the more people believed in a memory, and the 
more the memory was accompanied by a sense of reliving, the more helpful people rated it. In 
addition, belief was related to harmful functions such that the more people believed in a memory, 
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the more harmful they rated it—although the size of this effect is plausibly very small. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that belief is important for memories to serve functions, 
and suggest that a sense of reliving might also be important—at least for helpful functions. 
Table 3 
Standardized Beta estimates from the regressions from Experiment 3 predicting helpful and harmful 
functions among subjects’ retracted memories 
 Reliving Vividness Belief 
Dependent Measure β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p 
Helpful Function 0.21 [0.09, 0.32] .001 0.09 [-0.04, 0.21] .162 0.27 [0.19, 0.36] <.001 
Harmful Function 0.03 [-0.08, 0.15] .635 0.04 [-0.09, 0.16] .589 0.12 [0.03, 0.20] .045 
Given that we found no evidence that phenomenology is related to harmful functions, 
what other factors might drive memories to serve these harmful functions? One recent study 
found evidence of harmful functions only in memories of negative events, a finding that might 
suggest the valence of a memory is important (Burnell et al., 2020). Because a fair number of the 
retracted memories in this study were negative—30.53% were rated above the midpoint on the 
item assessing negative feelings—we conducted exploratory correlations between the extent to 
which a memory elicits negative feelings and the extent to which it serves harmful functions. We 
found that the more a memory elicited negative feelings, the more harmful it was rated, r(319) = 
0.42, 95% CI [0.33, 0.51]. Furthermore, adding negative feelings to the regression model 
predicting harmful functions showed that this relationship held even after accounting for belief, 
reliving, and vividness (p < .001; see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix C for the full 
regression table). By contrast, the relationship between negative feelings and helpful functions 
was trivial, r(319) = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.15]. These findings suggest that characteristics 
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specific to negative memories, such as the emotions those memories elicit or the kinds of events 
that these memories depict, might be important for memories to serve harmful functions. 
Taken together, these first three experiments provide some evidence that belief is related 
to the helpful functions a memory serves—or, at least, to the functions people think the memory 
serves. But this possibility merits further investigation, for several reasons. First, the regression 
analyses we conducted in this experiment were exploratory. Second, we have so far used only 
single-item measures of belief, reliving, and vividness that might not capture all aspects of those 
constructs. Third, we have so far treated helpful functions as one unitary construct. But it is 
possible the relationships between belief and functions might be different for different functions. 
For example, people might not draw on retracted memories when making decisions, but might 
still talk about those memories with others to forge relationships—after all, people often 
embellish or even lie about their experiences when talking to others (Marsh & Tversky, 2004). 
Therefore, in Experiment 4, we sought to conduct a more robust, pre-registered 
investigation of the relationships between belief, reliving, and helpful functions. And to ensure 
we gathered memories with a wide enough range of belief to see meaningful relationships, we 
broadened our memory prompt instructions—rather than asking people for a memory they have 
completely retracted, we asked them for the memory about which they have the most doubts4. 
 
4 A pilot study established this prompt elicits memories held with varying degrees of belief, see 
the Supplemental Materials. 
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Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 departed from the previous experiments in a number of ways. First, rather 
than asking people for retracted memories, we asked them for the memory they have the most 
doubts about. Second, we employed multi-item measures of belief, reliving, and vividness 
adapted from the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (see Rubin et al., 2019). Third, to 
better enable us to separately examine directive, self, and social functions, we used a different 
measure of functions: the Thinking About Life Events questionnaire, which includes five items 
measuring each of the directive, self, and social functions (TALE; Bluck & Alea, 2011). This 
experiment was pre-registered. 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers on MTurk through TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017). Subjects 
participated in exchange for Amazon credit. Because we anticipated most subjects would be able 
to think of a memory they doubt, we aimed to collect data until 400 subjects had completed the 
survey. Because of the way MTurk interacts with Qualtrics, 413 subjects completed the survey. 
According to our pre-registered criteria, we excluded 13 subjects who failed both attention 
checks, 90 subjects who failed to provide two autobiographical memories, and 14 subjects who 
reported they could not think of a memory they doubt, leaving us with our final sample of 298 
subjects. 
Design 
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We manipulated Memory (doubted, believed) within-subjects. 
Procedure 
First, we provided subjects with a description of a doubted memory: “Sometimes people 
have doubts about particular memories of their past experiences—that is, they doubt whether the 
events they remember really happened at all.” 
Then, we asked subjects to describe the memory they have the most doubts about. To 
provide a believed memory comparison, we asked subjects to describe a memory that happened 
to them during their early childhood5. 
Next, subjects rated the functions, belief, and phenomenology of each memory. Subjects 
made these three sets of ratings in counterbalanced order, and completed all ratings for one 
memory before rating the other. 
Functions. Subjects rated the functions of their memory on the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 
2011). We adapted this questionnaire to ask about a specific memory (see the Supplemental 
Materials in Appendix C). In this scale, subjects complete 15 items that ask about how often they 
 
5 We used this prompt, rather than yoking the believed memories to the retracted memories as we 
did in Experiment 3, so as to counterbalance the order in which people provided and rated the 
two memories. In Experiment 3, we piloted this prompt among subjects who did not have any 
retracted memories (see the Supplemental Materials). 
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think or talk about the memory for a series of reasons, on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (very 
frequently). Five of the items ask about reasons that map on to the directive function, five about 
reasons that map onto the self function, and five about reasons that map onto the social function. 
Note that this scale measures only helpful functions—we did not include a measure of harmful 
functions because in Experiment 3 belief was only a weak predictor of harmful functions and we 
found no evidence that vividness or reliving predicts harmful functions. 
Belief. Subjects rated their belief in the memory on the three items from Rubin et 
al. (2019). The first of these items was the belief item from Experiments 1-3. The second was 
“My memory of the event is an accurate reflection of the event as a neutral observer would 
report it and is not distorted by my beliefs, motives, and expectations” (1 = 100% distorted, 7 = 
100% accurate). The third was “Would you be confident enough in your memory of the event to 
testify in a court of law?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = As much as any memory). 
Phenomenology. Subjects rated the sense of reliving produced by the memory using three 
items from Rubin et al. (2019), all rated from 1 (not at all) to 7 (as if it were happening now): 
“While remembering, it is as if I am living the occurrence again.”; “While remembering, it is as 
if I am mentally traveling back to the time and place of the occurrence.”; and “While 
remembering, it is as if I am experiencing the same feelings, emotions, and/or atmosphere 
again.” Subjects rated the vividness of the memory using two items, also from Rubin et al., on a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (as vivid as if it were happening now): “While remembering, I can 
see everything in my mind.” and “While remembering, the actions, objects, and/or people that 
are involved in the memory are as clear now as they were when the event occurred.” 
Results 
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We first checked that subjects’ doubted memories were rated lower on belief than their 
“believed” memories from a similar time. They were, Mdoubted = 3.98; Mbelieved = 5.84; Mdiff = 
1.86, 95% CI [1.67, 2.05]. Examples of subjects’ doubted memories include “I have a memory 
about my learning to ride a bike. I remember my dad teaching me to ride the bike when I was 5 
years old, but my aunt said that my dad was out of town and she taught me. My aunt has been 
known to stir up trouble so I am not really sure if I can believe her. My dad said that he taught 
me” and “I have doubts about my memory of my grandmother’s death.” 
Before we addressed our primary aim, we next examined subjects’ ratings of the functions 
served by their doubted memories. Recall that in this experiment, we used a function scale that 
measures only the degree to which a memory is helpful. We created a sum variable for each of 
the directive, self, and social functions by taking the mean of the 5 items from the TALE 
measuring that function. We display these function sum variables for the doubted and believed 
memories in Figure 4. As the figure shows, subjects rated the functions of the two types of 
memory as remarkably similar. More specifically, we found no difference between doubted and 
believed memories in terms of directive functions, Mdoubted = 1.93, Mbelieved = 1.86, Mdiff = 0.07, 
95% CI [-0.03, 0.17]; self functions, Mdoubted = 1.88, Mbelieved = 1.84, Mdiff = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 
0.14]; or social functions, Mdoubted = 1.83, Mbelieved = 1.90, Mdiff = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.17]. 
These results replicate the findings of the previous experiments, and provide further support for 
the idea that memories can serve functions even when people doubt the veracity of the memories. 
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Next, we addressed our primary aim: to investigate the relationships among belief, 
recollection, and self-reported helpful functions. To do so, we created a sum variable for reliving 
by calculating the mean of the three items measuring reliving, and a sum variable for vividness 
by calculating the mean of the two items measuring vividness. Then, for each type of memory 
(doubted and believed), we conducted three pre-registered linear regressions—one for each 
function—with belief, vividness, and reliving as predictors. 
Figure 4.   Subjects’ ratings from Experiment 4 of the extent to which their believed and 
doubted memories serve helpful and harmful functions. Bars represent the mean values; dots 
represent individual data points, and error bars represent the 95% CIs around the cell means. 
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We first consider the results from the regressions conducted on subjects’ ratings of their 
doubted memories, displayed in the top half of Table 4. As the table shows, reliving predicted 
the directive and self functions of subjects’ doubted memories, such that the more a memory was 
accompanied by a sense of reliving, the more it tended to serve those two functions. There was 
again no evidence that vividness was related to the functions of these doubted memories. These 
findings are consistent with the pattern we found in Experiment 3. But in contrast to Experiment 
3, we found no evidence that belief predicted the functions of doubted memories. 
We next consider the regressions conducted on subjects’ ratings of their believed 
memories, displayed in the bottom half of Table 4. Here, too, we found that reliving predicted 
the directive and self functions, such that the more a believed memory was accompanied by a 
sense of reliving, the more it tended to serve those functions. We also found that belief predicted 
the directive and social functions of subjects’ believed memories, such that the more subjects 
believed in a memory, the less it tended to serve these functions. This pattern of results is the 
opposite of what we would expect if belief in a memory is important for that memory to serve 
functions—and provides some evidence against this hypothesis. 
Taken together, we did not find evidence to suggest that belief is important for memories 
to serve functions. Instead, the most consistent finding from these regression analyses was that 
the more a memory was accompanied by a sense of reliving, the more people rated it as serving 
directive and self functions. 
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Table 4 
Standardized Beta estimates for the regressions from Experiment 4 
Dependent Measure Reliving Vividness Belief 
 β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p 
Doubted Memories       
Directive function 0.14 [0.02, 0.25] .018* -0.03 [-0.14, 0.07] .550 0.09 [-0.03, 0.20] .138 
Self function 0.13 [0.02, 0.25] .026* -0.02 [-0.13, 0.08] .650 0.05 [-0.07, 0.16] .441 
Social function 0.02 [-0.08, 0.12] .669 0.05 [-0.04, 0.14] .284 -0.01 [-0.11, 0.10] .910 
Believed Memories       
Directive function 0.14 [0.04, 0.25] .007* 0.07  [-0.04, 0.17] .231 -0.18 [-0.31, -0.05] .007* 
Self function 0.21 [0.11, 0.31] <.001* 0.02 [-0.08, 0.13] .665 -0.11 [-0.24, 0.02] .084 
Social function 0.05 [-0.06, 0.15] .372 0.09 [-0.02, 0.20] .120 -0.14 [-0.27, -0.01] .041* 
 
Meta analyses 
Across the four experiments, our findings about the relationships between belief and 
functions were inconsistent. For example, in Experiment 1 we found a moderate positive 
correlation between belief and helpful function, but in Experiment 2 that relationship was smaller 
and plausibly zero. Therefore, to obtain more precise estimates of the strength of these 
relationships, we followed recommendations from Cumming (2014) and conducted two 
exploratory (not pre-registered) mini meta-analyses. 
First, we conducted a meta-analysis of the relationships between belief and helpful 
functions across the four experiments. As the top panel of Figure 5 shows, this analysis 
suggested there was a small, positive correlation between belief and helpful functions. Next, we 
conducted a meta-analysis of the relationships between belief and harmful functions across the 
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first three experiments (we did not measure harmful functions in Experiment 4). As the bottom 
panel of Figure 5 shows, we also found a small positive relationship between belief and harmful 
functions. Given that the four experiments differed in some aspects of their design, the overall 
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effect size estimates should be considered with some caution. But across the board, the results 
suggest belief is, at best, weakly related to the functions people think their memories serve. 
General Discussion 
Figure 5. Forest plots of the relationships between belief and functions. The top panel displays the forest 
plot of the correlations between belief and helpful functions. The bottom panel displays the forest plot of 
the correlations between belief and harmful functions. Squares represent the correlations for each 
experiment, diamonds represent the overall effect size estimate from the meta-analyses. 
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Across four experiments, we investigated the extent to which retracted memories continue 
to serve functions. We consistently found evidence that people think their retracted memories 
serve helpful and harmful functions, and found only weak relationships between people’s belief 
in a memory and the reported functions of the memory. We also found in both Experiments 3 
and 4 that the more a memory was accompanied by a sense of reliving, the more helpful it tended 
to be—even after controlling for subjects’ belief in the memory. 
Taken together, our findings do not support the hypothesis that belief is important for 
memories to serve functions. If belief were important, we would expect the memories people 
have retracted to serve functions less than the memories they still believe. But we instead found 
that people think their retracted memories continue to serve functions to a similar degree as 
believed memories. In addition, the mini meta-analyses showed that belief was, at best, only 
weakly related to helpful and harmful functions. Moreover, in Experiment 4 these relationships 
did not hold after controlling for vividness and sense of reliving. Considered together, our data 
fit with the idea that believing a memory is “real” is not a pre-requisite for that memory to serve 
functions. 
Our findings do, however, support the hypothesis that the phenomenology of memory 
plays a role in at least some memory functions—we consistently found relationships between a 
sense of reliving and ratings of helpful functions, even after controlling for subjects’ belief in the 
memory. These findings are consistent with other literatures showing that both thoughts about 
the future and counterfactuals about the past can evoke emotions and influence behavior, even 
though people do not believe those events have happened (Daniel et al., 2013; Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2013; Roese, 1994). These findings also extend work investigating the relationships 
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between memory characteristics (Rubin et al., 2019). But we found no evidence that the 
phenomenology of memory plays a role in harmful functions—neither reliving nor vividness 
predicted ratings of harmful functions in Experiment 3. Our results raise the possibility that 
helpful and harmful functions are driven by different factors. In support of this possibility, we 
found that the negative feelings elicited by a memory were related to subjects’ ratings of harmful 
functions, but there was no such relationship with helpful functions. If it is the case that different 
factors drive helpful and harmful functions, what would such a pattern suggest? One 
interpretation is that helpful and harmful functions are not entirely parallel, and might be better 
thought of as distinct functions—albeit with some conceptual similarities. 
Of course, our quasi-experimental designs make it difficult to establish causality, so it is 
important that future research manipulates factors that might drive memories to serve functions. 
One way to further investigate the role of belief would be to implant false memories and measure 
the effects of those memories, after debriefing, on people’s behavior. For instance, in one study, 
subjects were led to believe they loved asparagus the first time they tried it (Laney et al., 2008). 
This false memory influenced subjects’ behavior, leading them to rate asparagus as more 
appealing than subjects without the false memory. Researchers could use this paradigm to 
measure the extent to which these effects continue after subjects learn their asparagus memory is 
false. Such an experiment would provide a stronger test of how important it is for people to 
believe a memory for that memory to serve functions. 
In this study, we investigated how the characteristics of a memory are related to the 
functions served by that memory. But it would also be useful to investigate how the 
characteristics of the person recalling the memory are related to the functions of that memory. 
  146  
After all, we know that some people place more importance on their memories than others, and 
also that people’s emotion regulation strategies during memory recall vary markedly (see Rubin, 
Dennis, & Beckham, 2011). Therefore, in much the same way that two people who experience 
similar traumas can have very different responses, two people who have similar memories might 
be affected by those memories in different ways (Bonanno, 2004). By furthering our 
understanding of how memory functions are related to both the characteristics of memories and 
the characteristics of the people remembering them, we might be better able to reduce any 
harmful effects memories might have. 
These experiments, of course, have several limitations. First, we investigated the role of 
belief in functions by comparing retracted memories to ones people still believed. But we found 
that these memories differed not only in belief, but in phenomenology—for example, believed 
memories were accompanied by a stronger sense of reliving. Although we attempted to address 
this limitation by controlling for reliving and vividness in our regression models, the differences 
in phenomenology between retracted and believed memories made it difficult to isolate the 
effects of belief. Second, our findings rely on subjects’ self-reports of the functions their 
memories serve. Although this approach is commonly used in the literature, it is a complex 
metacognitive task that requires subjects to bring to mind occasions during which they had 
previously thought about the memory, and then to evaluate how the memory affected their 
thinking and behavior on those occasions (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Because of the complexity and 
retrospective nature of this task, behavioral evidence would address these issues more directly. 
Third, we asked people only about the functions their memories currently serve. It is therefore 
impossible to know with any degree of precision how, if at all, people’s memories changed when 
they were retracted. One possibility is that these memories continued to serve the same functions 
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as they did before the retraction. It is also possible that some functions have reduced, while other 
new functions arose—for example, people might have stopped relying on the memory itself 
when making decisions, but might now be less trusting of their memories in general. 
Our findings also resonate with the idea that a memory does not need to be a faithful 
representation of a personal experience in order be useful (Johnson & Sherman, 1990). A clear 
demonstration of this idea is that people sometimes draw on both memories of fictional stories 
and “vicarious memories” of other people’s experiences when making decisions (Bandura, 2006; 
Pillemer, Steiner, Kuwabara, Thomsen, & Svob, 2015; Yang, 2018). And even when we consider 
people’s own autobiographical memories, the objective truth of what happened is not always that 
important. For example, when people share their memories with others, they often tweak, 
embellish, or lie about their experiences to engage or impress those listening (Marsh & Tversky, 
2004; McCann & Higgins, 1992). Furthermore, the way people remember and interpret past 
events changes over time depending on their circumstances and goals (Conway, 2005; Johnson 
& Sherman, 1990). Some memory distortions might even be adaptive. For example, when 
considering memories of successes and failures from a similar time, people tend to judge the 
failures as further in the past—a tendency that might help people maintain a positive view of 
their current self (Wilson & Ross, 2003). The data reported here further support these ideas by 
providing evidence that retracted memories might serve functions even though people no longer 
believe the events happened. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the effects of real-world 
retracted memories on people’s thinking and behavior. We have long known that false memories 
can have a range of helpful and harmful effects, but our findings suggest that these effects might 
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continue even after someone realizes a memory is false (Bernstein et al., 2005; Laney et al., 
2008). In doing so, our results highlight the potential for false memories to do both lasting good 
and lasting harm. For this reason, one could interpret our findings as evidence that studies that 
implant false memories have the potential to produce memories that are harmful to subjects even 
after debriefing. But there are a number of reasons to think such a scenario is unlikely. First, 
false memory studies do not implant the kinds of extremely negative memories that our data 
suggest are most likely to be harmful (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012). Second, in false 
memory studies, subjects typically learn their memory is false only days or weeks after coming 
to believe in it. By contrast, subjects in these experiments tended to have believed in their 
retracted memories for many years before retracting them. Finally, research shows that people 
tend to find participating in false memory studies both enjoyable and valuable (Murphy, Loftus, 
Grady, Levine, & Greene, 2020). 
Our findings also have implications for our understanding of how common false 
memories are. The data we report here are at odds with recent claims that false memories are 
rare, and occur only as a consequence of highly suggestive procedures (Brewin, Andrews, & 
Mickes, 2020). Across four experiments, we found that some 26% to 45% of people have at least 
one memory they now believe to be false. These proportions provide further support for the idea 
that misinformation can be readily incorporated into people’s memories (Johnson et al., 1988; 
Mazzoni et al., 2010). It is possible that some subjects had incorrectly retracted memories of 
events that really did happen (Scoboria et al., 2014). But people are generally unwilling to invest 
effort in questioning the accuracy of their memories, so it is unlikely they would have done so 
without compelling reasons (Nash, Wade, Garry, & Adelman, 2017; Wade, Nash, & Garry, 
2014). Moreover, because it is often difficult to distinguish real from false memories, it is likely 
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that some people have yet to realize, or may never realize, that they harbour false memories that 
should be retracted. (Johnson et al., 1993). Therefore, our data might actually underestimate the 
frequency of false memories in the general population. 
Taken together, our data show that people think their retracted memories serve both 
helpful and harmful functions. These results highlight the potential for false memories to have 
lasting effects on thinking and behavior, even after they have been retracted. 
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Abstract 
People from the same country often hold shared, culturally-shaped memories about 
important events from that country’s history, known as collective memories (Wertsch & 
Roediger, 2008). Although empirical research has started to shed light on the properties of these 
memories, none has systematically examined their functions. To what extent do collective 
memories serve functions? We hypothesized that collective memories serve functions for a 
collective similar to those that autobiographical memories serve for individuals—directive, 
identity, and social functions. We conducted two experiments using adapted versions of the 
Thinking About Life Experiences questionnaire (Bluck & Alea, 2011) in which we asked people 
to rate the functions of their collective memories. Across both experiments, we found evidence 
that collective memories serve directive, identity, and social functions for the collective. These 
results suggest collective memories perform important roles in their collectives. 
Keywords: Collective memory, Memory functions, Autobiographical memory, Nationally 
relevant memories 
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General audience summary 
People from the same country often hold shared, culturally-shaped memories about 
important events from that country’s history, known as collective memories. Research has started 
to shed light on how these shared memories form and the characteristics these memories tend to 
have. But we still don’t know what functions these memories serve for the groups who hold 
them. To address this gap, we looked to research that has investigated the functions people’s own 
personal memories serve for them as individuals. We adapted a questionnaire that measures the 
functions of people’s personal memories (the Thinking About Life Experiences questionnaire) 
and used this adapted questionnaire to conduct two studies in which we asked people to rate the 
functions their country’s collective memories serve for the country. In the first study, we asked 
people to rate the functions of their collective memories, in general. In the second study, we 
asked people to rate the functions of specific historical events. Across both studies, we found 
evidence that these collective memories serve at least three functions: they guide the decision 
making of the country, help shape the country’s identity, and help the country form and maintain 
relationships with other countries. These results suggest collective memories perform important 
roles in their collectives, and highlight the similarities between shared, culturally-important 
memories and people’s own personal memories. 
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Collective memories serve similar functions to autobiographical memories 
If you were to ask Americans about important events from their country’s history, you 
would probably find a remarkable amount of overlap in their answers (Choi, Abel, Siqi-Liu, & 
Umanath, in press; Taylor, Burton-Wood, & Garry, 2017). In fact, work from history, sociology, 
anthropology, and political science demonstrates that people from the same country often hold 
shared memories of important events from that country’s history (Bodnar, 1994; Cole, 2001; 
Zerubavel, 2003). These “collective memories” are part of a broader set of schemas, beliefs, and 
views that groups hold about their collective past (Dudai, 2002). However, these memories are 
not simply accurate, objective accounts of past events. Instead, they are biased and often 
emotionally-charged accounts of the past that can be shaped by a complex combination of 
political, social, and cultural factors (Hirst & Manier, 2008; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). But 
what functions do collective memories serve for the groups who hold them? 
Across the world, collective memories regularly feature in conversations, jokes, and 
formal education, and are often transmitted from one generation to the next (Svob, Brown, 
Takšić, Katulić, & Žauhar, 2016). It stands to reason that memories worthy of this amount of 
time and attention probably serve some useful functions. Consistent with this idea, theoretical 
accounts of collective memories suggest they play an important role in forming and maintaining 
the identity of the collective—that is, collective memories help people have a feeling of 
belonging and connection within their group (Hirst & Manier, 2008; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). 
In addition, collective memories might provide a framework that guides groups’ decision making 
(Abel, Umanath, Wertsch, & Roediger, 2018; Pillemer, 1992). For example, in ancient Rome, 
the collective memory of the city being sacked by Gauls in the third century B.C.E. was 
  164  
described as giving Romans “nightmares which lasted for centuries” and had lasting effects on 
Roman foreign policy (Rosenberger, 2003; Williams, 2001, p. 221). If collective memories do 
indeed have such profound effects on the collectives who hold them, it is important to understand 
when and how they might do so. This understanding requires systematic empirical work about 
the functions served by collective memories. But we have been unable to find any such published 
work. Therefore, we set out to answer these questions: What functions do collective memories 
serve? And to what extent? 
To answer these questions, we began with the extensive literature on the functions of 
autobiographical memories. After all, collective memories have properties that are similar in 
many ways to those of autobiographical memories. For example, Americans’ collective 
memories for US Presidents show a similar pattern of forgetting to autobiographical memories 
(Roediger & DeSoto, 2014; Roediger & DeSoto, 2016). Specifically, more recent presidents tend 
to be remembered better than earlier ones, with a couple of exceptions: the first few presidents 
(Washington, Adams, Jefferson) are well-remembered, as are presidents who played a distinctive 
role in the history of the country, such as President Lincoln. These recency, primacy, and 
distinctiveness effects closely resemble those seen in autobiographical memory (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1977; Sehulster, 1989; von Restorff, 1933). In addition, collective memories are often 
distilled to a small number of important events, not unlike people’s narratives of their own life 
story (Bartlett, 1932; McAdams, 2001; Wertsch, 2002; Zaromb, Butler, Agarwal, & Roediger, 
2014). Finally, much like autobiographical memories, collective memories can become distorted, 
perhaps to help the group maintain a positive identity (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008). For example, shameful events perpetrated by a group 
are sometimes minimized or even removed entirely from that group’s collective memory (Sahdra 
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& Ross, 2007). Given these similarities in the properties of collective and autobiographical 
memories, we might also expect them to serve similar functions. 
The autobiographical memory literature suggests that autobiographical memories serve at 
least three main functions (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Pillemer, 1992). First, they 
help people maintain a coherent sense of identity across time (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Wilson & Ross, 2003). For instance, recalling the memory of a good deed might reassure 
someone that he or she is a good person. Second, autobiographical memories direct people’s 
behavior; for example, the memory of failing a test might prompt a student to study harder in 
future (Pillemer, 2003). Third, autobiographical memories encourage social bonding with others, 
such as by increasing intimacy or highlighting shared interests (Alea & Bluck, 2003). These 
functions are remarkably similar to the theorized functions of collective memories. Take, for 
instance, the identity function of autobiographical memories, which conceptually maps on to the 
theorized role that collective memories play in forming the identity of the collective. Likewise, 
the directive function maps on to the idea that collective memories can guide the decision-
making of the group. Finally, collective memories might serve a function akin to the social 
function when shared between groups—such as when two nations commemorate an event that 
was important to both nations, or when politicians harken back to previous examples of co-
operation between nations. Given these conceptual similarities, measures of autobiographical 
memory functions might provide a useful starting point for developing measures of collective 
memory functions. 
Therefore, we created a measure for the functions of collective memories by drawing on 
the Thinking About Life Events questionnaire (TALE)—a well-known scale that asks people to 
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report the extent to which their autobiographical memories serve directive, identity, and social 
functions (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Of course, it is essentially impossible to ask a collective directly 
about the functions of its memories. We instead must ask the individual people who make up the 
collective, who are likely to have at least some insight into the identity and behavior of their 
group. For this reason, a logical initial approach would be to ask people from a particular 
collective about the ways in which their collective memories serve functions for that collective. 
Taken together, there are good reasons to expect that collective memories might serve 
directive, identity and social functions much like their autobiographical counterparts. But there 
are also reasons to expect collective memories might be markedly less functional than 
autobiographical memories. For instance, many collective memories are of events people did not 
personally experience. As a result, these memories would not be accompanied by episodic details 
such as the sense of reliving—details that are thought to be important for memories to serve 
functions (Pillemer, 1992). The idea is that episodic details are useful pieces of information in 
and of themselves, and also act as memory cues that help the memory come to mind when it is 
needed (Schacter & Madore, 2016; Tulving, 1985). Consistent with this idea, there is evidence 
that people who have an impaired ability to mentally time travel back to past experiences tend to 
be worse at using their autobiographical memories to solve problems (Sheldon, McAndrews, & 
Moscovitch, 2011). Perhaps, then, collective memories might serve functions less than 
autobiographical memories—at least to the extent they lack the episodic details that accompany 
many autobiographical memories. 
To investigate the functions of collective memories, we asked subjects to report the 
functions of important memories from their country’s history. We then compared these reports to 
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subjects’ reports of the functions of their own autobiographical memories. Across two 
experiments, our results converge on the idea that, at the very least, collective memories serve 
directive, identity, and social functions—much like people’s autobiographical memories. 
Experiment 1 
Our primary question in Experiment 1 was: to what extent do collective memories serve 
directive, identity, and social functions. To address this question, we adapted a well-known 
instrument, the TALE (Bluck & Alea, 2011), which measures how often autobiographical 
memories serve directive, identity, and social functions. The TALE has good psychometric 
properties (Bluck & Alea, 2011), and a factor structure that maps onto the three functions. In 
practice, the TALE therefore generates three subscales, each producing a mean score. We created 
a “Collective TALE” to measure how often a country’s collective memories serve directive, 
identity, and social functions for the people of that country. Subjects completed both the original 
TALE and the collective TALE so we could compare the functions of people’s autobiographical 
and collective memories. This experiment was pre-registered, as was Experiment 2. The pre-
registrations, materials, and data for the two experiments can be found on the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/rfjq3/?view_only=258b9602cf1548df93c90f478a0ee0c9).  These 
experiments were approved by the University of Waikato’s School of Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee under the delegated authority of the University’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee, and by the Claremont McKenna College Institutional Review Board. 
Methods 
Subjects 
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We recruited workers from the United States and Canada on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform through TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). Subjects participated in 
exchange for Amazon credit. We aimed to collect data until 300 subjects had completed the 
survey. Because of the way Mechanical Turk interacts with TurkPrime, 310 subjects completed 
the survey. According to our pre-registered criteria, we then excluded 19 subjects who failed one 
or both of the attention checks, leaving us with our final sample of 291 subjects. The mean age of 
these subjects was 41.15 (SD = 13.29,  range 19-76), 110 of whom identified as men, 179 as 
women, and 2 as gender diverse. All but 5 subjects reported their primary language as English, 
all but 15 subjects grew up in the USA, and all but 5 reported they currently live in the USA. In 
addition, all but 16 subjects reported the country they most identify with is the USA. 
Design 
We manipulated Memory Type (collective, autobiographical) within subjects. 
Materials and Procedure 
Subjects completed both the original TALE and the Collective TALE, in counterbalanced 
order. Half the subjects saw the original TALE first, which is displayed in the left side of Table 
1. The first part of this scale asks subjects two questions that broadly tap into how often they 
think back over and talk about their autobiographical memories. The second part asks subjects to 
complete 15 items about how often they think or talk about their autobiographical memories for 
various reasons, on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (very frequently). Five of the items map on 
to the directive function (e.g. “when I want to remember a lesson I learned in the past”), five map 
onto the identity function (e.g. “when I want to feel that I am the same person that I was 
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before”), and five about reasons that map onto the social function (e.g. “when I want to develop a 
closer relationship with someone”). We also included an attention check within this block 
(“when I want to this is not a real question please select Seldom”). 
These subjects then completed the Collective TALE we created. The items on this scale 
parallel those of the original TALE, adapted to ask about the functions a collective memory 
serves for the collective. The first part of the scale asks subjects two questions that broadly tap 
into how often people of their country think back over their country’s history and talk with 
people from another country about their own country’s history. The second part asks subjects to 
complete 15 items about how often people of their country think back over or talk about periods 
of their history, once again on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (very frequently). These items 
map onto those in the original TALE, with one exception: for the sake of intelligibility, we 
replaced the item “when I want to develop more intimacy in a relationship” with “when we want 
to develop a new relationship with another country.” As in the original TALE, we included an 
attention check within this block (“when we want to this is not a real question please select 
Often”). 
The other half of subjects also completed the same two scales, but in the opposite order. 
Once subjects had completed both scales, we asked them to report their age and gender. Finally, 
we asked them to report their first and primary languages, where they grew up, where they 
currently live, and with which country they most strongly identify.  
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Table 1 
Items from the original (Bluck & Alea, 2011) and collective versions of the TALE. 
Autobiographical Memory Version Collective Memory Version 
Think and talk about items  
In general, how often do you think back over your 
life? 
In general, how often do people from your country 
think back over your country’s history? 
In general, how often do you talk to others about 
what’s happened in your life? 
In general, how often do people from your country talk 
to others about your country’s history? 
Prompt  
I think back over or talk about my life or certain 
periods of my life… 
People of my country tend to think back over or talk 
about certain periods of our history… 
Identity Function Items  
when I want to feel that I am the same person that I 
was before. 
when we want to feel that our country is the same as it 
was before. 
when I am concerned about whether I am still the 
same type of person that I was earlier. 
when we are concerned about whether our country is 
still the same kind of place that it was earlier. 
when I am concerned about whether my values have 
changed over time. 
when we are concerned about whether our values have 
changed over time. 
when I am concerned about whether my beliefs have 
changed over time. 
when we are concerned about whether our beliefs have 
changed over time. 
when I want to understand how I have changed from 
who I was before. 
when we want to understand how we have changed 
from who we were before. 
Directive Function Items  
when I want to remember something that someone 
else said or did that might help me now. 
when we want to remember something that another 
country said or did that might help us now. 
when I believe that thinking about the past can help 
guide my future. 
when we believe that thinking about our country’s past 
can help guide our future. 
when I want to try to learn from my past mistakes. when we want to try to learn from our past mistakes. 
when I need to make a life choice and I am uncertain 
which path to take. 
when we need to make an important choice and we are 
uncertain which path to take. 
when I want to remember a lesson I learned in the 
past. 
when we want to remember a lesson we learned in the 
past. 
Social Function Items  
when I hope to also find out what another person is 
like. 
when we hope to find out what another country is like. 
when I want to develop more intimacy in a 
relationship. 
when we want to develop a new relationship with 
another country. 
when I want to develop a closer relationship with 
someone. 
when we want to develop a closer relationship with 
another country. 
when I want to maintain a friendship by sharing 
memories with friends. 
when we want to maintain friendships with other 
countries by sharing memories with them. 
when I hope to also learn more about another person’s 
life. 
when we hope to learn more about another country’s 
history. 
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Results 
Before turning to our primary research question, we first determined how often, in a 
general sense, people think and talk about their autobiographical and collective memories. To do 
so, we examined subjects’ responses to the two broad items from the beginning of both the 
original and Collective versions of the TALE. As the top half of Table 2 shows, subjects reported 
that they think about their autobiographical memories moderately often, and that people of their 
country think about their country’s history more often, Mdiff = 0.51, 95% CI [0.38, 0.64]. 
Likewise, subjects reported they talk about their memories moderately often, and that people of 
their country talk about their country’s history more often, Mdiff = 0.20, 95% CI [0.06, 0.34]. 
Together, these results fit with the idea that people often think and talk about collective 
memories. 
Table 2 
Subjects’ ratings of how often they think and talk about their 
autobiographical and collective memories. 
Rating 
Autobiographical 
M (SD) 
Collective 
M (SD) 
Experiment 1   
Think about 3.27 (0.99) 3.78 (0.82) 
Talk about 2.78 (0.94 2.98 (0.95) 
Experiment 2   
Think about 2.98 (1.05) 3.53 (0.98) 
Talk about 2.82 (0.99) 2.61 (1.10) 
We next checked the measurement properties of the Collective TALE and set out to 
determine if it showed the same factor structure as the original TALE. That is, we calculated 
Cronbach’s alpha for each subscale and also conducted an exploratory factor analysis, assuming 
three factors. We used a Promax rotation because the literature on the functions of 
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autobiographical memory clearly shows the three functions are correlated with one another 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011). We found that the three subscales had good reliability ("directive = 0.81, 
"identity = 0.88, "social = 0.82). Furthermore, the results of the factor analysis (which can be found 
in the Supplemental Materials in Appendix D) showed that all but one of the items loaded as 
expected. One directive item unexpectedly loaded more strongly on the social factor than the 
directive factor (“when we want to remember something another country said or did that might 
help us now”). When this item is dropped from the analysis, the overall pattern does not change, 
so the analyses reported here use the item groupings from the original TALE—as we pre-
registered. 
Having established the Collective TALE has good measurement properties, we next 
turned to our main research question: To what extent do collective memories serve functions? To 
answer this question, we calculated, for each subject, three subscale scores for the Collective 
TALE—one for each function—as well as the corresponding subscale scores for the original 
TALE. Each subscale score was calculated by taking the mean of the five items that make up that 
subscale. These data are displayed in Figure 1. First, let us consider the right-hand side of the 
figure, which depicts the distribution of subjects’ ratings of the functions of their collective 
memories. As the figure shows, subjects rated their country’s collective memories as serving all 
three functions moderately often. These distributions support the hypothesis that collective 
memories serve identity, directive, and social functions for the collectives who hold them. 
But recall that we hypothesized collective memories might serve functions less than 
autobiographical memories. Therefore, we next compared the functions served by collective 
memories to those served by autobiographical memories (displayed in the left-hand side of 
  173  
Figure 1). We found that subjects reported their autobiographical memories serve directive and 
social functions more often than their country’s memories do for the country, Mdiff(directive) = 0.15, 
95% CI [0.05, 0.25], Mdiff(social) = 0.29, 95% CI [0.18, 0.40]. By contrast, subjects reported that 
their collective memories serve identity functions for their collective more often than their 
autobiographical memories do for themselves, Mdiff(identity) = 0.42, 95% CI [0.31, 0.53]. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that collective and autobiographical memories might serve 
directive, identity, and social functions to different degrees. 
One limitation of this experiment is that we asked subjects to report the functions of their 
collective memories as a whole. This task is highly abstract and requires subjects to think 
Figure 1. Violin plot of function ratings for autobiographical and collective memories from 
Experiment 1. Dots represent individual data points, diamonds represent the cell means, and error bars 
represent the 95% CIs around those cell means. 
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broadly about their country’s history in a way that they normally might not. We addressed this 
limitation in Experiment 2 by asking subjects about specific events from their country’s history, 
an extension of prior work that has investigated the functions of specific autobiographical 
memories (Hyman & Faries, 1992; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). This approach also fits with 
work that has investigated the characteristics of collective memories by asking about specific 
memories (Roediger & DeSoto, 2016; Zaromb et al., 2014). If we found the same pattern as in 
Experiment 1, it would provide converging evidence that collective memories serve directive, 
identity, and social functions. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we asked subjects about the functions of specific collective memories. 
We selected five specific collective memories from the most important events Americans 
nominated when asked what historical events shaped their country’s identity (Choi et al., in 
press; Taylor et al., 2017). We presented subjects with one of these events and asked them to rate 
the extent to which that memory serves directive, identity, and social functions for the country. 
We then compared these reports to subjects’ reports of the functions of an important memory 
from their own life. 
Methods 
Subjects 
We recruited workers from the United States on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform 
through TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017). Subjects participated in exchange for Amazon credit. 
We aimed to collect data until 500 subjects had completed the survey. Because of the way 
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Mechanical Turk interacts with TurkPrime, 510 subjects completed the survey. According to our 
pre-registered criteria, we then excluded 27 subjects who failed the attention check, and 5 
subjects who did not provide a genuine autobiographical memory. We also excluded a further 12 
who reported living outside the US, leaving us with our final sample of 466 subjects. The mean 
age of these subjects was 41.88 (SD = 13.26, range 18-78), 164 of whom identified as men, 300 
as women, and 2 as gender diverse. All but 3 subjects reported their primary language as 
English, and all but 16 subjects grew up in the USA. In addition, all but 21 subjects reported the 
country they most identify with is the USA—the pattens do not change if these subjects are 
excluded. 
Design 
We manipulated Memory Function (collective, autobiographical) within subjects. 
Materials and Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1. Subjects completed 
two rating scales, in counterbalanced order: the original TALE and the Collective TALE. We 
adapted the instructions for both versions of the scale to refer to one specific memory. 
Half the subjects completed this new, “specific autobiographical memory” version of the 
original TALE first. They were asked to describe “an important event from any point in your life 
that has helped shape your identity.” and rated the adapted questions (e.g. “when I want to feel 
that I am the same person that I was before”; see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix D for 
the full instructions). We used this prompt because it mirrors the prompt used in prior work to 
elicit the collective events described below (Choi et al., in press; Taylor et al., 2017). 
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These subjects then completed the “specific collective memory” version of the Collective 
TALE. They read a brief description of one of five events from American history: World War 2, 
The American Civil War, The American Revolutionary War, The September 11 attacks, or the 
signing of the Declaration of Independence (see Supplemental Materials in Appendix D for the 
full descriptions). These descriptions were between 44 and 61 words (M = 51.2), and were 
adapted from Wikipedia and other encyclopaedias. Then, they rated the adapted questions (for 
example, “when we as a country want to feel that our country is the same as it was before”). 
The other half of subjects completed the same two scales, but in the opposite order. Once 
subjects had completed both scales, we asked them to report their age and gender. Finally, we 
asked subjects to report a range of demographics, including the country they live in now and the 
country with which they most strongly identify. 
Results 
Before addressing the primary question in Experiment 2, we again determined how often 
people think and talk about their autobiographical and collective memories in a broad sense. As 
the bottom half of Table 2 shows, these results were similar to those in Experiment 1. That is, 
subjects reported they think about their nominated autobiographical memory moderately often, 
and that people of their country think about the historical event slightly more, Mdiff = 0.55, 95% 
CI [0.43, 0.67]. Subjects reported they talk about their nominated autobiographical memory 
moderately often. But in contrast to Experiment 1, they reported that people of their country talk 
about the respective historical events slightly less often, Mdiff = 0.21, 95% CI [0.08, 0.34]. Next, 
we once again checked the measurement properties of the Collective TALE. As we found in 
Experiment 1, the three subscales had good reliability ("directive = 0.88, "identity = 0.89, "social = 
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0.84). Moreover, the results from the exploratory factor analysis were similar to Experiment 1 
(see the Supplemental Materials in Appendix D). 
We next returned to our primary question: To what extent do collective memories serve 
functions? As the distributions on the right-hand side of Figure 1 show, we replicated the 
findings from Experiment 1. More specifically, subjects rated their country’s specific collective 
memories as serving all three functions moderately often. This pattern provides converging 
evidence that collective memories serve identity, directive, and social functions for the 
collectives who hold them. 
When we compared subjects’ ratings on the specific collective TALE to their ratings on 
the specific autobiographical TALE, we again found that subjects rated their autobiographical 
memories as serving social functions for them more often than their country’s memories do for 
the country, Mdiff = 0.17, 95% CI [0.07, 0.26]. Unlike Experiment 1, subjects reported that their 
country’s collective memories serve directive functions slightly more often than their nominated 
autobiographical memories, Mdiff = 0.13, 95% CI [0.03, 0.24]. But once again, subjects reported 
that their collective memories serve identity functions for their country more often than their 
autobiographical memories do for themselves, Mdiff = 0.38, 95% CI [0.27, 0.48]. These 
differences again raise the possibility that collective and autobiographical memories might differ 
in the degree to which they serve functions. 
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Thus far we have examined the functions of collective memories by collapsing across the 
set of five specific memories. But there are also reasons to expect the functions of these specific 
memories might differ. First, the events differ markedly in when they occurred. For example, the 
Revolutionary War occurred more than two centuries ago, whereas the September 11 attacks 
occurred only two decades ago. We might therefore expect the more recent events to be more 
relevant to the group’s current thinking and behavior. Second, the events differ in the emotions 
they evoke—for instance, Americans are proud of the Declaration of Independence, and 
celebrate it each year, while the Civil War is an event many Americans are ashamed of (Choi et 
Figure 2. Violin plot of function ratings for autobiographical and collective memories from 
Experiment 2. Dots represent individual data points, diamonds represent the cell means, and error bars 
represent the 95% CIs around those cell means. 
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al., in press). We know from the literature on autobiographical memories that both the age of a 
memory and the emotions it evokes are related to the functions the memory serves (Burnell, 
Rasmussen, & Garry, 2020; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). To what extent, then, do the 
collective memories of different events serve different functions? 
To answer this question, we examined the functions of the 5 collective events separately, 
and display those data in Figure 3. On the whole, the patterns were quite similar across the 
different events, though there were notable differences. For instance, subjects rated the memories 
of the two most recent events—World War II and the September 11 attacks—as serving directive 
functions more than the other three memories. Subjects also rated World War II as serving social 
functions more than the other four memories. In addition, the Civil War tended to serve social 
functions less than the other four memories—perhaps because it is a controversial topic even 
today (Cook, 2017). Finally, World War 2 was unique in that it served directive functions more 
than identity, Mdiff = 0.16 [0.10, 0.22]. These results suggest that directive, identity, and social 
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functions tend to be common across different collective memories, but also fit with the idea that 
more recent collective memories might serve directive function more than older memories.  
General Discussion 
Across two experiments and 757 subjects, we investigated the extent to which collective 
memories serve functions akin to the directive, identity, and social functions served by 
autobiographical memories. In Experiment 1, we asked subjects to rate the functions of their 
collective memories, in general. In Experiment 2, we asked subjects to rate the functions of 
specific collective memories. Across both experiments, subjects reported that their collective 
memories serve directive, identity, and social functions moderately often—much like their 
autobiographical memories. Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that collective 
Figure 3. Violin plot of directive (Dir), identity (Idn), and social (Soc) function ratings for each 
collective event from Experiment 2. The events are displayed in order from oldest to most recent. Dots 
represent individual data points, diamonds represent the cell means, and error bars represent the 95% 
CIs around those cell means. 
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memories serve—at a minimum—directive, identity, and social functions for the collectives that 
hold them. 
But the fact that subjects rated their collective memories as serving functions moderately 
often in both studies raises a counter-explanation for the results: that subjects were not sure how 
to evaluate how often their collective memories serve functions, and simply chose the middle of 
the scale, interpreting it as an “I don’t know” response, or perhaps a “best fit” option for 
communicating “I don’t know.” After all, it is reasonable to wonder if the task is difficult 
conceptually—subjects needed to take the perspective of the people from their country as a 
whole and then think through how the memory (or memories) served the group. But a look at the 
distributions (displayed in Figures 1 and 2) shows that subjects were not simply selecting the 
middle of the scale. Instead, their responses were spread across the whole scale, with many 
subjects reporting that collective memories frequently serve functions. Furthermore, if subjects 
were simply unsure how to respond, we should expect to see similar ratings across all functions 
and across all events (Experiment 2). But that is not what we saw; instead, subjects consistently 
tended to rate directive and identity functions higher than social functions. Moreover, in 
Experiment 2 we saw variation across the different events. This counter-explanation, therefore, 
does not adequately explain our results. 
Our findings provide empirical support for existing theoretical perspectives on the 
functions of collective memories. More specifically, the findings fit with suggestions that 
historical events play an important role in shaping the identity of groups and convey useful 
lessons that guide the decision making of collectives (Assmann & Czaplicka, 1995; Hirst, 
Yamashiro, & Coman, 2018; Wertsch & Roediger, 2008). Furthermore, we found evidence that 
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groups believe they use collective memories to help them forge and maintain relationships with 
other groups. These three functions were common across important historical events, regardless 
of whether those events were old (e.g. The Revolutionary War), or more recent (e.g. the 
September 11 attacks). 
Our findings also add to a growing body of evidence that autobiographical and collective 
memories share many characteristics. Given that some of the collective events we studied 
occurred long before subjects were even born, these similarities have implications for how we 
might understand the functions of memory. In particular, these data suggest that memories might 
serve directive, identity, and social functions even in the absence of episodic recollection. Such a 
possibility does not, of course, mean episodic recollection plays no part in memory functions. 
After all, empirical studies suggest that episodic information in autobiographical memories can 
help people solve problems (Sheldon et al., 2011). To the extent that recollection plays some 
part, we might expect collective memories for events people lived through to serve functions to a 
greater extent than ones people did not live through. Our data provide tentative support for this 
possibility: the only event that occurred in our subjects’ lifetimes was the September 11 attacks, 
and their self-reports suggested their memory for this event served directive and identity 
functions more than any other memory, and social functions more than three of the four other 
memories. But such a possibility is purely preliminary, tempered by the fact that we had limited 
experimental control, which precludes us from drawing causal conclusions. 
Collective memories might also serve functions that autobiographical memories do not. 
As a first attempt at investigating the functions of these memories, we used the framework from 
the autobiographical memory literature (Bluck et al., 2005; Pillemer, 1992). But it is reasonable 
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to speculate that the functions of collective memories are much more complex than our data 
suggest. For example, we measured the extent to which collective memories are shared with 
other collectives—an “outward-facing” social function that maps on to the (outward-facing) 
social function served by autobiographical memories. But for collective memories to become a 
shared cultural narrative, they need to be shared among the members of the collective, which 
could be thought of as an “inward-facing” social function (Cuc, Ozuru, Manier, & Hirst, 2006; 
Rajaram & Maswood, 2017). Another possible function of collective memories is that they allow 
collectives to pass knowledge from one generation to the next—a function that might be 
especially prominent among older adults (Mergler & Goldstein, 1983; Svob et al., 2016). Finally, 
although collective memories might serve functions for the group as a whole, these memories 
might also serve distinct functions for the individual people who make up that group. To fully 
understand the effects collective memories have on the groups who hold them, it is important 
that future work investigates the extent to which collective memories have benefits beyond those 
reported here. 
Of course, collective memories might not always be entirely beneficial. Many collective 
memories, including some of those we examined in Experiment 2, are of negative events. 
Although our findings suggest even these negative collective memories can serve functions, they 
might also carry with them maladaptive effects—much like autobiographical memories (Burnell, 
et al., 2020). For example, the memory of the September 11 attacks led many Americans to be 
fearful of travel and contributed to America’s decision to go to war in Iraq (Goodrich, 2002; 
McCartney, 2004; Pillemer, 2003). The extent to which collective memories might be harmful 
for the collectives who hold them is an empirical question that we hope future work can address. 
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There are, naturally, several limitations to our conclusions. First, the factor structure of 
the collective version of the TALE did not perfectly align with that of the original version. 
Although the structure was very similar, we found that one directive item loaded only weakly on 
the expected factor in both experiments. For this reason, it is worth investigating the possibility 
that the precise ways in which collective memories serve directive, identity, and social functions 
might be different from the ways in which autobiographical memories serve these functions. 
Second, our samples consisted entirely of American and Canadian subjects. The extent to which 
these findings generalize to other cultures is an important issue for future research to address. For 
example, in China, the past is viewed as a particularly important source of knowledge and 
guidance (Wang, 2008). Therefore, we might expect collective memories to serve directive 
functions more in China than in the United States. Third, in these Experiments we chose nations 
as the collectives to investigate. It remains unclear whether the functions of collective memories 
held by other kinds of collectives (such as a family or cultural group) are similar. In addition, the 
idea of a collective memory relies on the assumption that there is some consensus among the 
collective about that event. But in a group as large as a nation, this assumption might not always 
hold—for example, young and old Americans have very different attitudes towards the events of 
World War 2 (Zaromb et al., 2014). How consensus (or a lack thereof) might affect the functions 
of collective memories is another interesting avenue for future research. 
Taken together, the experiments we report here provide evidence that collective memories 
serve directive, identity, and social functions. They also add to a growing body of literature 
showing that collective memories and autobiographical memories are similar in a variety of 
ways. Although this study is only the first step towards understanding the functions of collective 
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memories, our findings provide a foothold from which to investigate further the effects of these 
memories on the collectives who hold them. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
Summary of the findings 
The primary aim of this thesis was to further our understanding of the functions of 
autobiographical memory. To do this, we conducted eleven experiments reported across four 
manuscripts. In the first manuscript, we developed a measure of autobiographical memory 
functions that separates adaptive and maladaptive outcomes. Using this measure, we asked 
people to rate the functions of their most positive and most negative memories. We found that 
people’s positive memories are primarily adaptive, whereas their negative memories serve a mix 
of adaptive and maladaptive functions. These findings demonstrate that autobiographical 
memories can sometimes serve functions in ways that are maladaptive. 
In the second manuscript, we focused on the social function of autobiographical 
memories—specifically on how people appraise the memories others share with them. We found 
that when someone reports growing from a negative event, others tend to appraise that event as 
less negative than they otherwise would. In turn, these appraisals could have maladaptive 
outcomes if they lead others to provide less support or empathy to the person sharing the 
memory. 
In the third manuscript, we sought to better understand the factors that drive memories to 
serve particular functions. We asked people to rate the adaptive and maladaptive functions of 
their retracted memories. We then compared these functions to the functions of believed 
memories. We found that people’s retracted memories continue to serve functions to a similar 
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extent as their believed memories. This finding suggests it is not necessary for people to believe 
in a memory for that memory to serve functions. We also found that a sense of reliving was the 
characteristic most reliably associated with the extent to which memories serve functions. 
In the fourth manuscript, we investigated the extent to which collective memories for 
important historical events serve functions for the collectives who hold them. We found evidence 
that collective memories serve directive, self, and social functions—much like autobiographical 
memories. 
Considered together, these four sets of experiments broaden our understanding of the 
functions of autobiographical memories, and highlight the need for more nuanced measures of 
memory functions. 
Adaptive and Maladaptive Functions 
A key finding from the experiments reported here is that the functions of autobiographical 
memory are not always adaptive. For example, memories might direct people’s behaviour in 
ways that have maladaptive outcomes if the memories lead people to make poor decisions or 
engage in harmful behaviors. Likewise, memories could affect people’s sense of self in 
maladaptive ways—for instance when people incorporate the memory of a failure or traumatic 
experience into their sense of self in a way that contributes to a negative self-concept. Finally, 
sharing a memory in social situations could be maladaptive if listeners appraise the memory in a 
way that hurts the relationship. Indeed, subjects in our first set of experiments frequently 
reported that their most negative memories serve these maladaptive functions. 
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One might wonder, then, whether these findings challenge the idea that the directive, self, 
and social functions of memory provide benefits that would boost humans’ survival chances. But 
it is clear from the evolutionary literature that even when traits are adaptive on the whole, they 
can sometimes be maladaptive (Darwin, 1859). And in the case of autobiographical memories, 
there are reasons to think these maladaptive functions might be relatively rare—or, at least, less 
common than adaptive functions. For instance, people rated even their most negative 
memories—the memories we might expect to be most maladaptive—as only moderately 
maladaptive, and often rated these memories as more adaptive than maladaptive. Moreover, 
outside of these highly negative memories, we found little evidence of these maladaptive 
functions. For example, in our first set of experiments, subjects rarely rated their positive 
memories as serving any maladaptive functions. And in our third set of experiments, subjects 
tended to rate both their childhood memories and their retracted memories low on maladaptive 
functions. Clearly, a broader sample of memories would be needed to evaluate the relative 
frequency of adaptive and maladaptive functions. That said, our data are consistent with 
theoretical accounts suggesting autobiographical memories tend to be more adaptive than they 
are maladaptive. 
The mix of adaptive and maladaptive functions served by people’s negative memories 
also highlights the complexity of autobiographical memory functions, and raises the possibility 
that the functions of a memory might change across contexts or across time. For example, the 
memory of failing an important exam might serve an adaptive directive function in the lead-up to 
a subsequent exam by prompting the rememberer to study hard. But come the night before the 
exam, the same memory might make the rememberer so anxious about the next day that he is 
unable to sleep—a directive function that likely would have maladaptive outcomes. Such a 
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possibility fits with the evolutionary literature, which emphasizes that the adaptiveness of any 
trait depends on the context in which it is expressed (Darwin, 1859). This possibility has also 
been raised previously in the autobiographical memory literature (Alea & Bluck, 2003). Just how 
autobiographical memory functions change across time and across contexts is a question I hope 
future research can answer. One way to do so would be to ask subjects to recall various 
occasions or contexts in which they had previously brought the memory to mind, and then to 
report what functions the memory served on each of those occasions. But given the complexity 
of such a task and the recall biases it might introduce, a stronger test of this possibility would be 
to conduct a longitudinal study that measures the functions of a specific memory at several time-
points. 
Another of our key findings was that subjects consistently reported that their memories 
serve maladaptive social functions less than they serve maladaptive self or directive functions. 
There are at least two possible explanations for this finding. The first is that the maladaptive 
social function is less prevalent than the other two maladaptive functions. It is plausible, for 
example, that people are better able to prevent their memories from serving maladaptive social 
functions than from serving maladaptive self or directive functions. After all, people can choose 
how they share a memory with others—people tune their retellings of events based on their 
audience, and sometimes even embellish or lie about what happened in order to impress others 
(Marsh & Tversky, 2004; McCann & Higgins, 1992). Moreover, if people were to share a 
memory in a way that ends up causing them harm, they could simply choose to stop sharing that 
memory, or adjust the way they share it in future. By contrast, it might be difficult for people to 
stop memories from serving maladaptive self or directive functions. For example, it is well-
established that negative self-evaluations can be difficult to overcome (Beck & Alford, 2009). 
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Likewise, maladaptive thoughts, such as rumination and anxiety, and maladaptive behaviors, 
such as substance use, violence, and over-eating, are often difficult to correct (Adams et al., 
2019; Babcock et al., 2004; Barlow, 2002; Watkins & Roberts, 2020; Witkiewitz et al., 2019). 
Therefore, to the extent that autobiographical memories serve maladaptive self or directive 
functions by contributing to these kinds of thoughts and behaviors, it might not be easy for 
people to prevent these maladaptive effects. 
Measuring adaptive and maladaptive functions 
Our findings also have implications for the way researchers measure the functions of 
autobiographical memory. If any given memory can serve a mix of adaptive and maladaptive 
functions, we need to take a nuanced approach to measuring functions that does not conflate 
adaptive and maladaptive usage. To the extent we conflate adaptive and maladaptive usage., it 
becomes difficult to interpret any findings. To see why, let us consider some recent work 
showing that negative and positive memories tend to serve directive functions to a similar extent 
(Rasmussen, Burton-Wood, Burnell, & Garry, 2021). The function measures used in this work 
did not separate adaptive and maladaptive functions—subjects rated only the extent to which the 
memory “guides my thinking and behavior.” How are we to interpret the finding that positive 
and negative memories were rated as similarly directive? One possibility is that negative and 
positive memories are equally useful for guiding people’s behavior in ways that are adaptive. But 
it is also possible that positive memories tend to serve adaptive directive functions more 
frequently, but because negative memories also serve maladaptive directive functions, subjects 
rated their negative memories as similarly directive. Without separating adaptive and 
maladaptive functions, it is difficult to tease apart these two possible explanations. The first set 
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of experiments in this thesis, which did separate adaptive and maladaptive functions, fit with the 
second possibility: we found that negative memories serve adaptive directive functions to a 
lesser extent than positive memories, but serve maladaptive directive functions far more. As this 
example demonstrates, if we want to fully understand the ways in which people’s memories 
affect their thinking and behavior, it is vital to use measures that separate adaptive and 
maladaptive functions. 
But in order to separate adaptive and maladaptive functions, we need measures that are 
sensitive to maladaptive functions. Here, we made an initial attempt to create a broad, eight-item 
measure of the extent to which a memory serves functions in adaptive and maladaptive ways. 
Across the experiments reported here, we found that this measure had good reliability. But this 
measure includes only a single, broad item for each function—for example, the maladaptive 
directive function is measured using the item “this memory guides my thinking and behavior in 
ways that hurt me”. For this reason, this measure cannot provide insight into the precise ways in 
which people’s memories serve maladaptive functions. For instance, memories might serve 
maladaptive directive functions by leading people to make poor decisions. But they might also 
serve maladaptive directive functions by causing people to ruminate excessively about their 
experiences. If we want to fully understand how often—and in what ways—people’s 
autobiographical memories can be maladaptive, we need measures that can capture maladaptive 
functions in a more fine-grained way. 
It also remains unclear how well the three-function model describes maladaptive 
functions. There is no clear theoretical reason to expect maladaptive functions to fit neatly into 
the same three broad categories (directive, self, and social) as adaptive functions. After all, even 
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if maladaptive functions are simply “side effects” of the systems that allow people’s memories to 
serve adaptive functions, there is no guarantee that these side effects are the negative parallel of 
the benefits. In fact, the side effects of drugs, behavioral interventions, and even laws and 
regulations are often completely unrelated to the intended effects (Clemens et al., 2020; Devine 
& Barnhill, 2018; Ferguson, 2001). It is true that the data reported here provide some evidence 
that memories can be adaptive and maladaptive in ways that parallel each other on directive, self, 
and social functions. But it is still possible that autobiographical memories have other 
maladaptive effects we did not measure. 
How, then, might we develop appropriate, fine-grained measures of maladaptive 
functions? Although we could adapt an established measure of functions such as the TALE by 
creating “maladaptive” items that parallel the adaptive ones, this approach relies on the dubious 
assumption that the three-function model captures maladaptive functions well. For this reason, it 
might be better to start with a bottom-up approach. One reasonable starting point would be to ask 
people to list all the ways a given memory is harmful to them, and then collate common 
responses to guide scale development. This kind of bottom-up approach has been used before in 
the autobiographical memory literature. For instance, the Reminiscence Functions Scale—a fine-
grained measure of memory functions—was developed by asking people to write, in their own 
words, the various reasons why they reminisce (Webster, 1993). Subjects’ responses were then 
collated, and common reasons were used to craft a set of scale items. The Reminiscence 
Function Scale does not measure maladaptive usage because it was created using prompts that 
would probably have encouraged people to consider adaptive usage (“what purpose does 
reminiscence fulfill, or, what goal does retrieving certain memories help you accomplish?”). But 
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a similar approach could be used to develop a measure of maladaptive functions if subjects were 
explicitly asked to think of the ways in which their memories cause them harm. 
Factors that drive memories to serve functions 
Belief 
Finally, our findings have implications for our understanding of the factors that drive 
memories to serve functions. In our third set of experiments, we found that retracted memories—
that is, memories people no longer believe—continue to serve directive, self, and social 
functions, much like memories people still believe. These findings suggest that it might not be 
important for people to believe a memory in order for that memory to serve functions. 
In the case of the directive function, it makes sense that belief would not always be 
critical for this function. After all, one does not need to have personally experienced an event to 
learn lessons from that event. People regularly imagine events that might happen in the future 
and use these imagined events to guide their decisions, even though they may never come to pass 
(Sanson et al., 2018). People also glean useful lessons from other people’s experiences, and even 
from fictional stories (Pillemer et al., 2015; Yang, 2018). Moreover, as our fourth set of 
experiments show, collectives use memories of historical events that happened lifetimes ago to 
guide the decision making of the collective. In a similar way, retracted memories might provide 
valuable lessons even though the events did not really happen. For example, one subject’s 
retracted memory of a metal shard flying into his eye during renovations could impart a useful 
warning about the dangers of not wearing eye protection, even though the accident did not really 
happen. Still, there might be some situations in which people’s belief in a memory is important 
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for the directive functions that memory serves. Take the case of Beth Rutherford discussed 
earlier. Having come to believe she had been raped by her father, Rutherford cut all contact with 
her family and anyone else who did not believe her allegations—clear examples of a directive 
function. But after she learned that her memory was false, Rutherford reconnected with her 
family and rebuilt her relationship with her father. It seems unlikely Rutherford would have 
taken these steps had she still believed her father had raped her, which suggests Rutherford’s 
belief in her memory was important for the directive functions it served. Perhaps, then, belief is 
important for some instances of the directive function, but not others—a possibility that fine-
grained measures of maladaptive functions might be able to address. 
It is also plausible that memories could serve social functions without people believing 
the memories. After all, something does not need to be true for it to be an engaging or interesting 
topic of conversation. Indeed, people often talk to others about fictional stories they have read in 
books or seen in movies (Storey, 2010). There is also evidence that people sometimes discuss 
news they know to be fake on social media (Brummette et al., 2018). In some cases, then, people 
might continue sharing a story with others even though they no longer believe it to be true. 
People might also talk about the memory with others to figure out what really happened. 
Consistent with this idea, the most common reason people point to for retracting a memory is 
because a family member or friend told them their memory is wrong (Mazzoni et al., 2010). 
Finally, the very fact that a memory turned out to be false might make it worthy of sharing with 
others. For example, people might share the memory as a warning to others that memory is 
fallible, or simply because it makes for an interesting story. For all these reasons, people might 
continue to share memories with others in ways that serve social functions even after the 
memories are retracted. 
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It is less clear, however, why memories would serve self functions in the absence of 
belief. On the face of it, it seems counter-intuitive that people would draw on events that never 
really happened to inform their sense of self. But there are at least two reasons why people might 
think their retracted memories serve self functions. First, when people endorse self-function 
items like “this memory tells me something about my identity,” it might not be the events 
portrayed in the memory per se that are shaping their identity, but rather the knowledge that they 
had come to believe in something that never happened. For instance, a retracted memory might 
lead people to think they are stupid to have made such an error, or to conclude they have an 
unreliable memory. Second, it is possible that retracted memories had shaped elements of 
people’s identity while those memories were still believed, and that these elements remain even 
after the memory has been retracted. Take Beth Rutherford, who became strongly religious after 
coming to believe her father raped her. Just because she realised her memory was false does not 
mean she would necessarily discard such an integral part of her identity—even though the false 
memory contributed to that identity. One way to tease apart these possibilities would be to ask 
people to report, in their own words, how their retracted memory has shaped their identity, and to 
code these responses according to which explanation (if either) they support. 
Phenomenology 
Although we found no strong evidence that belief is related to the functions people’s 
memories serve, we did find evidence in our third set of experiments that these functions are 
related to the phenomenology of people’s memories. More specifically, the more strongly a 
memory was accompanied by a sense of reliving, the more it tended to serve directive and self 
functions. These findings support theoretical accounts that suggest episodic information is 
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important for memories to serve directive functions because this information provides useful 
memory cues and contains information that can aid problem solving and decision making 
(Madore & Schacter, 2014; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009; Sheldon et al., 2011). Theoretical 
accounts of the self function place less importance on episodic information, and instead 
emphasise the role of the self-related semantic knowledge that these memories contain (Conway, 
2005). For instance, people use specific memories to build a narrative of their life story 
(McAdams, 2001). This life story narrative is semantic and does not necessarily include episodic 
information. Nonetheless, episodic information might still play a role in the self function. Being 
able to relive past experiences might make people feel connected to their past selves, which in 
turn gives people a sense of self-continuity (Sokol et al., 2017). As for the social function, it is 
puzzling that we found no relationship between a sense of reliving and this function. This finding 
conflicts with theoretical accounts of the social function, which suggest that episodic information 
allows people to share their experiences in ways that are engaging and easy for listeners to 
comprehend and empathise with (Cohen, 1998; Pillemer, 1992). It is possible that this 
unexpected finding is a consequence of how we measured social functions. We asked people to 
report the degree to which they “share this memory with other people in ways that help/hurt me.” 
Because this measure does not explicitly ask subjects about how listeners responded to the 
memory, it may not be sensitive to the relationship between episodic information and listeners’ 
comprehension and engagement. 
Given we found relationships between reliving and the directive and self functions, why 
did we not find similar relationships between these functions and the vividness of the memory? 
In Experiments 3 and 4 of our third manuscript, we found no evidence that vividness is related to 
functions after controlling for reliving and belief. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
  205  
asking people about the extent to which they experience a sense of reliving broadly captures the 
phenomenological experience of remembering, while asking about vividness captures only one 
aspect of that phenomenological experience. In other words, vividness could be thought of as a 
subset of what reliving captures. If this explanation is correct, it would be unsurprising that 
vividness explains little variance in functions over and above the variance explained by reliving. 
Such a possibility does not necessarily suggest vividness is unrelated to memory functions, 
though. Indeed, when we examined the raw correlations between vividness and functions, we 
found small positive correlations between vividness and both directive and self functions, 
rdirective(594) = 0.14 [0.06, 0.22], rself(594) = 0.15 [0.07, 0.22]. Still, the fact that reliving was a 
significant predictor of functions even after controlling for vividness suggests that a sense of 
reliving is a better predictor of memory functions than vividness. 
Limitations 
A critic might argue that our measures did not truly tap into the extent to which people’s 
memories are adaptive, because they do not measure the effects of these memories on survival. 
Our measures show people believe their memories are sometimes helpful and sometimes harmful 
in their everyday life, but that does not necessarily mean the memories have direct effects on 
survival. It would, of course, be difficult to measure the evolutionary adaptivity of people’s 
autobiographical memories; we can measure only the ways in which memories affect people in 
the contexts of modern society. There is no guarantee that the ways in which people’s 
autobiographical memories affect them today reflect the functions that autobiographical 
memories served during human evolution. Therefore, studies of memory functions might be 
better, as some have suggested, to frame their findings in terms of how people use their memory 
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in today’s world, rather than attempting to draw conclusions about the functions 
autobiographical memories evolved to serve (Bluck & Alea, 2011). Yet autobiographical 
memories are, almost certainly, a product of evolution, and considering the functions these 
memories evolved to serve might still generate useful questions and hypotheses (Baddeley, 1988; 
Neisser, 1978). For instance, the hypothesis that memories might have evolved to help people 
imagine the future has generated a large body of work investigating the relationships between 
memory and imagination (Addis et al., 2007; Mullally & Maguire, 2014). For this reason, it is 
important that researchers do not ignore the evolutionary roots of autobiographical memory. 
One limitation that cuts across the experiments presented here is that we relied on self-
report measures of function. Self-report measures are common in the autobiographical memory 
literature, but there are issues with relying on them (Bluck & Alea, 2011; Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2009). An inherent assumption of using a self-report approach is that people’s reports 
about the functions of their memories align relatively closely with the functions those memories 
actually serve. But it is unlikely this assumption always holds (Banaji & Crowder, 1989). 
For one thing, self-report measures of function are almost always retrospective—that is, 
people are asked to report the functions their memories have served in the past, rather than the 
functions the memories are serving right now. Therefore, people’s reports of functions are 
subject to the various errors and biases that plague other retrospective judgments (Kihlstrom et 
al., 2000). For example, recent memories tend to be more accessible than distant memories, and 
therefore tend to have greater sway over people’s judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . As 
a result, people’s ratings of functions might be disproportionately influenced by recent instances 
of the memory serving a function. 
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In addition, people’s judgments about their memories can be biased by their general 
schemas and beliefs about memory (Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Conway et al., 2004; Johnson & 
Sherman, 1990). If, as our second set of experiments suggests, people tend to believe that 
negative events will have negative consequences, they might be prone to overestimate how 
maladaptive their negative memories tend to be. Confirmation bias may also play into these 
judgments—if, for example, people believe a particular memory tends to be maladaptive, they 
will tend to search for evidence that supports this belief and rationalize or ignore evidence to the 
contrary (Mynatt et al., 1977). 
There is also specific evidence to suggest people might underestimate the extent to which 
their memories serve functions. Studies show that people often forget instances in which they 
have brought a memory to mind—a phenomenon known as the forgot-it-all-along effect (Arnold 
& Lindsay, 2002; Schooler et al., 1997). If people struggle to remember all the occasions in 
which they brought a memory to mind to guide their behavior or identity, it stands to reason they 
would rate functions lower than they should. 
Finally, there might be situations in which people have difficulty evaluating the extent to 
which a memory has had helpful or harmful effects. Take, for instance, someone who has a 
memory of being attacked by a dog in childhood and for whom the memory evokes a feeling of 
anxiety when she brings it to mind. This person might believe the memory is serving a 
maladaptive directive function because the feeling of anxiety is unpleasant. Yet this anxiety 
might have unrecognised benefits—motivating her to avoid potentially dangerous dogs and 
preparing her fight-or-flight response. 
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For all these reasons, self-report measures of function might not accurately capture the 
functions of people’s autobiographical memories. But these limitations do not mean these data 
are uninformative. Although we cannot be sure people’s negative memories are really serving 
functions in the way they reported in the experiments reported here, our findings generate a 
useful hypothesis for researchers to test: that the functions of autobiographical memory 
sometimes produce maladaptive outcomes. But it is vital that this hypothesis is tested using 
behavioral measures of function.  
There are paradigms in the literature that could be used to achieve this aim. For example, 
some studies investigating social functions have asked pairs of subjects to engage in 
conversations (Klein et al., 2010). The researchers then either monitor or manipulate whether the 
subjects share autobiographical memories during the conversation. Finally, the researchers ask 
both the sharer and the listener to evaluate their conversational partner. Using this paradigm, 
researchers can directly measure the effects of sharing autobiographical memories on the 
relationship between the two subjects, which allows them to search for circumstances in which 
sharing a memory might harm the relationship. Similarly, researchers could investigate the 
directive function by asking people to recall either a specific autobiographical memory or more 
general semantic information, and then measuring the effects of the recalled information on 
people’s decision making (see Sheldon et al., 2011). By requiring subjects to recall a memory 
that the researchers know might lead the subjects astray, this paradigm could provide more 
robust evidence that memories can serve maladaptive directive functions. Collecting behavioral 
measures of the self function is somewhat difficult because of the introspective nature of the self. 
But it might be fruitful to ask subjects to recall a specific memory of a past success or failure and 
then measure the effects of that recall by having subjects rate themselves on various personality 
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traits. Ultimately, a variety of methods will be needed to provide a full understanding of the 
functions of autobiographical memory. 
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Appendix A: Supplemental Materials for Manuscript 1 (Chapter 2) 
Experiment 1 
Memory prompt 
“For this study, we are interested in some of the memories from your life.  
A memory is defined as the memory of a single event that took place within 24 hours at a 
specific time and place that you personally experienced.  
--page break-- 
A human life consists of many emotional and less emotional events. Some events become highly 
significant to your personal life story, whereas others are forgotten. From where you are in your 
life right now, some events may stand out as your most negative[positive] memories.  
Now imagine that you have to choose between these memories. What is your most 
negative[positive] memory?  
 
Please describe your most negative memory in a few brief sentences. Please be assured that your 
answers are confidential. Don't give us any identifying information. And, of course, feel free to 
leave out details that you don't wish to share.” 
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Erase Instructions 
"Suppose that you could permanently erase this memory. If you erased this memory, you 
would not be able to re--experience it again. That is, you would not be able to bring to mind 
any aspect or aspects of what happened. You would also not be able to bring to mind what you 
experienced at the time of the event. In other words, the visual images, feelings, and particular 
associations with other experiences would be gone.  
Now imagine you were able to use this service." 
 
Individual Function Correlations 
 
Helpful function Cronbach’s alpha: 0.83, 95% CI [0.8, 0.85] 
Hurtful function Cronbach’s alpha: 0.86, 95% CI [0.84, 0.88]  
Measure Directive Helpful 
Self 
Helpful 
Social  
Helpful 
Social 
Identity  
Helpful 
Directive 
Hurtful Self  Hurtful 
Social  
Hurtful 
Social 
Identity  
Hurtful 
Directive  
Helpful - 
       
Self 
Helpful 0.71 - 
      
Social 
Helpful 0.48 0.50 - 
     
Social Identity  
Helpful 0.48 0.49 0.62 -     
Directive 
Hurtful -0.46 -0.41 -0.36 -0.46 -    
Self 
Hurtful -0.32 -0.32 -0.33 -0.42 0.82 -   
Social 
Hurtful -0.19 -0.21 -0.09 -0.20 0.54 0.56 -  
Social Identity 
Hurtful -0.29 -0.33 -0.39 -0.58 0.67 0.66 0.45 - 
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Plots of individual functions 
 
     
 
  
Directive Function Self Function 
Social Function Social Identity Function 
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Likelihood of Erasing 
If you could actually erase[save] this memory, how likely would you be to do that? (1 = Not at 
all likely, 7 = Extremely likely)  
Negative Memories 
 
Positive Memories  
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Experiment 2  
Memory Prompt Instructions 
" For this study, we are interested in some of the memories from your life.  
A memory is defined as the memory of a single event that took place within 24 hours at a 
specific time and place that you personally experienced.  
--page break-- 
A human life consists of many emotional and less emotional events. Some events become highly 
significant to your personal life story, whereas others are forgotten. From where you are in your 
life right now, some events may stand out as your most negative[positive] memories.  
Now imagine that you have to choose between these memories. What are your five most 
negative[positive] memories? 
 
Please describe your five memories in a few brief sentences. Please be assured that your answers 
are confidential. Don't give us any identifying information. And, of course, feel free to leave out 
details that you don't wish to share." 
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Erase & Save Instructions 
Save Instructions 
“Suppose that you could permanently save one specific memory. If you saved that memory 
you would save whatever information you currently have about that event, and be able to re- 
experience it whenever you wanted to. That is, you would be able to bring to mind some aspect 
or aspects of what happened. You would also be able to bring to mind what you experienced at 
the time of the event. In other words, the saved memory would enable you to bring back to mind 
visual images, feelings, and particular associations with other experiences even if you lost your 
memory for all other life experiences.” 
   
Erase Instructions 
“Suppose that you could permanently erase one specific memory. If you erased that memory 
you would not be able to re-experience it again. That is, you would not be able to bring to 
mind any aspect or aspects of what happened. You would also not be able to bring to mind what 
you experienced at the time of the event. In other words, the visual images, feelings, and 
particular associations with other experiences would be gone.” 
Memory selection instructions 
Now imagine you were able to use this service.  
Which memory would you be most likely to erase[save]?  
[all 5 memory descriptions fed back as a forced choice selection] 
Which memory would you be least likely to erase[save]?  
[all 5 memory descriptions fed back as a forced choice selection] 
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Plots of individual functions 
Error bars indicate 95% CIs of the cell means. 
Directive Erase Plot 
 
Directive Save Plot 
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Self Erase Plot 
 
Self Save Plot 
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Social Erase Plot 
 
Social Save Plot 
 
  
  241  
Social Identity Erase Plot 
 
Social Identity Save Plot 
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Likelihood of Saving/Erasing 
 
 
 
  
Valence Condition M SD 95% CI 
Negative Most likely to erase 5.46 1.89 [5.07, 5.85] 
 Least likely to erase 2.96 1.90 [2.57, 3.35] 
 Most likely to save 4.35 2.12 [3.98, 4.73] 
 Least likely to save 2.12 1.81 [1.80, 2.44] 
Positive Most likely to erase 2.58 2.00 [2.20, 2.97] 
 Least likely to erase 1.45 1.26 [1.20, 1.69] 
 Most likely to save 6.49 1.07 [6.26, 6.71] 
 Least likely to save 4.77 1.79 [4.39, 5.15] 
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Appendix B: Supplemental Materials for Manuscript 2 (Chapter 3) 
Memory reports 
Car crash 
I was driving to school early in the morning. I began nodding off on the highway. I was two or 
three blocks from school and I fell asleep on a long straight road. When I woke up, I had crashed 
through a barbed wire fence and into a telephone pole. My shirt was bloodied. I was crying. The 
smell of the engine fluids just permeated. I was taken to the hospital. No serious injuries, but I 
was rather lucky to be alive. (82 words) 
Father suicide 
My father has had some issues with drinking and had recently gotten into a toxic relationship 
with a woman. We got the call that he had a big fight with his girlfriend and said he was going to 
kill himself. We called the cops and tried to find him. We ended up locating him at a local 
fishing spot. He had gone out in the woods and was sitting on a log. When the cops got close to 
him, he saw them and put the gun to his head and pulled the trigger. (93 words) 
Friend drowned 
Some friends and I were at the river and a friend of ours decided to dive in. The water wasn’t as 
deep as we thought and he went head first into some rocks. He didn’t come up from the water, so 
we went and got him and he wasn’t breathing. We called 911 and they came and pronounced him 
dead. (60 words) 
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Tornado (Experiment 1 only) 
I was six years old and was staying with my grandmother at the time. I was not in school, and 
she was sick at the time. I remember that the hail was as big as softballs, and I remember granny 
said to get to the center of a room and get away from the windows. Then I heard her say “oh my, 
it’s coming toward us.” I just looked out the window in the kitchen and there was a big black 
tornado coming right toward the house. She grabbed me and put me behind a sofa, against a wall. 
The noise did not sound like a train at all, it was a noise that was so loud that nothing can 
compare to it. I felt the wall against my back give a little, and granny said “it’s going to be 
okay.” I was screaming so loud I could hardly hear her. And then, all at once, it was still—no 
noise. We got up, and it was gone. (168 words) 
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Results broken down by memory report 
On the whole, we found similar patterns across the different events. But there were some notable 
differences. In Experiments 1 and 2 the effects of the growth consequence were more 
pronounced in the tornado and friend drowned memory reports than in the father suicide and car 
crash reports. In addition, subjects rated the car crash and tornado events as less negative overall 
than the friend drowned and father suicide events. In Experiment 3, we found an effect of the 
harm consequence for the car crash and friend drowned reports, but no effect of the growth 
consequence. By contrast, for the father suicide report we found an effect of the growth 
consequence but no effect of the harm consequence. But given the small number of people in 
each cell when analyzing the memory reports separately, we are reluctant to draw conclusions 
from these differences. 
Experiment 1 
Car Crash 
 
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, although 
these differences were plausibly no different from zero, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.38, 
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0.70]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.45 [-0.07, 0.98]. Subjects who read the harm consequence rated the 
event as slightly less negative than subjects who read nothing about consequences, although this 
difference was plausibly no different from zero, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.30 [-0.22, 0.81]. 
We found a similar pattern when we turned to subjects’ ratings of P7’s feelings at the time of the 
event, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.83, 95% CI [0.06, 1.60]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.62 [-0.12, 1.37]. Here, 
though, subjects who read the harm consequence rated P7’s feelings at the time as slightly more 
negative than subjects who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.21 [-0.53, 0.94]. 
Father Suicide 
 
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, although 
these differences were plausibly no different from zero, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.11, 
0.46]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.20 [-0.09, 0.50]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 
0.03 [-0.27, 0.33]. 
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We found a similar pattern when we turned to subjects’ ratings of P7’s feelings at the time of the 
event, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.50, 95% CI [-0.06, 1.06]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.56 [-0.03, 1.14]; 
Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.06 [-0.54, 0.66]. 
Friend Drowned 
 
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, although 
these differences were plausibly no different from zero, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.25, 95% CI [-0.06, 
0.57]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.25 [-0.06, 0.55]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(harm-control) = 
0.01 [-0.29, 0.30]. 
Similarly, we found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated P7’s feelings at the 
time as substantially less negative than subjects who read the harm consequence or who read 
nothing about consequences Mdiff(harm-growth) = 1.39, 95% CI [0.77, 2.01]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 1.29 
[0.68, 1.89]. The difference between subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who 
read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.10 [-0.49, 0.70]. 
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Tornado 
 
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-
growth) = 1.05, 95% CI [0.46, 1.64]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 1.15 [0.53, 1.77]. The difference between 
subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was 
trivial, Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.10 [-0.54, 0.74]. 
Similarly, we found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated P7’s feelings at the 
time as substantially less negative than subjects who read the harm consequence or who read 
nothing about consequences Mdiff(harm-growth) = 1.18, 95% CI [0.60, 1.76]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.65 
[0.04, 1.25]. The difference between subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who 
read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.53 [-0.10, 1.16]. 
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Experiment 2 
Car Crash 
 
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-
growth) = 1.01, 95% CI [0.59, 1.43]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.98 [0.54, 1.42]. The difference between 
subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was 
trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.03 [-0.39, 0.45]. 
We found a similar pattern when we turned to subjects’ ratings of P7’s feelings at the time of the 
event, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.72, 95% CI [0.29, 1.16]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.74 [0.28, 1.19]; Mdiff(control-
harm) = 0.01 [-0.42, 0.45]. 
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Father Suicide 
 
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-
growth) = 0.41, 95% CI [0.11, 0.71]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.42 [0.15, 0.68]. The difference between 
subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was 
trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.00 [-0.27, 0.28]. 
We found a similar pattern when we turned to subjects’ ratings of P7’s feelings at the time of the 
event, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.45, 95% CI [0.09, 0.81]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.39 [0.07, 0.71]; Mdiff(control-
harm) = 0.06 [-0.27, 0.39]. 
Friend Drowned 
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We found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated the event as less negative than 
subjects who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-
growth) = 0.55, 95% CI [0.27, 0.83]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.50 [0.23, 0.78]. The difference between 
subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was 
trivial, Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.05 [-0.27, 0.36]. 
We found a similar pattern when we turned to subjects’ ratings of P7’s feelings at the time of the 
event, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.56, 95% CI [0.18, 0.94]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.33 [-0.04, 0.71]; 
Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.22 [-0.20, 0.64]. 
Experiment 3 
Car Crash 
  
We found that subjects who read the harm consequence thought that P7 would have experienced 
more intense symptoms of distress in the months following the event than subjects who read the 
growth consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 12.11, 95% CI 
[4.82, 19.41]; Mdiff(harm-control) = 11.82 [3.63, 20.00]. The difference between subjects who read the 
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growth consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(control-
growth) = 0.29 [-7.00, 7.59]. 
 
Father Suicide 
  
We found that subjects who read the growth consequence thought that P7 would have 
experienced less intense symptoms of distress in the months following the event than subjects 
who read the harm consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 
12.09, 95% CI [4.42, 19.76]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 12.20 [4.31, 20.08]. The difference between 
subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was 
trivial, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.11 [-7.41, 7.62]. 
Friend Drowned 
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We found that subjects who read the harm consequence thought that P7 would have experienced 
more intense symptoms of distress in the months following the event than subjects who read the 
growth consequence or who read nothing about consequences, although these differences were 
plausibly no different than zero, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.55, 95% CI [0.27, 0.83]; Mdiff(harm-control) = 
0.05 [-0.27, 0.36]. The difference between subjects who read the growth consequence and 
subjects who read nothing about consequences was trivial, Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.50 [0.23, 0.78]. 
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Pilot study 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 1983 subjects from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. From these subjects, we excluded 
175 who failed the attention check, leaving us with our final sample of 1808 subjects. 
Procedure 
In this pilot study, we piloted two sets of consequences. The first set ultimately formed the basis 
for the consequences we used in Experiment 1 (“Through this experience, I discovered that I’m 
stronger than I thought I was.” and “Through this experience, I discovered that I’m not as strong 
as I thought I was.) and the second set formed the basis for the consequences we used in 
Experiments 2 and 3 (”Because of this experience, I ultimately became a better person." and 
“Because of this experience, I ultimately became a worse person.”). We created these 
consequences by adapting items from the Post-traumatic Growth Inventory (Cann et al., 2010). 
Subjects read one of the four memory reports used in the main experiments. As in the main 
experiments, we manipulated what consequences, if any, were reported at the end of this 
memory report. To do so, we first divided subjects into three groups: one group who would read 
that P7 grew from the experience, one group who would read that P7 was harmed by the 
experience, and one group who would read nothing about consequences. Of the subjects who 
read that P7 grew, half of those subjects read the growth sentence from the first set, and half read 
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the growth sentence from the second set. Likewise, of the subjects who read that P7 was harmed, 
half of those subjects read the harm sentence from the first set, and half read the harm sentence 
from the second set. 
Once subjects had read the memory report, they rated how plausible it is that P7 really 
experienced the event, how clear they found the story in P7’s description, and how well they 
understood what happened in the event P7 described, all on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 
(Completely). We also included an attention check in this ratings block and excluded subjects 
who failed it. 
Results 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of subjects’ ratings of 
plausibility, clarity, and understanding. 
Ending Plausibility Clarity Understanding 
Not as strong as I 
thought 
5.93 (1.29) 6.17 (1.10) 6.36 (0.97) 
Stronger than I thought 5.91 (1.29) 6.08 (1.09) 6.21 (1.07) 
Control 5.71 (1.39) 5.97 (1.16) 6.17 (1.08) 
Became a worse person 6.09 (1.16) 6.29 (0.92) 6.42 (0.82) 
Became a better person 6.05 (1.18) 6.18 (1.00) 6.26 (0.94) 
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Results including subjects who failed to identify the ending sentence they read 
Experiment 1 
 
Considering subjects’ ratings of the valence of the event, we found that subjects who read the 
growth consequence rated the event itself as less negative than subjects who read the harm 
consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(growth-harm) = 0.35 [0.08 , 0.62]; 
Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.46 [0.19, 0.73]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was plausibly no different from 
zero Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.11 [-0.16, 0.38]. 
Likewise, we found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated P7’s feelings at the 
time of the event as being less negative than subjects who read the harm consequence or who 
read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(growth-harm) = 0.81 [0.48 , 1.14], Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.65 
[0.32, 0.98]. The difference between subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who 
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read nothing about consequences was plausibly no different from zero, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.17 [-
0.16, 0.49]. 
Experiment 2 
 
Considering subjects’ ratings of the valence of the event, we found that subjects who read the 
growth consequence rated the event itself as less negative than subjects who read the harm 
consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(growth-harm) = 0.55 [0.34 , 0.75], 
Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.54 [0.34, 0.74]. The difference between subjects who read the harm 
consequence and subjects who read nothing about consequences was plausibly no different from 
zero, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.00 [-0.20, 0.21]. 
Likewise, we found that subjects who read the growth consequence rated P7’s feelings at the 
time of the event as being less negative than subjects who read the harm consequence or who 
read nothing about consequences, although this latter difference was plausibly no different than 
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zero, Mdiff(growth-harm) = 0.31 [0.02 , 0.60], Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.28 [-0.01, 0.56]). The difference 
between subjects who read the harm consequence and subjects who read nothing about 
consequences was plausibly no different from zero, Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.03 [-0.26, 0.32]. 
Experiment 3 
 
Subjects who read the growth consequence thought P7 would have experienced less intense 
symptoms of distress in the months following the event than subjects who read the harm 
consequence or who read nothing about consequences, Mdiff(harm-growth) = 10.68 [6.37 , 14.98]; 
Mdiff(control-growth) = 5.82 [1.49, 10.15]. These results suggest that subjects were using P7’s report 
of growth to make appraisals about his or her symptoms of distress in the months following the 
event—consistent with the findings from the first two Experiments. Furthermore, we found that 
subjects who read the harm consequence thought that P7 would have experienced more intense 
symptoms of distress in the months following the event than subjects who read nothing about 
consequences, Mdiff(harm-control) = 5.82 [0.45, 9.25]. 
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Personality rating results 
Adapted Ten Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003) 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to Participant 7. For each 
statement, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to Participant 7, even if one 
characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
I see Participant 7 as extraverted, enthusiastic  
I see Participant 7 as critical, quarrelsome  
I see Participant 7 as dependable, self-disciplined  
I see Participant 7 as anxious, easily upset  
I see Participant 7 as open to new experiences, complex  
I see Participant 7 as reserved, quiet  
I see Participant 7 as sympathetic, warm  
I see Participant 7 as disorganized, careless  
I see Participant 7 as calm, emotionally stable  
I see Participant 7 as conventional, uncreative  
All items rated from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
Subscales 
Extraversion: 1, 6 (reversed) 
Agreeableness: 2 (reversed), 7 
Conscientiousness: 3, 8 (reversed) 
Emotional Stability: 4 (reversed), 9 
Openness: 5, 10 (reversed) 
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Results 
Condition 
Emotional 
Stability Extraversion Conscientiousness Agreeableness Openness 
Harm 3.86 (1.34) 3.77 (1.13) 4.16 (1.28) 5.00 (1.03) 4.21 (0.89) 
Control 4.28 (1.21) 4 (1.08) 4.16 (1.19) 4.84 (1.06) 4.34 (0.87) 
Growth 4.69 (1.30) 4.07 (1.12) 4.61 (1.50) 4.96 (1.07) 4.54 (0.98) 
We found that, compared to subjects who read nothing about consequences, subjects who read 
the growth consequence rated P7 as more emotionally stable, and subjects who read the harm 
consequence rated P7 as less emotionally stable, Mdiff(growth-control) = 0.41, 95% CI [0.11, 0.72], 
Mdiff(control-harm) = 0.41 [0.10, 0.72]. These results suggest that when someone reports that a 
negative event helped them grow, others use that report as evidence of emotional stability. 
Conversely, when someone reports that a negative event caused them harm, the results suggest 
that others use that report as evidence of a lack of emotional stability. 
  
Violin plots of subjects’ personality ratings split by condition. Dots represent individual data points, 
diamonds represent the cell means, and error bars represent the 95% CI around the cell means. 
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Intensity results 
Experiment 1 
 
Considering subjects’ ratings of the intensity of the event itself, the effects of the consequences 
on subjects’ ratings of the intensity of the event were plausibly no different than zero (Mdiff(harm-
growth) = 0.14 [-0.06 , 0.33]; (Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.02 [-0.18, 0.22]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.12 [-0.08, 
0.31]). 
Considering subjects’ ratings of the intensity of P7’s feelings at the time, we found that subjects 
who read the harm consequence rated P7’s feelings at the time of the event as being more intense 
than when P7 reported harm or reported nothing about consequences (Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.38 [0.04 
, 0.72]; Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.39 [0.05, 0.74]). The difference between when P7 reported growth and 
when P7 reported nothing about consequences was plausibly no different from zero (Mdiff(growth-
control) = 0.01 [-0.33, 0.36]). 
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Experiment 2 
 
Considering subjects’ ratings of the intensity of the event itself, the effects of the consequences 
on subjects’ ratings of the intensity of the event were plausibly no different than zero (Mdiff(harm-
growth) = 0.19 [-0.00 , 0.37]; (Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.04 [-0.15, 0.23]; Mdiff(control-growth) = 0.15 [-0.04, 
0.33]). 
Likewise, considering subjects’ ratings of the intensity of P7’s feelings at the time, the effects of 
the consequences on subjects’ ratings of the intensity of the event were plausibly no different 
than zero (Mdiff(harm-growth) = 0.07 [-0.22 , 0.36]; Mdiff(harm-control) = 0.12 [-0.17, 0.41]; (Mdiff(growth-
control) = 0.05 [-0.23, 0.33]). 
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Adapted Impact of Events Scale - Revised (Weiss, 2007) 
Item Subscale 
Any reminder brought back feelings about it Intrusion 
I had trouble staying asleep Intrusion 
Other things kept making me think about it Intrusion 
I felt irritable and angry Hyperarousal 
I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about it or was reminded of it Avoidance 
I thought about it when I didn’t mean to Intrusion 
I felt as if it hadn’t happened or wasn’t real Avoidance 
I stayed away from reminders about it Avoidance 
Pictures about it popped into my mind Intrusion 
I was jumpy and easily startled Hyperarousal 
I tried not to think about it Avoidance 
I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it, but I didn’t deal with them Avoidance 
My feelings about it were kind of numb Avoidance 
I found myself acting or feeling like I was back at that time Hyperarousal 
I had trouble falling asleep Hyperarousal 
I had waves of strong feelings about it Intrusion 
I tried to remove it from my memory Avoidance 
I had trouble concentrating Hyperarousal 
Reminders of it caused me to have physical reactions, such as sweating, trouble 
breathing, nausea, or a pounding heart Hyperarousal 
I had dreams about it Intrusion 
I felt watchful and on guard Hyperarousal 
I tried not to talk about it Avoidance 
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Symptom subscale results 
 
Violin plots of symptom subscale scores. The maximum intrusions score was 24, the maximum 
avoidance score was 32, and the maximum hyperarousal score was 28. 
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Appendix C: Supplemental Materials for Manuscript 3 (Chapter 4) 
 
Reasons for retracting 
In Experiments 1, 2, and 3, we asked people about their primary reason for retracting their 
retracted memory using one multiple choice question: 
What was the primary reason you stopped believing the event happened?  
• I was told the event never happened  
• I was told the event happened to someone else  
• I was told the event happened differently to how I remember it  
• The event was unrealistic or impossible  
• There was evidence to suggest the event never happened (Experiments 1 and 2 only)  
• There was other evidence to suggest the event never happened (Experiment 3 only)  
• There was no evidence to suggest the event happened  
• Other (please describe) 
Results 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Reason n % n % n % 
I was told the event never happened 13 12.26 44 43.56 113 35.20 
The event was unrealistic or impossible 26 24.53 19 18.81 64 19.94 
There was evidence to suggest the event never 
happened 9 8.49 18 17.82 52 16.20 
There was no evidence to suggest the event 
happened 22 20.75 12 11.88 50 15.58 
I was told the event happened differently to how I 
remember it 18 16.98 3 2.97 26 8.10 
Other 18 16.98 5 4.95 16 4.98 
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Age distributions from Experiments 1 and 2 
Experiment 1 
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Experiment 2 
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Results from Experiment 3 for people who did not have any retracted memories 
Participants who reported they did not have any retracted memories were asked to describe and 
rate two believed memories: one from their early childhood, and one from after age 10. 
Subjects reported strong belief in both their memories from early childhood (M = 6.04, SD = 
1.36) and their memories from after age 10 (M = 6.33, SD = 1.28). 
As the distributions in the figure below show, people reported that their believed memories from 
after age 10 serve helpful functions more than their believed memories from early childhood, 
Mearly childhood = 3.44; Mafter 10 = 2.95; Mdiff = 0.49 [0.30, 0.67]. Likewise, people’s memories from 
after age 10 were slightly more harmful, Mearly childhood = 2.00; Mafter 10 = 1.82; Mdiff = 0.18 [0.04, 
0.32]). 
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Phenomenology results 
Measures 
This memory is significant for my life because it imparts an important message for me or 
represents a critical juncture or turning point. 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are positive 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are negative 
The feelings I experience as I recall the event are intense 
above items rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (To a very high degree) 
 
As I remember the event, I feel as though I am reliving it 
As I remember the event, I can see it in my mind 
As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind 
As I remember the event, I can hear myself or other people talking 
As I remember the event, I know its spatial layout 
As I remember the event, I can recall the setting where it occurred 
above items rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (As if it was happening right now) 
 
As I remember the event, I feel that I travel back to the time it happened 
How vivid and clear is your memory for this event? 
If another witness to the event (who you generally trusted) existed and told you a very different 
account of the event, to what extent could you be persuaded that your memory was wrong? 
above items rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Completely) 
 
  270  
Since it happened, I have talked about the event 
Since it happened, I have deliberately thought about the event 
Since it happened, the event has come to me out of the blue, without my trying to think about it 
above items rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (As often as any event in my life) 
 
Sometimes people know an event happened to them without being able to actually remember it. 
As I think about the event, I can actually remember it rather than just knowing that it happened. 
(1 = Not at all, 7 = As clearly as if it was happening right now) 
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Results  
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Experiment 3 regression with negative feelings as a predictor 
Standardised Beta estimates from the two regressions predicting helpful functions and harmful 
functions respectively, with reliving, vividness, belief, and negative feelings as predictors. 
 Helpful function Harmful function 
Predictor β [95% CI] p β [95% CI] p 
Reliving -0.21 [0.10, 0.33] <.001* -0.03 [-.13, 0.08] .668 
Vividness 0.09 [-0.04, 0.21] .154 0.01 [-0.10, 0.12] .901 
Belief 0.27 [0.19, 0.36] <.001* 0.12 [0.04, 0.20] .029* 
Negative feelings -0.03 [-0.11, 0.51  .587 0.42[0.35, 0.49] <.001* 
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Distributions of belief ratings 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2 
 
 
Retracted memories Believed memories 
Retracted memories Believed memories 
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Experiment 3 
Experiment 4 
 
  
Retracted memories Believed memories 
Doubted memories Believed memories 
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Pilot study with Doubted Memories Prompt 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited workers from the United States and Canada on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform through TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017). Subjects participated in exchange for Amazon 
credit. We aimed to collect data until 50 subjects had completed the survey. Because of the way 
Mechanical Turk interacts with Qualtrics, 52 subjects completed the survey. 
Procedure 
First, we provided subjects with a description of a doubted memory: “Sometimes people have 
doubts about particular memories of their past experiences—that is, they doubt whether the 
events they remember really happened at all.” Then, we asked subjects to describe the memory 
they have the most doubts about. Next, subjects rated their belief in the memory on the three 
items from Rubin et al. (2019). The first of these items was the belief item from Experiments 1-
3. The second was “My memory of the event is an accurate reflection of the event as a neutral 
observer would report it and is not distorted by my beliefs, motives, and expectations” (1 = 100% 
distorted, 7 = 100% accurate). The third was “Would you be confident enough in your memory 
of the event to testify in a court of law?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = As much as any memory). 
  
  276  
Results 
As the figure below shows, our instructions elicited a wide range of memories that are believed 
to various degrees (M = 4.64, SD = 1.62). 
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TALE adapted version 
[memory description fed back to subjects] 
Please keep the above memory in mind while answering the questions below. We are interested 
in the extent to which you think back over or talk about the above event in different situations. 
For each situation below, your task is to indicate how often, when you think or talk about this 
event, you do so for the reasons given. Do not hesitate to use any of the points on the scale. If 
you never think or talk about the event for this reason, circle “Almost never.” Please answer 
every question. I think back over or talk about this event… 
when I want to feel that I am the same person that I was before. 
when I want to remember something that someone else said or did that might help me now. 
when I hope to find out what another person is like. 
when I am concerned about whether I am still the same type of person that I was earlier. 
when I believe that thinking about the past can help guide my future. 
when I am concerned about whether my values have changed over time.  
when I want to try to learn from my past mistakes. 
when I want to develop more intimacy in a relationship. 
when I need to make a life choice and I am uncertain which path to take. 
when I want to remember a lesson I learned in the past. 
when I want to develop a closer relationship with someone. 
when I want to maintain a friendship by sharing memories with friends. 
when I am concerned about whether my beliefs have changed over time. 
when I hope to learn more about another person’s life. 
when I want to understand how I have changed from who I was before. 
All items rated on the following scale: Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very frequently 
Self items: 1,4,6,13,15 Social items: 3,8,11,12,14 Directive items: 2,5,7,9,10 
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Correlations between age during event, length believed, and functions 
Experiment 1 
We found no significant relationship between how long people believed a retracted memory and 
how helpful that memory was, r(104) = -0.18, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.01]. Likewise, we found no 
relationship between how long people believed a retracted memory and how harmful that 
memory was, r(104) = -0.18, 95% CI [-0.36, 0.01]. 
We also found no significant relationship between long ago a memory was retracted and how 
helpful that memory was, r(104) = -0.14, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.05]. Likewise, we found no 
relationship between how long people believed a retracted memory and how harmful that 
memory was, r(104) = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.07]. 
We did, however, find that the older people were when the retracted event “occurred,” the more 
that memory tended to serve helpful and harmful functions, rhelpful(104) = 0.31, 95% CI [0.13, 
0.47]; rharmful(104) = 0.29, 95% CI [0.11, 0.46]. 
Experiment 2 
We found no significant relationship between how long people believed a retracted memory and 
how helpful that memory was, r(99) = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.17]. Likewise, we found no 
relationship between how long people believed a retracted memory and how harmful that 
memory was, r(99) = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.20]. 
We also found no significant relationship between long ago a memory was retracted and how 
helpful that memory was, r(99) = -0.16, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.03]. Likewise, we found no 
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relationship between how long people believed a retracted memory and how harmful that 
memory was, r(99) = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.32, 0.07]. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, we found no significant relationship between the age at which a 
retracted event “occurred” and how helpful or harmful that memory was, rhelpful(99) = 0.06, 95% 
CI [-0.13, 0.26]; rharmful(99) = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.30]. 
Experiment 3 
We found that the longer people had believed a retracted memory, the less helpful that memory 
tended to be, r(319) = -0.19, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.09]. ]. Likewise, the longer people had believed a 
retracted memory, the less harmful that memory tended to be, r(319) = -0.21, 95% CI [-0.31, -
0.10]. One possible explanation for these findings is that memories that were believed for long 
periods also tended to be memories that occurred at very young ages—perhaps, then, these 
memories tend to be less relevant to people’s current thinking and behavior than retracted 
memories that “occurred” more recently. 
We found that the more time had passed since a memory was retracted, the less helpful that 
memory tended to be, r(319) = -0.13, 95% CI [-0.24, -0.02]. Likewise, the more time had passed 
since someone retracted a memory, the less harmful that memory tended to be, r(319) = -0.14, 
95% CI [-0.25, -0.03]. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that the older people were when the retracted event 
“occurred,” the more that memory tended to serve helpful and harmful functions, rhelpful(319) = -
0.19, 95% CI [0.09, 0.30]; rharmful(319) = 0.11, 95% CI [0.01, 0.22]. 
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Appendix D: Supplemental Materials for Manuscript 4 (Chapter 5) 
 
Collective TALE (general version from Experiment 1) 
Sometimes the people of a country think back over, or talk to others about, their country’s history—about 
things that happened quite a long time ago, or more recently. We are not interested in a particular event, 
but more generally in how you think your country brings together and connects the different events and 
periods of its history. Please circle a response to answer these two questions:  
In general, how often do people from your country think back over your country’s history? 
[Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
In general, how often do people from your country talk to others about your country’s history? 
[Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
Next we present a variety of situations. Please circle one response on each scale to indicate how often, 
when people from your country think back over or talk about your country’s history, they do it for the 
reasons given. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not hesitate to use any of the points on the scale. 
If people from your country never think back over or talk about your country’s history for this reason, 
circle “Almost never.” Please answer every question. 
People of my country tend to think back over or talk about certain periods of our history… 
when we want to feel that our country is the same as it was before. 
when we want to remember something that another country said or did that might help us now. 
when we hope to find out what another country is like. 
when we are concerned about whether our country is still the same kind of place that it was earlier. 
when we believe that thinking about our country’s past can help guide our future. 
when we are concerned about whether our values have changed over time. 
when we want to try to learn from our past mistakes. 
when we want to develop a new relationship with another country 
when we need to make an important choice and we are uncertain which path to take. 
when we want to remember a lesson we learned in the past. 
when we want to develop a closer relationship with another country. 
when we want to maintain friendships with other countries by sharing memories with them. 
when we are concerned about whether our beliefs have changed over time. 
when we hope to learn more about another country’s history. 
when we want to understand how we have changed from who we were before. 
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Items rated on the following scale: [Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
Self items: 1, 4, 6, 13, 15  
Social items: 3, 8, 11, 12, 14  
Directive items: 2, 5, 7, 9, 10 
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Collective TALE (specific event version from Experiment 2) 
Below is a description of [event name], an event from American history: 
[event description] 
 
In general, how often do the people of your country think about this event?  
[Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
In general, how often do the people of your country talk about this event?  
[Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
We are interested in the extent to which people of your country think back over or talk about this 
event in different situations. 
For each situation below, your task is to indicate how often, when people from your country 
think or talk about [event name], they do so for the reasons given. Do not hesitate to use any of 
the points on the scale. If people from your country never think or talk about the event for this 
reason, circle “Almost never.” Please answer every question. 
People from my country tend to think back over or talk about [event name] 
when we as a country want to feel that our country is the same as it was before. 
when we as a country want to remember something that another country did that might help us 
now. 
when we as a country hope to find out what another country is like. 
when we as a country are concerned about whether our country is still the same kind of place that 
it was earlier. 
when we as a country believe that thinking about our country’s past can help guide our future. 
when we as a country are concerned about whether our values have changed over time. 
when we as a country want to try to learn from our past mistakes. 
when we as a country want to develop a new relationship with another country. 
when we as a country need to make an important choice and we are uncertain which path to take. 
when we as a country want to remember a lesson we learned in the past. 
when we as a country want to develop a closer relationship with another country. 
when we as a country want to maintain friendships with other countries by sharing memories 
with them. 
when we as a country are concerned about whether our beliefs have changed over time. 
when we as a country hope to learn more about another country’s history. 
when we as a country want to understand how we have changed from who we were before. 
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Items rated on the following scale: [Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very 
Frequently] 
Self items: 1, 4, 6, 13, 15  
Social items: 3, 8, 11, 12, 14  
Directive items: 2, 5, 7, 9, 10 
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Original TALE (Specific event version from Experiment 2) 
We'd like you to bring to mind an important event from any point in your life that has helped 
shape your identity. 
Please describe your memory for that event, in a few sentences.  
[essay text box] 
 
In general, how often do you think about this event? 
[Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
In general, how often do you talk about this event? 
[Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very Frequently] 
 
Now we are interested in the extent to which you think back over or talk about the event you just 
described in different situations.  
For each situation below, your task is to indicate how often, when you think or talk about this 
event, you do so for the reasons given. Do not hesitate to use any of the points on the scale. If 
you never think or talk about the event for this reason, circle ‘‘Almost never.’’ Please answer 
every question.  
I think back over or talk about this event...  
when I want to feel that I am the same person that I was before. 
when I want to remember something that someone else said or did that might help me now. 
when I hope to also find out what another person is like.  
when I am concerned about whether I am still the same type of person that I was earlier.  
when I believe that thinking about the past can help guide my future.  
when I am concerned about whether my values have changed over time. 
when I want to try to learn from my past mistakes.  
when I want to develop more intimacy in a relationship. 
when I need to make a life choice and I am uncertain which path to take.  
when I want to remember a lesson I learned in the past.  
when I want to develop a closer relationship with someone.  
when I want to maintain a friendship by sharing memories with friends.  
  285  
when I am concerned about whether my beliefs have changed over time. 
when I hope to also learn more about another person’s life.  
when I want to understand how I have changed from who I was before. 
 
Items rated on the following scale: [Almost never, Seldom, Occasionally, Often, Very 
Frequently] 
Self items: 1, 4, 6, 13, 15  
Social items: 3, 8, 11, 12, 14  
Directive items: 2, 5, 7, 9, 10 
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Collective TALE Factor Analysis Results 
Experiment 1 
Factor Loadings 
Item 
Factor1: 
Social 
Factor2: 
Self 
Factor3: 
Directive 
Same as before 0.04 0.51 -0.06 
Same kind of place -0.01 0.79 -0.09 
Values changed -0.02 0.96 -0.13 
Beliefs changed -0.02 0.69 0.09 
Changed from before -0.08 0.42 0.36 
Find out about another 0.71 0.05 -0.03 
Develop relationship 0.91 -0.06 -0.05 
Closer relationship 0.85 -0.01 -0.01 
Maintain friendship 0.81 -0.02 -0.05 
Learn about another 0.66 0.00 0.05 
Remember what other 
did 0.62 0.02 0.05 
Guide future 0.02 0.16 0.62 
Learn from mistakes -0.05 -0.08 0.91 
Uncertain path 0.22 0.06 0.45 
Lesson learned -0.02 -0.09 0.92 
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 Factor 1: Social Factor 2: Self Factor 3: Directive 
SS Loadings 3.577   2.505  2.442 
Proportion 
Variance 
explained 
0.238    0.167   0.163 
Cumulative 
Variance 
0.238    0.405 0.568 
    
Factor Correlations 
 Factor1: Social Factor2: Self Factor3: Directive 
Factor1: Social 1.000 0.429 -0.603 
Factor2: Self  1.000 -0.704 
Factor3: Directive   1.000 
 
Hypothesis Test 
Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient. 
The chi square statistic is 177.05 on 63 degrees of freedom. 
The p-value is 8.96e-13  
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Experiment 2 
Factor Loadings 
Item 
Factor1: 
Social 
Factor2: 
Self 
Factor3: 
Directive 
Same as before 0.13 0.40 0.19 
Same kind of place -0.04 0.69 0.11 
Values changed -0.03 0.89 -0.01 
Beliefs changed 0.05 1.02 -0.23 
Changed from before -0.12 0.53 0.39 
Find out about another 0.88 0.06 -0.17 
Develop relationship 0.86 -0.01 -0.02 
Closer relationship 0.86 -0.02 -0.03 
Maintain friendship 0.80 0.01 -0.06 
Learn about another 0.65 -0.10 0.16 
Remember what other 
did 0.63 -0.04 0.19 
Guide future -0.02 0.18 0.68 
Learn from mistakes 0.04 -0.06 0.77 
Uncertain path 0.27 0.29 0.27 
Lesson learned -0.08 0.06 0.83 
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 Factor 1: Social Factor 2: Self Factor 3: Directive 
SS Loadings 3.83 2.90 2.17 
Proportion 
Variance 
explained 
0.26 0.19   0.14 
Cumulative 
Variance 
0.26 0.45 0.59 
 
Factor Correlations 
 Factor1: Social Factor2: Self Factor3: Directive 
Factor1: Social 1.000 -0.45 -0.76 
Factor2: Self  1.000 0.63 
Factor3: Directive   1.000 
 
 
Hypothesis Test 
Test of the hypothesis that 3 factors are sufficient. 
The chi square statistic is 144.17 on 63 degrees of freedom. 
The p-value is 2.65e-08 
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Event Descriptions 
World War 2 
World War 2 (also known as the Second World War) was a global war fought on several fronts 
that was sparked by the Nazi invasion of Poland that lasted from 1939 to 1945. The war was 
fought between the Axis powers (including Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the Allies 
(including France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union).[61 words] 
The Civil War 
The American Civil War was a civil war fought in the United States from 1861 to 1865, between 
the North (the Union) and the South (the Confederacy). The Civil War began primarily as a 
result of the long-standing controversy over the enslavement of black people. [45 words] 
The September 11 Attacks 
The September 11 attacks (also referred to as 9/11) were a series of coordinated terrorist attacks 
by the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda against the United States on the morning of Tuesday, 
September 11, 2001. Two hijacked planes crashed into the North and South towers of the World 
Trade Center in New York City, and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon. [61 words] 
The Declaration of Independence 
The United States Declaration of Independence is a statement adopted in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, in 1776 by the thirteen American colonies at war with the Kingdom of Great 
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Britain. The Declaration announced that the Colonies would regard themselves as thirteen States, 
no longer under British rule. [45 words] 
The Revolutionary War 
The American Revolutionary War (also known as the American War of Independence), was a 
war that lasted from 1775 to 1783. The war was fought between Great Britain and its Thirteen 
American Colonies, which declared independence in 1776 as the United States of America. [44 
words] 
  
